Theorizing State Dispossessive Planning vs. Community Self-Determinative Planning: The Case of the Al-Bostan Palestinian Community Struggle against the Israeli Planning in East Jerusalem

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Abstract (up to 125 words)
The Jerusalem Municipality recently launched the King's Garden Plan to transform Al-Bustan, a Palestinian neighborhood in the heart of East Jerusalem. The Plan called for demolishing Al-Bustan's buildings, displacing its residents, and constructing a park, named after the Biblical King David. The Al-Bustan community objected fiercely to the Plan, resisting it through a political campaign, preparing an alternative plan, and undertaking various measures to prevent their displacement and ensure their continued presence. This paper investigates what I call dispossessive planning, contrasting it with the self-determinative planning developed by communities in response. Dispossessive planning is a regime of practices that dispossesses and displaces relatively disadvantaged groups, weakening the material foundations of their affective and existential security, as it deliberately constructs a new reality. In response, self-determinative planning, as I conceptualize it, involves the development of forms of autonomy in their place, as dispossessed urban populations assert their right to produce and control their spaces of existence autonomously.

Keywords: Planning theory, Palestine, Israel, Jerusalem, Displacement

Introduction

In 2009, the Municipality of Jerusalem launched the King's Garden Plan, to transform Al-Bustan, a Palestinian neighborhood in the heart of East Jerusalem. The Plan called for demolishing Al-Bustan's buildings, displacing its residents, and constructing a park, named after the Biblical King David. The Al-Bustan community objected fiercely to the plan, resisting it through a political campaign, preparing an alternative plan, and undertaking various measures to prevent their displacement and ensure their continued presence.

This paper is based on a longitudinal study that incorporates observation and data collection from 2009 to the present, concerning this spatial conflict between the Palestinian residents and the Israeli Jerusalem Municipality. This paper raises some critical questions regarding state and community planning, the state's planning, and the encounter and conflict between it and the community. It asks what accounts for their differences and interactions. Elaborated with respect to the same place, they present different and conflicting visions of future planning and development, and in some ways are negations of each other. How can we best understand a type of state planning that directly involves the harassment, dispossession, and displacement of disadvantaged groups? And how to best understand the spatial, political, and social actions and protests of the communities facing the state planning, and the encounter between them?

Planning literature has a long history of criticizing the dark side of planning, holding that zoning and land use policies are in many cases unjust, discriminatory or exclusionary, disempowering or disenfranchising, or otherwise doing other harm to, various population groups (i.e. Flyvbjerg, 1996; Gaffikin & Morrissey, 2011; Howitt & Lunkapis, 2010; Huxley, 2010; Rothwell &

Massey, 2009; Scott 1999; Shertzer & Walsh, 2015; Wilson et al., 2008; Yiftachel, 2006). There are also many discussions of alternative planning approaches, such as "advocacy planning" (Davidoff, 1965), "radical planning" (Grabow and Heskin, 1973), "insurgent planning" (Miraftab, 2009), "hegemonic planning" (Jabareen, 2017), and "insurgent informality" (Jabareen and Switat, 2019). However, there is a necessity for more elaboration on how to comprehend best the political, spatial, and social actions and protests of the communities facing state tyrant planning and the encounter between them.

Thus, this paper aims to conceptualize contradictory planning approaches for the state and community, taking into account that they usually are at work simultaneously, in the same place, and in conditions that are deeply conflictual ethnically and politically. It then proposes a methodological framework for capturing, analyzing, and conceptualizing an alternative planning approach rooted in community practices of autonomous self-determination.

I suggest that these respective planning approaches each involve their own specific and coherent 'regime of practices', which can be captured through interrelated 'logics', which function independently to reach convergent ends. By a 'logic' I mean to indicate a specific "kind of statements that we make about phenomena." Thinking through such logics enables us to investigate the "possibilities of phenomena" disclosed in their domain and the statements that can then be made about them in various spatial and temporal contexts (Glynos and Howarth, 2007: 134). In discussing the two types of planning, I will aim to distill their respective logics. Tracing that logic allows us to understand the central ideas and practices involved in the respective type of planning. This means that one goal of empirical work is to identify these logics. Understanding them can certainly help us grasp how the differing approaches relate to each other, what the problems are with currently dominant ones, and what the alternatives might look like.

In this paper, I consider state planning as *dispossessive planning*; it displaces and dispossesses people from their properties (land and dwellings), as it transforms and capitalizes on them through the planning endeavor. Communities encountering the state planning approach may engage, often in response to the former, in *self-determinative planning*, involving (collective) political practices that often begin with, and may aim at, protecting the community from the tyranny of state actions taken through its planning activities. I argue that each of these approaches involves a *specific coherent regime of practice*, which can be understood through its interrelated logics. These logics, as will be seen, are political, spatial, aesthetic, and economic.

The next section of this paper presents the context of the study. The second section deconstructs the state planning currently involved in Al-Bustan, and the third describes the planning efforts developed by the community of residents in response. The fourth section conceptualizes dispossessive and self-determinative planning and presents their logics. The final section discusses the findings and elaborates further on the framework of the architecture of dispossession.

Context of the study and data collection

The case study involved here focuses on Al-Bustan, a Palestinian neighborhood located in East Jerusalem, in the part of the city that was occupied in 1967 by Israel. The 1948 war over Palestine resulted in the establishment of the state of Israel and the displacement of some 780,000 Palestinians (Abu-Lughod, 1971). Jerusalem was divided, West Jerusalem coming under the control of Israel, while East Jerusalem, including the Old City, fell under Jordanian

rule. In 1967, Israel occupied Palestinian East Jerusalem, and in 1980, annexed it through its "Basic Law: Jerusalem, the Capital of Israel," which formally declared the "whole and united" area of East and West Jerusalem to be "the capital of Israel." In response, the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 478, which declared the annexation to be in violation of international law (Mayer and Mourad, 2008).

Jerusalem is thus a divided and conflicted city, and is highly segregated along ethnic lines between Palestinians and Jews. It is a frontier city subject to a deep bi-ethnic conflict around sovereignty, identity, narrative, and territoriality (Bollens, 2000; Jabareen, 2010). Israel's institutional planning, and its judicial and other national institutions, have been working to transform the demographic and territorial structures of East Jerusalem, aiming at control of the eastern part of the city, united under Israeli laws (Jabareen, 2017b; Jabareen et al., 2019; Yacobi, 2015). Since 1967, Israel has converted about 66 percent of the territory of East Jerusalem into open green lands and new neighborhoods built for Jews (Jabareen, 2020). The demography of this part of the city has been dramatically changed, such that about 40 percent of the population today is Jewish (CBS, 2024).

Al-Bustan, a Palestinian neighborhood that is home to 1,500 residents, is located in East Jerusalem near the Old City of Jerusalem, in the city's Holy Basin. The Old City of Jerusalem and the "Holy Basin," which has a rich history involving the three religions (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam), has been a major target for spatial and demographic transformation sine its occupation in 1967. This paper traces the Israeli institutional spatial planning of Al-Bustan and the reaction of its community to these plans, from the occupation of East Jerusalem in 1967 up today (2024).

It does so based empirically on an extensive data collection undertaken over a long period of time. This includes: (a) an analysis of all institutional spatial plans relating to the Al-Bustan neighborhood between 1967 and 2024; (b) an analysis of the alternative spatial plans developed by the Al-Bustan community; (c) a review of collected documents and protocols related to Al-Bustan planning. The sources of data and documents are as follows: (a) the Department of Planning and Infrastructure Administration of Jerusalem Municipality; (b) the Jerusalem Local Planning and Building Committee; (c) the Jerusalem District Planning and Building Committee; (d) the City Engineer of the Jerusalem Municipality; (f) the Al-Bustan Popular Committee, which was established in 2005; (g) the protocols regarding the meetings between the lawyers and planners of the Al-Bustan Popular Committee and the Jerusalem Municipality's representatives; (h) observations from four meetings between the representatives of the Al-Bustan Popular Committee and two consecutive Mayors of the Jerusalem Municipality; (i) observations of community reactions to the Israeli plans for Al-Bustan, which took the form of public meetings and protests in Al-Bustan's Tent of Protest.

The King's Garden Plan

In this section, I discuss the state planning endeavors in the Al-Bustan neighborhood, and specifically the King's Garden Plan, in order to understand the logics behind the planning approach.

Excluding the residents

Between 1948 and 1967, East Jerusalem was controlled by Jordan. During this period, the Municipality of East Jerusalem prepared a Master Plan for the entire eastern section of the city, which designated the area of Al-Bustan for residential use (Rapoport, 2005). However, since its occupation, the Israeli national, district, and local planning institutions, along with the

Jerusalem municipality, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Justice Ministry, have been engaged in concerted efforts to demographically and territorially transform East Jerusalem and its historic areas, including the Holy Basin, where Al-Bustan is located. The idea is, indeed, to ensure a solid Jewish presence in this section of the city.

In 1976, the Jerusalem District Planning and Building Committee approved the plan, 'EM/9-Local Master Plan for Ancient Jerusalem and its Surroundings' (State Controller, 2009: 688). The aim of this plan was to tighten, and put restrictions and obstacles on, the housing and economic development of the Palestinian residents, in order "to protect the urban landscape, and the religious properties of the Jewish religions and others, and to preserve the archeological sites within the area of the plan" (EM/9, 1977: 3). According to the EM/9 Plan, as Figure 1 shows, Palestinian neighborhoods, including Al-Bustan, were designated as "green open spaces" even though they were in fact inhabited (mostly by Palestinians).
Figure 1. Plan no. EM/9

Capitalizing on dispossession
In 1995, the Jerusalem Municipality decided to capitalize on the dispossessed space and make a profit from it. Accordingly, the Jerusalem Municipality and the Ministry of Tourism

established a Steering Committee for Tourism Development in Jerusalem to prepare the city for the "3000 years of the establishment of Jerusalem."[i] The main recommendations were to develop tourism in Jerusalem to transform the city into "the most important tourist center in the Middle East" and make it "an economic lever for tourism development throughout the country" (2015: p. 30).[ii] The committee proposed a plan called *King's Garden: 3000 Years of Jerusalem* (p. 108). About a decade later, the City Engineer of Jerusalem decided to implement the *King's Garden* plan and, thus, to destroy the entire Al-Bustan neighborhood, under the excuse of ending "illegal building in the Garden." The idea was to empty the neighborhood of housing and allow the municipality and the private sector to capitalize on the dispossessed neighborhood, instead of allowing the residents themselves to enjoy and share the benefits of its economic development.

On September 9, 2009, the Knesset's (Israeli parliament's) Finance Committee approved a budget of NIS 600,000 to promote a plan to build a national park in the King's Garden following Safdie's plan. Accordingly, Nir Barakat, the Mayor of Jerusalem, launched *The King's Garden Plan* on March 2, 2010. The plan has been called "a first-class national project" (Jerusalem Municipality and Jerusalem Development Authority, 2010, 5).[iii] Since then, the Jerusalem Municipality and local planning institutions have been striving to promote this plan despite the objections of many residents of the Al-Bustan neighborhood, who were almost unanimously opposed.

The *King Garden's Plan* (2010: 6) makes claims regarding a religious Jewish "history," integrating it with the capitalization of the spaces, considering the space as the site of a *business initiative*, and mixing this with a reinvented historical narrative in order to colonize what was then an authentic Palestinian space in Eastern Jerusalem:

> As part of its vision to develop the city, the Municipality of Jerusalem is making every effort to preserve and restore these green areas as part of this commitment and responsibility to the values of nature and environment, *a historic commitment*, which the inhabitants of Jerusalem have stood by steadfastly in the past, and that we will continue in the present for the future. (*King's Garden Plan*, 2010: 9)

The Plan presents as its overriding objective "to restore the King's Garden to its historic state as a major world and tourism site"; the "Plan's vision is to turn the King's Garden into a blossoming park that will flourish alongside a residential neighborhood, in which there will be restaurants, artists' studios, souvenir and local-art shops and more" (*King's ;Garden Plan*, 2010: 14-15).

Aesthetic justifications

The King's Garden Plan involves a specific aesthetic discourse that justifies the dispossession of the residents and the demolition of the neighborhood. It uses Biblical language to describe the neighborhood as an ancient landscape:

> Traditionally, it was in this place that the kings of Israel established their gardens. It is commonly believed that this is where King Solomon planted his garden, and where, sitting in the shade of its trees, he wrote the book *Ecclesiastes*. (*King's Garden Plan*, 2010: 9).

The Mayor of Jerusalem, Nir Barakat, claimed that:

> The initiative to restore the area of the King's Garden to its ancient glory is part of our fundamental commitment and responsibility to preserve and safeguard Jerusalem, its landscapes and vistas, historic and scenic sites for the sake of future generations. For thousands of years, the King's Garden was an island of green, a site of agriculture and water, as part of systems of valleys and wadis that surrond the Old City – ancient Jerusalem. (Jerusalem Municipality and Jerusalem Development Authority, 2010: 5)

Figure 2. The Plan of Jerusalem Municipality for Al-Bustan: The *King's Garden Plan*



Source: Jerusalem Municipality. *Launch of King's Garden Plan*, 2.3.2010.

Figure 3. Aerial Photo of Al-Bustan Neighborhood



Self-determinative planning in practice

The Al-Bustan community had been opposing the state's King's Garden Plan since it was first launched by the Jerusalem Municipality. This section analyzes the community's reaction to the plan, based on an ethnographic longitudinal study. (This included in-depth interviews with Palestinian residents, and members and leaders of local community and grassroots organizations, which I was unable to publish, because quoting them would have a great potential to endanger them and also lead to the immediate demolition of their homes. It should be noted that since the eruption of the current war between Hamas and Israel, on 7 October 2023, the Jerusalem Municipality has increased the demolition of houses in the neighborhood and in the city. As Hasson and Solomon (2024) have reported in their article aptly titled "Israeli Demolitions of Palestinian East Jerusalem Homes Spike amid War," there was "a 60% surge in demolished homes reported in 2023." I also had to decide not to use in their entirety any texts from the WhatsApp group in the community that I am part of. Alternatively, I have used the Arabic and international media, and observations from the community meetings, which were publicly held.)

Becoming a political community

The Palestinian Al-Bustan community had not been collectively organized and did not have a grassroots organization until the rise of the new threat to demolish their neighborhood, and from the beginning of its occupation in 1967 to 2005, there was almost no collective mobilization against the state planning and the housing demolition policy. In 2005, the residents of the neighborhood decided to establish a grassroots organization called the Al-Bustan Popular Committee. The people of the neighborhood elect seven representatives to constitute the committee, which then represents the community's residents as a group. The Popular Committee has been responsible for the community, social, and planning actions that are related to the city plan of King's Garden.

As a result of the decision of the Municipality to destroy the neighborhood, the residents of Al-Bustan submitted a new plan to the District Planning and Building Committee in 2005. The Popular Committee hired an architect to prepare a zoning plan for their neighborhood. At the end of 2005, they submitted City Plan Scheme #11641 to the District Committee (District Planning and Building Committee, 2005). In 2009, the District Planning and Building Committee rejected the plan, arguing that "the plan is situated under City Plan AM/9, which designates the site as a public open green area; there is no room for qualifying the illegal buildings; the area of the plan is located in part of the sequence of open spaces," which "should not be allowed to be harmed, given their scenic sensitivity and their great importance due to their location." Furthermore, the committee claimed that the area has a "a scientific and tourism potential," and "sensitive open space," where the existing Palestinian "buildings that were built without a permit" should not be allowed to remain. Furthermore, the representative of the city stated that "the position of the City Engineer is that the plan should be rejected, since it proposes construction in the valleys, in violation of the planning policy and the Master Plan.

In 2009, when the Jerusalem Municipality launched the King's Garden Plan, the Al-Bustan Popular Committee members realized that it would not be enough to submit a plan to the Israeli planning institutions, and that they needed a new approach to oppose the city's new plan and the effects it would have on their neighborhood. Thus, they moved from a simple resistance to a plan for a new mobilization strategy. The community of Al-Bustan decided to take a wide-range of planning, social, and political actions aimed at opposing the King's Garden plan and constructing a new reality.

The struggle for recognition

In response to the city's plan, the Popular Committee established a Steering Committee in 2009 to manage the case and advise the Popular Committee on legal and planning issues. The committee includes members of the Al-Bustan Popular Committee, leading political figures from Jerusalem, and representatives of grassroots organizations. The Steering Committee included political figures and civil society leaders, in order to construct a consensus around the activity of the Popular Committee and provide it with political legitimacy. In addition, the committee assigned a Chief Planner, who headed a team of practitioners and was asked to prepare an alternative detailed plan for Al-Bustan. In addition, three lawyers were selected to legally advise the planning team and the Steering Committee. The overriding objective of the Popular Committee was to achieve statutory recognition through promoting a three-part strategy: achieving political reach, developing an alternative plan, and building local self-determination and autonomy.

Political reach

The first strategy was to put international political pressure on the Mayor of the Jerusalem Municipality and the Israeli government to halt the proposed plan and stop the demolition of the neighborhood. Obtaining international support was crucial in this. Since its establishment, the Popular Committee has also been updating United States Congress members, Senators, the Secretary of the State, and many other European governments political leaders. As East Jerusalem is considered by the international community a city under Israeli occupation, the United States and other Western countries consider themselves somehow obliged to protect the rights of Palestinians in the city and prevent Israeli territorial and demographic transformations (Badran, 2023).

In this regard, when the Jerusalem Municipality launched the King's Garden Plan in 2010, the Al-Bustan Popular Committee occupied a public building in the neighborhood, built a large tent on the roof, and announced that the building was 'The Tent of Protest." This occupied building, considered an illegal building by the Israeli legal and planning institutions, has remained the communal site of social, cultural, religious, and political activities (Photos 1-3).

On March 2009, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, visiting Jerusalem and the Palestinian Tent of Protest, intervened in an effort to prevent the demolition. As a headline put it, "Clinton criticised Israel's plans to demolish dozens of homes in Arab East Jerusalem," stating, "Clearly this kind of activity is unhelpful and not in keeping with the obligations entered into under the 'Road Map'," and that "[I]t is an issue that we intend to raise with the government of Israel and the government at the municipal level in Jerusalem" (McCarthy, 2009).

Clinton refused to meet the Mayor of Jerusalem, Nir Barakat, because of his announced plan to demolish Palestinian homes to make way for a tourist park. In an expression of support for the Al-Bustan community, she chose instead to visit the Al-Bustan Tent of Protest. Jerusalem's mayor "became embroiled in a high-profile conflict with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton over his intention to demolish the homes" (Hasson, 2010). There was then pressure from Europe and the U.S. to prevent Israel demolishing the neighborhood.

The alternative plan

The creation of an alternative plan for Al-Bustan was based on wide public participation within the community. The city's planning and its results were presented in the Protest Tent. The alternative plan was eventually approved by the Al-Bustan Committee and the people of the neighborhood attending a community convention, establishing what was called the Popular

Community. In part to obtain recognition, the Popular Community proposed the renovation and beautification of the neighborhood, making use of the professional terminology of planning:

> Our vision is to create a socially, culturally, economically, environmentally and spatially vibrant and sustainable community at Al-Bustan and promote a place that enriches, uplifts, and inspires the human spirit (The Plan Report, 2010).

The plan would implement an aesthetics based on local Palestinian and historic Islamic architecture in Jerusalem. This would mean a landscape based on gardens and green routes, flowing water in canals, and a focus on protecting the environment. These features are meant to enhance the community environmentally and aesthetically as well as economically, and are a response to the recognition that the community's struggle concerns social and spatial conditions that it could aim at improving, while hoping to end the state's antagonism towards it.

Constructing autonomy

The Popular Community (PC) has been sustaining and strengthening the Al-Bustan community socially, physically, and environmentally, constructing a type of urban autonomy aiming to serve the central goal of preventing the demolition of the neighborhood and achieving recognition and approval for the alternative plan. Community cohesion, solidarity, and collective action have become central to the political and planning cause of the neighborhood. A sense of shared risk, feelings of deprivation, and national pride created conditions for mobilization and collective action that had been in a standstill since the city launched its plan in 2010.

The PC has conducted activities on a wide social, cultural, and environmental spectrum**.** Since the Jerusalem Municipality does not provide any services to the neighborhood, the Popular Community promoted various projects to improve the living conditions of the residents, including renovating the neighborhood's narrow paths, constructing a children's playground, painting the walls of the buildings facing the main road, drawing graffiti paintings to present the story of the neighborhood and show its durability, renovating a building for a kindergarten, cleaning the neighborhood streets, and building a mosque.

In fact, the community has taken the place the place of the municipality in providing municipal services. The occupied building became a community center for cultural and social activities, in which the committee provides courses and public lectures for residents. The building has its own "Tent of Protest" on its roof. This tent has been used for collective meetings, and is a popular site for visitors from elsewhere in the city as well as international diplomats.

Figure 4. Graffiti in the occupied Tent of Protest



Figure 5. Graffiti in the occupied Tent of Protest



Figure 6. Community Meeting at the Tent of Protest (2023)

Figure 7. The Community Members Volunteering in the Mosque Area

Conceptualizing dispossessive vs. self-determinative planning

In analyzing the framework of the planning of dispossession, I am looking at the *logics* of the regime of practices of the architecture of dispossession. Each "logic" is meant to grasp specific aspects of the architecture of dispossession, which they together constitute (Glynos and Howarth, 2007). Based on the underlying empirical work, this study identifies as three logics involved in dispossessive planning *accumulation by dispossession*, the logic of *exclusion*, and the logic of *aesthetics*.

The logic of *accumulation by dispossession* captures the economic aspects and capitalization of the dispossession through spatial planning practices. Harvey (2001, 2003, 2008) proposes that "[w]hat accumulation by dispossession does is to release a set of assets (including labour power) at very low (and in some instances zero) cost," following which, "over-accumulated

capital can seize hold of such assets and immediately turn them to profitable use" (Harvey, 2003, 149). *Accumulation by dispossession,* Harvey contends, is "the mirror-image of capital absorption through urban redevelopment," a process of displacement that lies at the core of urbanization under capitalism. This process is backed by the strong state, and state power is always a major player in accumulation by dispossession. At present, most policies of dispossession are what are widely called neoliberal policies. Accumulation by dispossession occurs in many ways, including displacement of people, privatization (converting public assets into private property rights), and commodification of cultural forms. Thus, following Harvey, the logic of accumulation by dispossession suggests that spatial strategy and capitalization interact to ensure both the alteration of a space and its use for capitalization and profit.

Thus, the state in Al-Bustan first demolishes the buildings on the grounds of the illegality of land uses, then confiscates the land, displaces the residents, and launches a new development project, aimed at tourism, in the dispossessed place. Dispossessive planning involves uses of planning in two ways: first, to legally justify the demolition and displacement, and secondly, to propose a new plan of economic development. In this way, planning serves the state in justifying the displacement of people and rationalizing future economic development of the dispossessed assets.

The *aesthetic logic* captures the politics of the aesthetic of transformation of places; specifically, the way in which dispossessive planning uses aesthetics to justify its *creative destruction strategy*. Aesthetics in this case is a matter of appearance. Rancière (2010) suggests that what is called "art" is always political, because in proposing ways of seeing reality, which can include the arrangement or rearrangement of spaces, it is engaged in the construction of (contingent and contested) "forms of life." The effort to construct an aesthetically pleasing, and thus valuable, new or renovated "reality" through changes to a place provides one way of understanding planning through dispossession and accumulation: the place and its uses are transformed, and increased in "value" in a sense that can both be appreciated and enjoyed, and be financially profitable.

In this case, the King's Garden Plan neglects the existing aesthetic qualities of the Al-Bustan neighbourhood, dismissing the fact that the residents protect, sustain, and use its running water, and have made the neighborhood greener than most, if not all, other neighborhoods in Jerusalem. Al-Bustan, which means "the garden" in Arabic, is instead represented as a collection of illegal houses, built on public lands, whose designation as a green park is contrary to its proper uses. Furthermore, the aesthetic images used in the official plan involves an untrue historic narrative, lacking any archaeological evidence, and plainly ideological, in claiming that "[t]raditionally, it was in this place that the kings of Israel established their gardens," and that it is where "King Solomon planted his garden, and where, sitting in the shade of its trees," whose ancient glory is even described in mythically paradisiacal terms as the place of the "Gates of the Garden of Eden" (The King Garden Plan, 2009: 9).

The *logic of exclusion* captures the way dispossessive planning excludes the very presence of the dispossessed, the excluded "others." In *The Politics of Dispossession*, Edward Said describes the use of concepts of absence/presence in which the dispossessor's presence is justified by the supposed absence of the dispossessed, an absence that has been conceptually transformed from a displacement into a supposed non-reality. Similarly, Butler (2013) conceptualizes dispossession as involving a dialectic of presence/absence "whereby presence (or a presence-effect) is produced by being constantly haunted by its spectral absences or (mis-)recognized presences" (Butler 2013, 16). The presence to be removed is represented as an

absence, but it is also haunted by it, since its negation is an uncertain, and troubling because troubled, project. Furthermore, "being dispossessed refers to processes and ideologies by which persons are disowned and abjected by normative and normalizing powers that define cultural intelligibility and that regulate the distribution of vulnerability" (Butler 2013, 2). The dispossession is normalized by a discourse that denies the existence of what it violently attacks.

Dispossession can be thought of as a way in which human bodies are de-materialized through these practices (Hirsh, et. al., 2020; Jabareen et. al., 2017). It is both a reality and a process, and it involves both a material process and a resulting sense of being "deprived of the ability to have control over their life" (Butler 2013, 3). Accordingly, dispossession, "whether it be colonial or neocolonial, capitalist, and neoliberal, endures by reproducing … the violence inherent in improper, expropriated, and dispossessed subjectivities" (pp. 18-19).

Exclusion through the process of dispossessive planning is a violent act, whose effects on the dispossessed include the creation of an ontological insecurity . In Al-Bustan case, the people living there must spend their days and nights under the threat of the demolition of their homes. On any given morning, officers of the Jerusalem municipality may come with the police to demolish a house. The residents are often asked to participate, by demolishing their own houses, failing which the Israeli authorities will destroy them and the displaced must pay the demolition costs.

Dispossessive planning is a coherent regime of spatial, aesthetic, legal, economic, and socially exclusionary practices of dispossessing and displacing a disadvantaged group of people in order to construct a new and "better" reality. The aesthetic logic of dispossessive planning represents this as creating a pleasing and attractive place for tourists and settlers. The logic of *accumulation by dispossession* captures the capitalization of dispossession through spatial practices of place alteration for economic redevelopment. The *exclusionary logic* captures the reasons given for the exclusion of specific people and places, which may be based on social differences and antagonisms. Dispossessive planning is a form of state violence that understands itself in these three analogous and convergent ways.

Conceptualizing self-determinative planning

Self-determinative planning is a regime of practices that normally emerges to counter the apparent injustice of institutional planning policies. Central to self-determinative planning is the *logic of becoming a political community*, which may arise through efforts to cope with actions that are interpreted as destructive of the community that is then substantially formed in response. The community may become constituted politically in the context of 'friend-enemy ' relations, in this case provoked by the opposition of the state. This has been found to occur in many places around the world where states have displaced communities for the sake of redevelopment and urbanism. In this case, the state has been antagonistic to Palestinian communities in Jerusalem, in various spheres including planning, housing, development, and issues of citizenship.

Dispossessive planning itself depends on a friend/enemy formation. It follows the logic identified by Schmitt (1932: 26), according to which "the phenomenon of the political can only be grasped by referring to the real possibility of friend and enemy groupings," which are the most intense and extreme political antagonisms (1932: 23). For Schmitt, the state is an organized political unit that depends on a friend-enemy decision. In East Jerusalem, the state has made a decision to clearly distinguish between two ethnic groups, Israeli Jews and Palestinians. The resulting antagonism "manifests itself in all sorts of tactics and practices"

(Schmidt 1932: 23), including, in urban development, what we can recognize as *dispossessive planning*. Thus, political community arises when its members collectively make a distinction between friend and enemy, the one expressing "inward" relationships and the other "outward" ones. For the community in this case, this means, internally, constructing a collective political identity in the face of the antagonism of the state's projects. Schmitt argues that every political community requires a substantive collective identity, which is independent of, and can exist outside, the established framework of constitutional rules, or the state itself (Vinx, 2015).

Under these circumstances of severe state antagonism, a community becomes political in aiming to mitigate, or dismantle and dissolve, the tyranny of the state and its institutions and policies over spatial production. It may even be thought that the antagonism of the 'friend-enemy 'divide constitutes the ontological foundations of self-determinative planning.

In our context, collective identity and solidarity derive from the shared common interests recognized among the community members, and these common interests are necessarily recognized in opposition to the state political authority, which opposes them and brings them together as a community sharing this situation. The community collectively produces, out of a sense of grievance, a collective "we" facing a "they," in this case the Israeli state, which is held responsible for its grievances. Becoming political is a response to the actions of a state apparatus as an "enemy" that is poised to do (and does) harm to the community. In the literature of collective action and protest, identity, injustice, and efficacy are sometimes said to be among the core concepts of social psychology of protest, with group identification fostering protest participation (Klandermans, 2002). The shared sense of becoming an urban political community provides its members with opportunities to take control over its spaces, conferring meaning on the choices and tasks involved. Self-determinative planning supports a sense of autonomy, solidarity, of belonging to the place, and destiny.

A logic of recognition reflects some of the political ends of the self-determinative planning approach. One objective of the community is achieving recognition for its demands, including its alternative plans regarding its space planning and production. Fraser (2000) conceives recognition as a question of social status, where the demand for recognition is about the status of individual group members to become full partners in social interaction. Thus, misrecognition involves not only the depreciation and deformation of a person's group identity, but also social subordination—in the sense of being "prevented from participating as a peer in social life" (p. 113). Understanding the important role of recognition as such, some scholars have called for more "substantial forms of recognition," without which, in one way or another "our lives are at risk," as Judith Butler put it (quoted in Willig, 2012: 139). Thus, Eizenberg et al. (2021) propose a framework of *urban space of recognition to* foster a more just and inclusive society.

A logic of autonomy or self-management describes the political settings of self-determinative planning. A political community embodies a collective identity it has constructed, originally, around the friend/enemy divide, and the sense among the community's members that it is a political entity that may have real power either to influence elites and state powers or of direct self-governance. If they find that they have some real strength in local, national, and sometimes international, contexts, they may then be able to oppose themselves to the state authority of the larger society.

Henri Lefebvre proposes, in his case by reworking the Marxist concept of the "withering away of the state," with its implication that this would equally involve "the decline of the Party as a centralized institution that monopolizes decision-making" (Brenner and Elden, 2009: 136), the

concept of self-management *(autogestion)*, which he takes as implicit and incipient each time a social group "refuses to accept passively its conditions of existence," and consequently forces itself "not only to understand but to master" those conditions (p. 135). This makes it a means of struggle that is also a "means for reorganization of society" (p. 149). This can force the state in reply to submit some of its own power "to 'grassroots' democratic control." The ideal or utopian character of this, which Lefebvre calls "the opening toward the possible," may be "only one element of a political strategy," though it may be significant in being, as he believes, the only way "members of a free association can take control over their own life" (p. 150).

The logics I have identified as involved in state dispossession are countered in those involved in the framework of what I call *self-determinative planning*, which may be provoked by them. Dispossession both wields and invokes an inescapable friend-enemy divide. In this context, people who have begun to organize themselves together in resistance may develop new forms of autonomy (as well as strengthening old ones), as well as seeking recognition, including from the state that acts otherwise as enemy, for their own demands and plans they are forced to develop as alternatives.

Self-determination as a social and political ideal can be rooted in liberal political theory as well as elsewhere. Classical liberal theory is based on the rights of individuals. Governments are expected to provide protection for those rights, failing which, people have the right to resist, as well as to emigrate or secede (Freeman, 1999). In radical versions of liberal theory, self-determination is justified when necessary to ensure liberty or protect civil or human rights (Beitz, 1979; Freeman, 1999). Similarly, psychological theories of self-determination ground its desirability in personal "needs": people are said to have needs for autonomy or self-governance, a sense of mastery or competence, and a sense of belonging and connection, that are best met by collective processes of self-management (Ryan & Deci, 2020). It may be held that "individuals experience greater psychological well-being through the satisfaction of these three psychological needs, and conversely feel highly fragmented, isolated, and reactive when their needs are not met" (Chiu, 2021). People may thus be seen as possessing rights to collective political self-determination that are grounded intrinsically either in their nature as human beings or in the extant political formations to which they are already subject. Thus, forms of urban planning that are manifestly destructive of these very principles may facilitate their assertion in part precisely because they were implicit to begin with.

Kymlicka (2012) suggests that "national minorities and indigenous peoples typically view themselves as 'peoples' or 'nations' and, as such, as having the inherent right of self-determination. They demand certain powers of self-government," and "they want to govern themselves in certain key matters to ensure the full and free development of their cultures and the best interests of their people." While it may appear that ethnic or national identity is here the basis on which the desire for self-government is founded, it may also be that the latter is prior or that the two are "given" together. National communities may derive some of their importance from the fact that they are the most available sites for possible collective self-government. At the same time, cultural "accommodation rights" that depend on minority status, may remain important as long as there are persistent cultural differences at the same time that governance remains linked to an ethnic or cultural identity that is held in common.

Self-determinative planning is a form of self-determination that involves a community's production and reproduction of its member's individual and collective property rights, and its physical space, which they may normally expected to be guaranteed by the state, and that may

be defended against if it is violated (including by or involving the state itself). In this way, planning may come to mean collectively seeking a mastery over the conditions of people's lives, in opposition to a state tyranny that undermines or threatens them. Self-determinative planning may thus be undertaken by members of a community that sees its interests as in an antagonistic relationship to state activities and institutions.

Conclusion

Planning literature includes frameworks that can be found useful by planners opposed to official state planning, such as "radical planning," "advocacy planning," and "insurgent planning." This paper conceptualizes the dominant state planning as a coherent regime of practices that function together, serving the political and economic purposes involved in the dispossession of an extant "foreign" population, in this case Palestinian citizens and residents of a neighborhood in East Jerusalem. A corresponding approach of self-determinative planning should, I am suggesting, be similarly composed of integrated political, economic, and aesthetic practices that are oriented to the local (Palestinian) community's continued residence rather than dispossession, autonomous self-governance, and maintenance of a satisfactory quality of life in the lived environment consistent with these ends. An appropriate regime of planning practices in situations and places like this would be the complementary contrary of the current one of dispossessive planning, and it is this whose coherent deployment I have called self-determinative planning.

As we have seen,, dispossessive planning involves a distinct and coherent regime of practices, which can be conceptualized through three interrelated logics. The aesthetic logic describes the way the dispossessive planning manipulates reality and creates a new reality through spatial, design, and aesthetic practices that are intrinsically political. The logic of exclusion is that of a violent practice that excludes the very presence of the dispossessed, negating their very existence. The logic of accumulation by dispossession describes the capitalization of the dispossessed spaces and places, which are then appropriated for profitable uses. Thus, displacing the poor or specific racial groups from specific sites in cities aims, in many cases, not only to create profits but also to 'clean' urban areas from undesired others. The purposes aimed at are functionally convergent, though through distinct "logics" with independent rationales.

Urban self-determinative planning must challenge dispossessive planning, on account of the uneven and distorted relationship between the planning apparatus of the state and affected disadvantaged communities. This tends to mean that it depends upon the community's resisting what must seem to it as state tyranny, and that resistance requires its becoming political by building specific forms of autonomy, if at first only to support the struggle for recognition of its members' needs and rights by the state. Planners attentive to the rights and needs of disadvantaged and minority populations to produce and control their very spaces of existence, a notion that the urban planning profession can hardly to fail recognize, as it would otherwise have to abandon all pretense of democratically being rooted in or responsive to the needs and interests of the inhabitants of the spaces being planned, perhaps in favor of something amounting to or approximating an act of war, must recognize the priority to their activity of the autonomous self-determinative political processes in the affected communities.

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