AMBIGUOUS RISKS, FIXED RESPONSIBILITIES: URBAN PLANNING IN JERUSALEM

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Abstract

Urban resilience has been widely adopted by planning scholars and practitioners as a framework for managing complexity and contingency. However, the term is not only over-ambiguous, but is also frequently adopted a-critically into planning policies. Therefore, the paper uses the concept of risk (rather than resilience) in order to investigate the way planners define, prioritize and respond to risks. This is explored as a normative decision (and action) with ethical implications, rather than a purely professional one. Acknowledging the need to investigate both the planning process and the physical environment, the paper focuses on the prioritization of risks, planners res *concretization of risk perceptions in the urban environment through urban planning and design.*

These issues are investigated in Jerusalem s city center, an area that has witnesse *attacks and has been going through a process of densification and renewal. Findings reveal that planners assume a fixed responsibility and distinguish between two types of risk: (a) economic-demographic risks, which are seen as central, and (b) security risks, which are disregarded as irrelevant and were not considered in the plan. Despite this distinction, the analysis reveals correlations between economic and security interests, demonstrating the connection between security practices and neo-liberal urban regeneration. The last section of the paper acknowledges the importance to resist the fortification of urban spaces, yet warn that ignoring certain risks in a conflictual arena may reflect a dismissal of the* conflict itself, as well as urban planning s role in perpetuating unjust circumsta

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Since this is an ongoing research, the findings and analysis are not final.
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A. Scope

During the last decade, the preparedness for unexpected risks has become a central theme in planning literature and practice. In this "period of crisis" (Larner, 2011), planners have been searching for theoretical frameworks that hold a promise for understanding and managing complex systems (Welsh, 2014). This is especially apparent in cities, which are viewed as the most pressing (and promising) sites for addressing the uncertain future (Wakefield and Braun, 2014). In light of this search, the idea of "urban resilience" has emerged as the main framework for dealing with unexpected disasters and events (Vale and Campanella, 2005; Coaffee, 2013). The resilient city is often expected not only to "bounce back" after a disturbance but also to bounce forwards (Shaw, 2012), in a process that is described disaster betterment (Olshansky, 2006). These expectations reflect the frequent non-critical and passive reception of the term (O hare and White, 2013), evident mainly in policy papers (e.g. UNISDR, 2012; City of New York, 2013). Thus, an a-political epistemology is being used in order to deal wi political of questions [ ] the causes, distribution and effects of differentiate (Welsh, 2014, pp. 21). Acknowledging this paradox, scholars have been recently emphasizing that resilience is a normative concept (Vale, 2014), and therefore needs to be investigated and employed from a critical perspective, taking into account questions of definition, power, politics, jus (Davoudi, 2013, pp. 5).

Indeed, the preparation for future risks is far from neutral; rather, it reflects a normative decision regarding the way risks should be defined and confronted. For instance, current preparedness strategies stress the importance of individual accountability (Joseph, 2013), arguing that communities and individuals should self-organize in order to deal with risks, while the state s role mediation and support (Rose, 2000; Wakefield and Braun, 2014; Welsh, 2014). However, despite this responsibilisation of risks, the public is not an active participant in deciding *which* risks should be confronted and ho*w* (Coaffee and Rogers, 2008). Thus, planning for future risks may prevent democratic access to public spaces (through physical barriers) and to decision-making processes (by promoting a discourse of experts). Moreover, since planning translates risk perceptions into a physical space using public resources and spatial tools, it concretizes certain risk perceptions that may not be shared by all.

In light of this debate, the paper suggests using the concept of "risk" rather than "resilience", which is not only over-ambiguous and in danger of becoming an empty signifier (Davoudi, 2012) but also already holds an inherently a-political character. While the debate around resilience explores ways of dealing with unexpected risks, the debate around risk investigates the way certain events are framed (Stanley, 2013) and acted upon. This is based on the premise that when confronted with a state of uncertainty, i.e. lack of knowledge about an unwanted outcome (Ericson and Doyle, 2004), different groups not only prioritize different risks, but also set different modes of action in response to the perceived risks. Therefore, the paper uses the idea of Risk Cultures for describing planners attitudes and actior Risk Cultures is used here not only to indicate that risk perceptions are socially constructed and

embedded in cultural values (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982) but also to explore the way in which planners actively (and often deliberately) prioritize and respond to certain risks.

Furthermore, since major events such as the 9/11 attacks, Hurricane Katrina, Superstorm Sandy and the Fukushima nuclear disaster were catalysts of the discourse revolving risk and resilience, empirical studies tend to focus on major events (for example: Campanella, 2006; Gotham and Greenberg 2014; ULI 2013; Zhang and Peacock, 2009). However, the focus on major catastrophes may ignore many other cases that are not shaped by a single occurrence but rather by multiple events and chronic crises. This research, then, responds to the need to prepare for sudden emergencies as well as for more gradual changes (Vale, 2014). Therefore, it expands the notion of risk by defining it not only as an anticipation of a potential catastrophic event, bounded in space and time, but also as an anticipation of a more gradual crisis, without a clear beginning or an end.

Using these definitions as a point of departure, the paper is comprised of five sections, proceeding from an empirical case to a theoretical discussion. The first section describes the conceptual-methodological framework that is used to understand the relationship between the prioritizati responsibility and the urban environment. The second section introduces the case study: the urban regeneration of Jerusalem s city center, an area that has witnessed numerous terror attacks an going through a process of densification and renewal. The third section analyzes the case study in relation to two types of risk: (a) economic-demographic risks, which are seen as central, and (b) security risks, which are considered by planners as irrelevant, although present in the everyday reality during the time of planning. The subsequent section summarizes the findings and identifies correlations between seemingly different risks. The last section of the paper is organized around three core questions: Why do planners perceive their responsibility as limited and address only certain risks while disregarding others? Why is it possible to identify correlations between different risks? What are the ethical implications of planning for future risks while disregarding others?

B. Goal and research framework

The goal of the paper is to understand the way risks are defined and confronted when facing a chronic and prolonged state of risk and uncertainty. It explores the way planners define and respond to risks as a normative decision (and action) with ethical implications, rather than a purely professional one.

In order to investigate the relationship between planning, risk and ethics, the paper addresses a key theme in ethical debates the distinction between teleological and deontological approaches; the former is concerned with whether the outcome by itself is good or bad, while the latter focuses on the rightness of the action (Campbell and Marshal, 1999). Acknowledging the need to investigate simultaneously the action (i.e. the planning process) and its outcome (i.e. the physical environment), the paper is based on two-stage research framework (see figure 1):

i. **The planning process** is analyzed with an emphasis on prioritization (i.e. which risks are being confronted and which are being ignored and why?) and responsibility (i.e. how do planners perceive their role and responsibility regarding these risks, the city and the public?). These aspects are explored using in-depth interviews with planners in the public and private sectors, observations in relevant meetings and roundtables, as well as a survey of plans, reports documents and transcripts.

ii. **The physical environment** is analyzed with an emphasis on resources and tools (i.e. how are these perceptions of risk concretized in the urban environment, through urban planning and design?). This is explored through a spatial analysis of plans and the built environment, using three spatial parameters that reflect questions of power, politics, control, equality and representation:

The built form, including land uses, anchor institutions, typologies and regulation, which reflect issues such as the distribution of municipal resources and the promotion of certain target audiences, activities and goals.

The urban language, including the urban design of public spaces and street furniture, which reflect issues such as place making, branding, creating a desired image, memory and history.

Connectivity, including motorized and pedestrian traffic, public transportation, the relationship between different areas and the movement through space, which reflect issues such as accessibility, freedom of movement, boundaries, restrictions, mix and separation, security and control.

This framework is employed in order to investigate the urban regeneration of Jerusal



Figure 1. conceptual-methodological framework

C. Case study

Jerusalem is Israel s largest city, with a population that exceeds 800,000 (appro 36% Palestinians).[2] The city has grown substantially since the annexation of East Jerusalem in 1967. During the annexation, 28 Palestinian villages and towns were incorporated as neighborhoods in Jerusalem (B Tselem, 1995). They have expanded significantly in the last five decades, and at the s time, Jewish neighborhoods were constructed in East Jerusalem as a way to modulate this growth and to prevent an urban continuum of a future Palestinian city (Braier, 2013).[3]

Jerusalem was selected as a case study for two main reasons. First, as a city under dispute, Jerusalem is not shaped by a single major event but rather by multiple risks and uncertainties. Second, as a contested urban environment in an asymmetrical power balance, Jerusalem does not only represent a case of uneven vulnerability but also a case in which one man s risk may be another man's desire

The paper focuses on the changes that were planned and implemented in the city center in the last fifteen years. Attempts to reinforce the geographic center of Jerusalem were made since the annexation of east Jerusalem in 1967, in an effort to construct a "united city" (Ramon, 2011). However, these were unable to stop the deterioration of the area. The deterioration reached a pinnacle point in the late 1990s and early 2000s, when dozens of people were killed and hundreds were wounded in over ten suicide bombings.[4]

At the same time, two consecutive plans for the urban regeneration of the city center were submitted, the first in 2000 and the second in 2003. The plans were integrated into the Jerusalem 2 (2009) and its introductory reports (2002, 2004). These plans attempted to *"inject new life to the streets of the city center"* (Urban Regeneration Plan, 2003, pp.15) and focused on densification and diversification of land uses in the city center, improving transportation and accessibility, creating employment opportunities, construction of anchor institutions and upgrading the public space. In 2001, the Jerusalem Center Development Company ("Eden") was established as a sub-company of the Jerusalem Development Authority, with the purpose of initiating and implementing both physical projects and economic initiatives. During these years, the city erected a light rail along Jaffa Street, the city's main commercial axis that connects the city entrance with the Old City. Apart from connecting the city center to remote (mostly Jewish) neighborhoods, the light rail project re-shaped the city center itself: The main section of Jaffa Street was completely renovated, vehicular traffic was banned, the street was re-paved, light rail stations were constructed and new street furniture was installed.

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[2] The majority of the Palestinian population in Jerusalem holds a permanent residency status and not a full citizenship. This status entitles them to vote in the municipal elections but not in the national ones. Furthermore, their status is dependent on their place of residency and may be revoked if they move out of the city (Braier, 2013).

[3] The Jewish urban growth is characterized by the construction of new neighborhoods, which are usually autonomous and spatially isolated. Palestinian urban growth, on the other hand, is characterized by the expansion of existing neighborhoods.

[4] From 1989 to 2003, Jerusalem has witnessed 73 terror attacks, which killed 283 people and injured 2067 more than in any other city in Israel (Savitch, 2005). In the second half of the 1990 s suicide bombings have become threat in the city. Suicide attacks mainly targeted the city s central areas, such as Jaffa Street as (Yehuda pedestrian mall (09/04/1997, 5 deaths), Mahane Yehuda market (07/30/1997, 16 deaths) and the Central Bus Station (25/02/1996, 26 deaths).



Figure 2. Jerusalem s city center as defined in the 2003 plan

The trigger for the urban regeneration of the city center may be traced back to a double paradigmatic shift. The first shift occurred in the planning paradigm. Following decades of suburbanization, planners and decision makers re-discovered the city center as the main anchor of the city. While a senior planner stated that this decision is purely professional (interview, March 2014), it is also tied to a change in the political paradigm. The suburbanization of the 1970s and 1980s was characterized by a construction of new Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem. Today, the municipality's ability to sprawl to the east is limited for political reasons. While planners insist the policy did not change officially, they often also state that the decision to build (or to sustain from building) new projects in East Jerusalem is determined by national and international dynamics and is ex-territorial to the planning establishment and to the municipality itself (interviews, March and May, 2014). In light of these limitations, the city promotes urban regeneration and densification of the inner city, as stated by the city s c *towards urban regeneration. [If] anyone thinks that we will continue to go for another hill and another hill and another hil*l, it will not happen (Israeli Planners Association annual conference, February 2014).

Given the violent history of the area and the unstable political climate in Jerusalem, the urban regeneration of the city center raises several questions: Were security risks considered in the plans? Were other risks taken under consideration? How do planners perceive their responsibility towards different risks and how do these risks influence the urban environment? The next section will respond to these questions and analyze the Risk Culture that emerges out of the city center regeneration plans.

D. Findings: between security and economic-demographic risks

In accordance with the conceptual framework that was presented above, the findings are presented in two stages: the first stage analyzes the way planners prioritize risks and perceive their professional responsibility. The second stage analyzes the concretization of these risks in the urban environment, based on three spatial parameters.

Planners priorities and responsibilities

The planners that were interviewed were asked to name the most significant risks that pose a threat to the city s future. At the same time, based on the definition of risk as an anticipatio crisis, further perceived risks were extracted from interviews, reports, transcripts and plans. These accounts do not use the term risk directly yet they do express a state of em upcoming disaster or crisis. Findings do not portray one unified image but rather uncover multiple risks that can be divided into two groups: (a) security risks, namely terror attacks and violent eruptions; (b) economic-demographic risks, namely the escalation of social conflicts and loss of balance between different social groups, and in particular, the out-migration of economic activities and Jewish secular residents. As this section shows, although both risks are perceived as important, planner's responsibility towards them differs significantly.

Economic-demographic risk: high responsibility

In general, the Jewish Ultra-Orthodox and Palestinian populations are often described as unproductive in terms of labor and subsequently as one of the main causes for Jerusalem s low socio-economic status. Therefore, planners view the growth of these populations and the out-migration of the Jewish secular population as an economic risk to the city's future.[5] While for the Palestinian population the Master Plan does acknowledge some growth (from 30% to 40%), the Ultra-Orthodox Jews are seen a real threat for the city's economic independence, with Jerusalem facing a destruction *in twenty years this could be a backward frontier town supported by the state"* (interview, March 2014). The secular Jewish population is described as feeling threatened (interview, May 2014) and as a minority group on decline (Master Plan

[5] According to the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, the percentage of orthodox Jews in Jerusa grown from 26.5 in the years 2002-2007 to 31.2 in the years 2008-2014. The percentage of secular Jews has dropped from 22.5 to 19.4 in the same period of time (CBS, 2014).

Report 4, 2004: 223). While the language in the official documents is neutral, in interviews and talks planners use blunt language to describe the Ultra-Orthodox population, for instance: *"entire neighborhoods are falling", "they are most likely to spread south and conquer Jaffa Street"* (interview, March 2014) and *"the sprawl of the Ultra-Orthodox population is shredding the city"* (high ranking former public official, "The Challenge of Jerusalem" conference, March 2014). [6]

The head of the 2003 urban regeneration planning team confirmed that these issues were on the agenda *all the time. The intention was to revive the city center* for everyone there was a sort of feeling *emergency, that if the city center continues to deteriorate it will become an Ultra-Orthodox residential* neighborhood and will cease to be a place for everyone (interview, December 2014). An Ultra-O majority in the city center is expected to change the situation in Jerusalem, by allowing one *group to transfer the center* from the hands of the public to the hand of a community (Report 4, 2004: 223). Demographic and economic issues are constantly intertwined. For instance, the 2003 regeneration plan lists a set of problems, the first of which states that Jerusalem is a relatively poor *city (economically), its population is polarized, and out-migration is carried out. These problems are reflected also in the state of the city center"* (Urban Regeneration Plan, 2003, pp. 13).

This type of risk is seen as integral to planning. One senior planner states that environmental or economic risks are risks that *"planning can completely control. Moreover, I think that these things are a result of planning, I mean that if you allow the city to be built in a non-*balanced way this is something that i *completely in the hands of the planners, in my opinion. Of course it is also influenced by other things, but 80-90% of it is in the hands of planners and planning can change it"* (interview, May 2014).

Security risk: low responsibility

The terror attacks are described in interviews and publications as the heaviest burden on the city center and a significant factor in its deterioration (interview, December 2014; Vitman, 2011), transforming it into a ghost town, devoid of people (interview, July 2014). Yet, although security instability peaked when they drafted the plans (in the early 2000's), planners assert that they did not address any security risks in the planning process. As a senior planner explains: It wasn t a consideration at any moment. It wa *reality, painful, bitter, an everyday reality during those weeks. [You] go to the city center, sit in a café,* and one week later, this cafØ explodes it was the center of the conflict [7] (intervie This understanding of security risks as irrelevant or to planning has not changed in recent years, although the discourse revolving urban resilience has become more prominent in planning literature and practice (interview, July 2014).

[6] A demographic-driven policy is not new to Israel. Criticized as "demographobia", these types of policies often see the Arab population as a threat to Jewish existence (Khamaisi, 2011). The discourse in Jerusalem exposes an additional economic-religious demographobia targeting Orthodox residents, as part of a neo-liberal agenda that promotes "productive" populations.

[7] It is important to note that the plan occasionally addresses the need to create a sense of comfort and personal safety (Regeneration Plan, 2003, pp. 15).

Findings reveal two possible explanations for this disregard: first, planning is not considered to be an effective measure to treat security risks, as a senior planner explains: *"some things you can deal with, some things you can't, for instance a security threat to tell you that this is responsible for or to greatly influence? no"* (interview, May 2014). Similarly, the city architect expressed skepticism regarding urban design's ability to eliminate terrorist threats, since erecting fences and protective measures might only transfer the risk from one place to another (interview, July 2014). This reflects an understanding of security risks as constant, while planning actions merely relocate it and not abolish it altogether.

Second, since these were long-term plans, planners describe looking into the distant future from an optimistic point of view, *"as if this cloud will lift from over our heads"* (interview, March 2014). All planners interviewed in the research state that they are optimistic, and the planning profession is characterized *as "optimistic by definition"* (interview, December 2014). Being optimistic is described as a mission (interview, December 2014), without which "we don t have a right to exist as plann (interview, July 2014).

Resources and tools

The previous section illustrated the different attitudes towards economic-demographic and security risks. The current section analyzes the concretization of these risks in the urban environment by analyzing the spatial changes that were planned and implemented in the city center. It will show that although the security risks were officially disregarded, some of the changes can be understood as addressing security issues, either indirectly or in retrospect. Based on the conceptual framework presented above, the changes are analyzed using three spatial parameters: built form, urban language and connectivity.

Economic-demographic risk: "creating a modern city for a liberal population"

As mentioned, the urban regeneration of the city center is part of an attempt to stop the area's economic deterioration, which was feared to be followed and accelerated by the further sprawl of the Ultra-Orthodox population. The first component, the built form, is the most significant tool in modifying these trends. An emphasis is put on encouraging commercial activities, employment and tourism, while housing remains a relatively minor land use. This is evident in the plan for the city entrance, which was not yet implemented and is expected to consist of 12 high-rise buildings containing offices, hotels, congress halls, entertainment and commercial activities (see figure 3). The area will not contain any residential units (district planning committee meeting, 29/07/2008;). The suggested plan is expected to encourage economic activities and to change the overall orientation of the city center towards the west, i.e. towards Tel Aviv, Israel's financial center (see figure 2). Furthermore, based on the assumption that *"in an urban area there is no void"* (Report 4, 2003, pp. 223), the lack of residential units would prevent Ultra-Orthodox residents from moving into the area. Since this is a sensitive subject, this is often only implied rather than stated explicitly. For instance, in a district planning committee meeting (29/07/2008), one of the participants implied that adding residential units in this area would create a continuum between two

neighborhoods, Romema and Giv'at Shaul (both characterized by mainly Ultra-Orthodox and religious residents, R.B.).

Nevertheless, the plan does recommend increasing the number of residential units in other areas of the city center. Although the plan s official goal is to attract a variety of populations, it recommer enhance the following housing mix: small apartment for students and young families; unique units in historic neighborhoods, and luxury apartments for an affluent population (Regeneration Plan, 2003: 70-71) all of which do not address the needs of the Ultra-Orthodox population, which is characterized by large families and relatively low income.

These attempts were surfaced more directly in interviews, in which planners describe high-rises and luxury apartments as unsuitable for Ultra-Orthodox populations. The head of the Master Plan planning team summarizes these attempts:

> *"We tried to build a plan that would create a modern city fit for a liberal* population We wanted high construction throughout Jaffa Street, why? *Because we said that high construction is the barrier preventing the Ultra-Orthodox population from penetrating into the area. We said that if the city loses its center, then there would be a problem. And we said that since they have reached Hanevi'im Street they are likely to continue to spread south and conquer Jaffa Street as well. That is why we said that Jaffa Street needs to be mainly offices, commerce and employment, not housing, and high construction" (interview, March 2014).*

Not all of the densification plans have been implemented, yet recent projects in the city center follow these lines. Several luxury apartment buildings and boutique hotels were (and still are) constructed just north of Jaffa Street and south of Hanevi'im Street. The momentum in the city, said one planner, *"has created a sort of market that is also and this needs to be said carefully but yes, it is definitely a market that appeals to a higher economic status than the one in the heart of the Ultra-Orthodox city"* (interview, December 2014).

The second component, the urban language, is used in order to create an attractive commercial street that will be conceptualized and managed as a shopping mall (Urban Regeneration Plan, 2003, pp. 70). In addition to the joint management, the "mallification" of the street is supported by a cohesive high-quality urban design, which is meant to re-brand the street in a new image (see figure 4). The beautification of the public realm is an explicit part of the plan s aim to compete with the suburbs an attract young families and visitors and to increase the property value of adjacent properties (Urban Regeneration Plan, 2003, pp. 71, 81). As part of this goal, the main section of Jaffa Street and additional 20 streets were completely renovated, and transformed from an urban space that *"looked like garbage ten years ago"* (interview, May 2014) to *"the most attractive and beautiful street in the country"* (the city chief architect, round table, May 2015).

These planning actions are tied to the third component, connectivity. The renewed public sphere in the heart of the city is pedestrian-friendly (see figure 4). It is encircled by a ring road, with multiple parking lots spread along the perimeter. The light rail connects the city center to residential neighborhoods (Jewish and Palestinian) and improves accessibility to the area. These changes can be analyzed from two points of view. On one hand, these actions have re-created the city center as a shared space for diverse populations. On the other hand, the same Jaffa Street or the planned city entrance are mentioned and constructed as a barrier, preventing the Ultra-Orthodox population from sprawling any further.

Figure 3. (left) a rendering of the planned entrance to the city (Farhi Zafrir Architects)

Figure 4. (right) the renovated Jaffa Street

Security risk: "it's in everyone's interest to keep the peace"

As elaborated above, although they admitted that the terror attacks do indeed constitute a significant factor in the city center's deterioration, planners stated that these security risks were not a consideration during the planning process. Yet, it is possible to identify three different ways in which security risks influence the urban environment: compensation (via the built form), negation (via the urban language), and regulated movement (via the connectivity).

The first component, the built form, was used as tool to compensate investors and encourage new construction in times of high security instability. In order to do so, potential investors were offered increased building rights, for instance when contracting or renovating hotels. Two senior planners from the district planning committee have spoken of these practices:

Planner A: "When we see [in] approved plans, suddenly a huge building that does not fit, we say: 'oh, it was during the Intifada

Researcher: Why?

Planner B: "To compensate the people"

Planner A: "It was a terrible period, all the cafés closed down, people were scared to walk in the street, and every investor that came, they caught him and begged: 'build whatever you want'."

(Interview, May 2014)

This wish to increase the tourist activity is tied to another form of economic compensation, as planners view the increased tourist activity as creating a shared economic interest and thus reducing security risks: *"This is also connected to the economic resilience, because it's a place of employment that provides income to low-income populations as well, Arabs and so forth... It's in everyone's interest to keep the peace, because they make a living"* (interview, May 2014).

The second component, the urban language, reflects a different approach towards security risks, one of negation and intentional disregard. The new urban language of Jaffa Street and the surrounding area is not based on security measures. On the contrary it opts for an open, barrier-free urban design. For instance, the light rail stations are completely open to the street, without any fences, despite earlier suggestions to construct them as enclosed structures with a security perimeter (interview, July 2014; see figures 5 and 6). As a design philosophy, the urban design of the public sphere is based on what the city chief architects describes as "universal urban design" (interview, July 2014), which is based on accessibility, coherence and cohesiveness of the public space. The universal nature of the urban design is also manifested in numerous references to Europe and the United States as precedents and as justifications for planning decisions (Urban Regeneration Plan, 2003). Creating a completely new image (and a universal one) may also have helped to disassociate the city center from its recent violent history, dimming old memories and images of the place. *"When the city changes its appearance, I'm sure it has an effect"*, argues the city architect, "*they forget it was dirty and that things were terrible here"* (interview, July 2014).

The creation of a well-ordered and cohesive urban space is further supported by the third dimension, connectivity, which has a potential to regulate the movement through space, especially within the ring road, due to the moderate vehicular traffic within its perimeter and the absolute ban on cars along Jaffa Street. Furthermore, the light rail line is the only form of public transportation along the street, replacing the buses that passed there in the past. Its stations are under constant surveillance, using CCTV, security guards and public announcement systems. It is important to note that while this regulated movement can potentially be used for policing and security purposes, it was achieved unintentionally.

In addition, planners and public officials from the municipality's emergency management department describe the increased accessibility to the city center, the shared infrastructure and the subsequent social

mix as potentially diminishing security risks.[8] They offer two explanations to this argument. The first, more optimistic, views the city s heterogeneity as contributing to its resilienc Similarly, the city center is described as *"the place to meet, the place for dialog, the place for tolerance"* (interview, December 2014). The second, more pragmatic, is based on the premise that that if Jews and Palestinians share the same space they also share the same risk: *"if the train explodes they need to understand that everyone explodes*. Fatma and Shoshanna explode together. (interview, May 2014).

Figure 6, 7. light rail stations along Jaffa Street, completely open to the street.

[8] In this respect, it is important to note that only two Palestinian neighborhoods, Shuafat and Beit Hanina, are connected to the light rail line. Both are considered to be of relatively high socio-economic status in comparison to other Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem.

Risk culture emerging from the city center regeneration plans				
	Planning process >> priorities and responsibilities	**Physical outcome >> resources and tools**		
		Built form	**Urban language**	**Connectivity**
Economic-demographic risk	Can be neutralized or diminished; central to planning and an integral part of planners' professional responsibility	Land uses: less housing, more commercial activities. Housing typologies: high rises, small apartments, luxury buildings.	"Mallification" of the street (reorganizing and designing the street as a mall)	Jaffa Street and the city s entran e as a barrier to the sprawl of the Ultra-Orthodox population 
Security risk	Constant, cannot be neutralized (at least not by planning); exterior to the planning field and its professional responsibility.	Building rights: flexible regulation Economic activities and shared economic interests as diminishing security risks **> Compensation**	Rebranding the city center image, disassociating the place from its violent history **> Negation**	Diverse groups share the same space and same risk. Potential to regulate the movement through space.  **> Regulated movement**

Figure 7. summary of findings

E. Summary of findings: fixed responsibilities, overlapping interests

What is the Risk Culture that emerges from the urban regeneration of Jerusalem s risks perceived, defined and confronted by planners? At a first glance, it seems that the risk culture clearly distinguishes between economic-demographic and security risks. Furthermore, planners assume responsibility towards the former and disassociate themselves from the latter. However, when analyzing their temporal and spatial characteristics, the distinction between the two risks becomes more ambiguous.

The temporal characteristics of these two risks share some similarities. The economic-demographic risk is a gradual process, without a clear beginning or an end. Likewise, planners also view the security situation in Jerusalem as a chain of events; a state of constant risk that cannot be completely neutralized. This challenges the distinction between event and crisis as distinct concepts. Here, the event does not represent a critical rupture or a sudden break from the status quo (Gotham and Greenberg, 2014), but an extreme occurrence in an already erratic sequence. This view of risk as constant has some common grounds with the idea that it is best to accommodate natural risks, i.e. to go along with rather than to try to defeat ecological processes (Fainstein, 2015). Here, however, the attitude of acceptance is extended from natural to man-made risks, and in particular to security ones.

The spatial analysis uncovers further points of conjunction between security and economic interests. First, in order to address the economic-demographic risk, planners aimed to create a social mix and encourage economic activities. Yet, these are also seen by planners as a means to diminish security risks, since they create a shared space with shared risks, shared opportunities and shared (economic) interests. The economic growth and increased tourist activity are hoped to prevent violent eruptions. Furthermore, the renovation, "mallification" and re-branding of the public sphere were done in order to increase the street's competiveness and attractiveness. However, these actions may also have helped to create a well-organized, regulated and potentially delineated space, as well as to disassociate the area from its previous image, which was tied to disorder, violence and terror.

Another correlation between the two risks emerges from the attempt to frame Jerusalem as a "normal" city, with "normal" population (liberal, secular), "normal" goals (economic growth), and without extreme risks (terror attacks). Planners insistence on normality is demonstrated by their emphasis o and the multiple references to cities in Europe and the United States. By doing so, they challenge the idea of Jerusalem as a particular event in space. This echoes their perception of risk as constant, which can be understood as a way to challenge the idea of "risk" as a particular event in time.

F. Debate

The last section of the paper is organized around three core questions. First, why do planners perceive their responsibility as fixed, addressing certain risks while disregarding others? One apparent explanation is that security risks are much more controversial than the allegedly neutral goal of economic prosperity. While a terror attack targets one population (either Palestinian or Jewish), an economic crisis threatens to harm the city as a whole. Another possible explanation can read this insistence on normality as a resistance to the centrality of risks in Israeli political discourse and daily lives, as well as in current planning literature. According to this thesis, urban planners are trying to create shared infrastructures and to enable normal routines, assuming that the political and security risks will be resolved on the national-political level. As opposed to the first explanation, which sees planners as passive and avoiding confrontation, the second type of explanation assigns them a much more active role. Their desire to create a normal and global city, which is regenerated as an economic and tourist center, surpasses the frequent tendency to fortify the urban space and to erect defensive cordons around strategic sites (Coaffee and Rogers, 2008). This is a significant statement especially in light of persisting security threats in Jerusalem, and although terrorism tends to target places with strategic or symbolic value such as city centers (Savitch, 2005).

This dismissal of security risks leads to the next question: if security risks were not officially considered in the plans, why some spatial changes can be understood retroactively as addressing them? In other words, why is there a correlation between economic and security risks? The plan to create a mall-like urban space in the middle of Jerusalem was initially meant to attract capital and economic investments. Yet, it shares a common logic with security interests. The mallification" of the urban environment as a controlled and well-ordered space, demonstrating the connection between policing practices and entrepreneurial urbanism, with security and order being a necessary precondition for neo-liberal urban regeneration (Samara, 2010). Thus, the regeneration of the city center can be understood as "post-crisis re-branding" (Gotham and Greenberg, 2014), which creates a pleasant and unintimidating urban environment as a means to suppress the harsh reality and to avoid the root causes of the problem for as long as possible (Ellin, 1997).

What are the ethical implications of planning for certain future risks while disregarding others? On one hand, it can be argued that ignoring certain risks has its benefits. It can allow planners to overcome the obsession with imagining the worst-case scenario (Neocleous, 2013), in which crisis is ubi the disaster-to-come is inevitable (Wakefield and Braun, 2014: 5). The fixation on risk may be then replaced with a positive vision and a conflict of principles can be reinstated as a conflict of interests, as a way to facilitate compromise (Sanyal, 2002).

On the other hand, while the paper acknowledges the importance to resist the fortification of urban spaces, some words of caution are required. Planners should be aware that the aspiration for normality is legitimate, and perhaps even beneficial, but it is also far from neutral. As Susan Fainstein argues: "normality tends to be what is in the interests of property owners [...] What ap

ontological security for many, even while exacerbating the insecurity of others" (Fainstein, 2015). In Jerusalem, the so-called normal vision of a universal and economically dependent city promotes a certain economic-demographic profile, while ignoring two thirds of the city s population, struggles and political conflicts.

Moreover, planners perception of certain risks as stemming from exterior, complex and uncontroll forces may lead to a denial of existing power relations (Swyngedouw, 2010). In other words, since planners do not see themselves as part of the problem they do not see themselves as part of the solution either. However, ignoring risks in a conflictual arena may reflect a denial of the conflict itself, as well as urban planning s role in perpetuating unjust circumstances. By disassociating from controversial risks and assuming a fixed responsibility, planners are in danger of assuming a professional and neutral fa ade in an extremely political and conflictual arena.

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