

Urban Resilience in a Post Crisis Context The Regeneration of the Dublin Docklands

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Abstract

This paper explores the regeneration of the Dublin Docklands, located in inner city Dublin, Ireland. Since the commencement of the regeneration programme in 1987, the area has been the site of complex, changing governance arrangements and has endured rapidly shifting economic conditions from the boom period of the late 1990s to the most severe economic crisis in 2007.

During the boom period, the Docklands transformed from an area of derelict land to become the location of Ireland's most important financial services centre. In 1997, the establishment of a Special Purpose Development Authority (SPDA) to govern the redevelopment of the Docklands marked a radical shift in the philosophy guiding urban planning in Ireland towards more entrepreneurial style engagement with the property development sector (McDonagh, 2007). The Authority was vested with powers to fast track development in the area, extracting powers from the local authority. Under this new scheme, the Docklands developed rapidly until the economic crash in 2007, which created a complex new context for regeneration.

This paper examines the role of urban planning in enhancing the resilience of the Docklands depicted here as the area's adaptive capacity in the face of crisis. Particularly, it focuses on the recent, post-crisis governance shift in the area – the closure of the SPDA (now known as the Dublin Docklands Development Authority) and the designation of the area, in May 2014, as a Strategic Development Zone (SDZ), a scheme which continues to utilise the fast track planning process.

1.0 Introduction

The history of the Dublin Docklands can be read as a microcosm of the history of Ireland, *both ancient and modern. The making of the Docklands is a complex tapestry of great engineering achievement, visionary planning, intrigue, economic rise and decline, and human triumph over adversity.* (Dublin Dockland Development Authority 1997:18; in Moore 2008:15)

Over the past two decades, the redevelopment of the Dublin Docklands has radically altered the physical fibre and social structure of a significant part of Dublin's inner city. This process commenced with the launch of a significant urban regeneration scheme in 1987; just as Ireland was emerging from a difficult recessionary period. Indeed 1980s Ireland was characterised by rising unemployment (increasing from 10% in 1981 to 17% by 1986) and a surge in emigration (Allen, 2000; Clinch et al., 2002). During this period, Dublin, like many other cities in Northern Europe, experienced the social and physical effects of economic re-structuring, particularly in the areas most dependent on industrial or manual activities (MacLaran, 1984). The abandonment of the urban core by manufacturing industries, a major modernisation of port activities, and a broader suburbanisation movement resulted in significant changes in the employment and social structure of the inner city. However, the general decay and degradation of Dublin's physical and social environment, combined with a growing disillusionment around the Irish planning system (O'Leary, 2014), led to a new approach to planning and development in the mid 1980s, which drew heavily on the experience of other countries. Importantly, this shift in planning thought also coincided with shifting economic conditions, and the birth of the so called Celtic Tiger (Whelan, 2013).

Following the launch of the major regeneration programme in 1987, the Dublin Docklands transformed from an area of dereliction and decline to become the location of Ireland's new financial services centre. However, it has also been the site of complex, changing governance arrangements and has endured rapidly shifting economic conditions - from the boom period of the late 1990s to the most severe economic crisis in Ireland's history since 2008. Moore (2008) argued that Docklands represents the best and worst of Celtic Tiger Ireland and is a microcosm of the history of Ireland, both ancient and modern (Dublin Dockland Development Authority, 1997; in Moore, 2008:15).

This research employs the concept of resilience to examine the transformation of the Dublin Docklands including the related and parallel evolution of Irish urban planning during the same period. In particular, it aims to utilise the resilience concept as an analytical tool to further explore the local and national responses to the most recent economic crisis and the recovery trajectory of the Dublin Docklands. Ultimately the paper argues that any effort to assess or enhance the resilience of a city involves developing a comprehensive understanding of its adaptive capacities and transform in the face of crisis. Yet it is not the city that acts but individual or collective actors; and it is their actions that constitute change or lack thereof (Lang, 2011). Therefore, in analysing the evolution of the Dublin Docklands and assessing its resilience, we must also examine patterns of institutional change in urban governance over the same period.

2.0 Examining the Evolution of the Dublin Docklands through a Resilience Lens

Resilience, and more specifically urban resilience, is a fuzzy concept (Era gained increasing public, political and academic interest over the past two decades; particularly in the context of the global financial crisis of the late 2000s and continuing forms of perceived social, political, economic and financial crises in a number of European countries. The concept is typically presented as the capacity of cities to bounce back or even bounce forward crisis event. Yet despite the increasing ubiquity of the resilience concept within urban planning literature, its exact meaning and measurement remains contested. Indeed, Davidson (2012, in Gleeson, 2013: 11) asserts that

It is far from clear whether the term resilience enjoys a shared understanding within academic disciplines and policy areas and also between them

Furthermore, the emergence of resilience ideas within academic and policy debates and their relative influence on practice are highly specific to institutional contexts and the perceived security risks faced in particular countries and their urban areas. National policies and associated responsibilities for dealing with disruptive challenges (which in effect build urban resilience), differ between nations and are influenced by historic policy developments and national governance structures (Handmer and Dovers, 2011). Yet these differences, in the manner in which resilience is interpreted, remains an area which has received little academic attention to date.

In Ireland, the concept of urban resilience has not typically been used in urban planning (explicitly, at least) although the resilience approach is beginning to be used in policy streams (in attempts to promote more resilient approaches to dealing with flooding, for example). However, explicit reference to the concept of urban resilience is included in the preparatory papers for the Dublin City Development Plan 2016-2022, where it is defined in the following manner

Urban resilience is a relatively new concept, and generally refers to the ability of an urban area to withstand shocks and stresses without reaching an undesired state. Achieving this involves a degree of reorganisation and adaptation, with the development of new structures and processes (Dublin City Council, 2014: 15).

Despite the ambiguity of this definition, its inclusion indicates movement towards shaping a resilience agenda for Dublin City planning and development. According to this definition, achieving a more resilient city which is capable of withstanding stresses and shocks is linked with the ability of the city to reorganise, and crucially to adapt to such incidents. However, if Dublin is to pursue such an agenda, how can this concept be operationalised and assessed in practice? In order to address this question, this paper utilises the resilience concept to examine the transformation of the Dublin Docklands including the related and parallel evolution of Irish urban planning during the same period. In particular, it aims to utilise the resilience concept to further explore the local and national responses to the most recent economic crisis and the recovery trajectory of the Dublin Docklands. This section briefly charts the development of the resilience concept, and sets out the intended approach for examining the development of the Dublin Docklands through a resilience lens.

C.S. Holling, a theoretical ecologist, is typically credited for bringing the prominence in 1970s. In his seminal 1973 paper, Holling utilises the concept to examine the behaviour of ecological systems that are exposed to unexpected external changes and disruptions, defining resilience as

A measure of the persistence of systems and of their ability to absorb change and disturbance and still maintain the same relationships between populations or state variables
(Holling, 1973: 14)

Holling draws an important distinction between engineering and ecological resilience defining engineering resilience as the ability of a system to return to an equilibrium or steady-state after a disturbance (Holling, 1973; 1986). Such a perspective understands resilience as a measure of the speed of return to equilibrium (Pimm, 1991). Essentially, the quicker the system bounces back more resilient it is. In contrast, Holling (1996: 33) asserts that ecological resilience is concerned with the magnitude of the disturbance that can be absorbed before the system changes rather than speed being a defining feature, resilience, in this instance, is understood as the disturbance a system can undergo while remaining within critical thresholds how it can persist and adapt in the face of disturbance (Adger, 2000). Ecological resilience rejects the existence of a single, stable equilibrium and instead recognises the existence of multiple equilibria, and the possibility of systems to move into alternative stability domains. Yet, despite this core difference in understanding, both perspectives acknowledge the existence of equilibrium in systems, be it a pre-existing one to which a resilient system bounces back (engineering) or a new one to which it bounces forth (ecological) (Davoudi et al, 2012).

Since the 1970s, resilience has been explored in a variety of different research areas including environmental studies, climate change reduction strategies and disaster prevention. It has also continued to expand as an adapted research concept within social and human geography studies (Kärrholm, Nylund & de la Fuente 2014) and more recently, applied specifically within the urban context where it can be broadly understood as the capacity of a city or urban system to withstand a wide array of shocks and stresses (Agudelo-Vero et al, 2012: 3). However, while the equilibristic view of resilience, as set out by Holling, has become particularly influential in many of these fields, such an understanding may be somewhat problematic when applied to the urban context (Alexander, 2013). Indeed, Dudley (2010; in Eraydin, 2013: 43) emphasises the importance of distinguishing this idea of system equilibrium from concepts of *urban* resilience; A resilient system may experience fluctuations or changes in conditions or structures, and these changes may provide the very basis for an urban systems persistence over time. Such equilibristic views too easily assume that there is some future steady-state (or a return to a past one).

Davoudi (2012), attempts to address the issues associated with applying such an equilibristic view to the urban context. In doing so, she argues for an evolutionary understanding of resilience requires continuous adaptation rather than a return to a previous equilibrium. This perspective is also often referred to as socio-ecological resilience (Folke et al, 2010). Here, resilience is not understood as bouncing back to normality, but as the ability of complex systems to change, adapt, and, crucially, transform in response to stresses and strains (Carpenter et al, 2005) a view of resilience is not dissimilar from that put forward by Dublin City Council in their preparatory Development Plan document. Systems, in this view, are conceived as *complex, non-linear, and self-organising, permeated by uncertainty and discontinuities* (Berkes & Folke, 1998: 12). Since cities can be interpreted as complex adaptive systems whose organisation and behaviour are comparable to ecosystems, most scholars agree that the socio-ecological or evolutionary side of the concept is the most appropriate when using the concept in an urban planning / management context.

The need for urban resilience enhancement is often justified through the argument of an increasing level of uncertainty in an increasingly complex world (Berkes & Folke, 1998). In line with this, Boshier and Coaffee (2008) propose that urban resilience is best understood as a capacity to manage natural and human induced hazards. If we view resilience in this way – the capacity to manage such challenges, which is a feature inherent to the specific place under observation, then we must link this to processes of and (institutional) frameworks for urban decision making instead of only focussing on structural determinants. Indeed, as with cities, urban planning is under constant pressure to adapt. In the midst of ever changing social and spatial challenges, planning must continually re-position itself, proving its social value and long term capacity to function and solve problems (Reimer et al, 2014). Indeed, as Friedmann states (2005: 29; in Reimer et al, 2014: 1).

within any given setting, planning must continuously reinvent itself as a profession. In contemporary societies, politics, institutions, economies, technologies and social values are all subject to continuous, often radical, change so planners often feel beleaguered, their profession perpetually on the brink of existential crisis

The need for planning to continuously reinvent itself (and in effect, build resilience) necessitates that its institutional setting is capable of innovation. An understanding of how and why institutional change occurs is particularly important in the context of resilience studies, where crisis events are often cited as catalysts for change or for re-thinking existing systems. Yet, how can we assess and examine this in practice? This paper proposes that new institutionalism is potentially useful here, referring to a diverse family of approaches to understanding stability, change and causal processes in social and economic systems (Davies & Trounstone, 2009).

First, it is important to define what is meant by institutions. Institutions are the rules and norms that govern human interaction (Herrfahrdt-Pähle and Pahl-Gras, 2009). Rules, structures and norms that create and enforce cooperative behaviour are characteristic of social groups (Davies & Trounstone, 2009). While formal institutions are legally binding – constitutions, laws and policies in the political system, the economic system, and the enforcement system; informal institutions include cultural norms, such as customs, moral values or traditions (socially shared rules which are enforced outside the formal governance structures). Both formal and informal institutions can enhance or reduce the resilience of a system. Although institutions are not unalterable, as Davies and Trounstone (2009) assert, they are difficult to change and embody power; so understanding an institution necessitates an examination of its origin and how (and whether) it has been altered over time.

While some studies on institutional change focus on rules and structures, others focus on norms. However, four analytical frameworks are often cited as important for the study of urban decision making – Rational choice institutionalism; Sociological institutionalism; historical institutionalism and discursive or constructivist institutionalism. This paper avoids privileging one of these factors over others but uses a three-dimensional framework to understand the process of change or stasis as the interaction of ideas, institutions and interests (similar approaches to studies of institutional change have been followed by Cox, 1995; Hay, 2004; and Murphy, 2014). In employing this organisational framework, one of the central aims of the paper is to explore how ideas, institutions and actors interacted throughout the recent Irish economic crisis and whether they maintained or intensified urban policy continuity or created a path shaping moment.

3.0 Phases of Irish Urban Planning

Writing in 2003, Barlley and Treadwell-Shine (in O Leary, 2014) identified three phases in Irish public policy and associated trends in planning since Irish independence in 1922. The first phase, from 1922 to 1960, was pre-industrial with a focus on economic isolationism and self sufficiency with minimal consideration of planning (limited to housing). The second phase, from 1960 to 1986, was one of urbanisation, industrialisation and seeking inward investment with authoritarian, centrally controlled planning. The third phase from 1986 was post industrial with more entrepreneurial and flexible planning. Now, in post Celtic Tiger Ireland, we have entered what is a recovery phase, referred to by O Leary (2014) as perhaps the most challenging discipline so far as planning seeks to assist economic growth while addressing the recent past (O Leary, 2014: 20).

Many of these shifts in public policy and planning thought, particularly post 1960, have been connected or linked with crisis events. Indeed, as Murphy (2014) asserts Previous Irish crises have proved to be path shaping in policy terms - Responses to the 1950s crisis shaped a new economic regime which reoriented and opened the economy towards international investment. The response to the 1980s crisis shaped the 1987 Programme for National Recovery which laid the foundations of the Celtic Tiger model of light regulation, low taxation and foreign direct investment (Murphy, 2014) and the move towards more entrepreneurial urban planning. It is beyond the scope of this paper to comprehensively analyse the complex causes of Ireland's recent economic crisis. Rather, this paper will focus on shifts in public policy and related planning trends from the mid to late 1980s, corresponding with the birth of the Celtic Tiger and the establishment of the regeneration programme for the Dublin Docklands through to the present day. Specifically, it aims to examine role of urban planning in mediating and responding to the most recent economic crisis during this period.

Since the mid 1980s, urban planning in Ireland has become increasingly infused with an ethos of entrepreneurialism with growing emphasis being placed on the facilitative role of planners rather than on their traditional reactive and essentially passive modes of operation (MacLaren et al, 2007). The transformation of Irish urban planning has not been an isolated event. In fact, the institutional and political contexts for such changes were associated with the growing penetration of political strategies, throughout Europe, by a neoliberal agenda. Such a movement is summarised by Brenner and Theodore (2002: 352) in the statement

the linchpin of neoliberal ideology is the belief that open, competitive, and unregulated markets, liberated from all forms of state interference, represent the optimal mechanism for economic development

As part of this, local authorities / municipalities have tended to move away from the managerial or development control approach that characterised their operation in the 1960s and 1970s towards a more entrepreneurial or innovative approach to city management and marketing. Harvey identifies three strands in this entrepreneurial approach: The first is a reliance on the concept of public-private partnerships (PPP) this is particularly evident in Docklands areas (like inner city Dublin) where many redevelopment projects have been undertaken by specially established development agencies working closely with private sector investors; the second characteristic of this approach is its speculative nature as the role of the public sector in these projects has, in most cases, absorbed much of the risk associated with projects to satisfy the private investors; Thirdly, these new developments tend to be place specific rather than jurisdictional, focussing on particular projects rather than on

redeveloping an entire local authority areas. Indeed, all three of these characteristics could be observed in Dublin throughout the late 1980s to the early 2000s.

4.0 A Period of Transition Responding to a Changing Dublin Docklands

One of the defining features of the Dublin Docklands has been the changing character of the area over time, and particularly during the period 1980-2008. From its origins until the later twentieth century, the area has always been a zone in transition (Moore, 2008: 165), particularly vulnerable to global economic changes. While once thriving trade resulted in a bustling port and docklands, the reverse was also true as the vibrancy of the area fluctuated in response to external conditions in the 1980s. Indeed, the history of the Docklands is quite different from the relatively more stable history of the rest of the city centre where districts have undergone less dramatic change over longer periods.

Perhaps one of the most significant periods of change occurred throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, as the area developed under an ambitious new urban regeneration programme, implemented through the use of a Special Purpose Development Authority (SPDA), first established in 1987. Two such agencies operated in the area between 1987 and 2014 – first, the Custom House Docks Development Authority (CHDDA) gained responsibility for 11 hectares of the Docklands, and operated until 1997. In 1997 this authority was subsumed by the Dublin Docklands Development Authority (DDDA), an authority which became responsible for more than 500 hectares of the Dublin Docklands until its formal dissolution in 2014.

Modelled on, and drawing upon the experience of Urban Development Corporations (UDCs) in the UK, most notably the London Docklands, these agencies operated entirely outside the jurisdiction of the Dublin City Council (then known as Dublin Corporation) Planning Department and were

endowed with planning powers to streamline planning controls and possess the operational and financial powers to undertake infrastructural developments, acquire land, reclaim it and dispose of it at a subsidised cost to private-sector developers (MacLaran, 2003: 10).

This creation of these agencies was driven, in large part, by a growing dissatisfaction with local authority planning during the late 1980s, which was considered bureaucratic and too inflexible (Bissett, 2008, 16) to tackle the scale of the city's problems. In Ireland, the traditional authority (the City and County Councils) had always focussed on development control. Yet in a context where very little development was taking place, this role became increasingly irrelevant and the role of the local authority began to be questioned (Moore, 2008).

The newly-created agency marked a radical shift in the philosophy guiding urban planning in Ireland towards more overtly facilitative entrepreneurial systems of engagement with the property-development sector. Yet of all the approaches and models introduced for entrepreneurial urban regeneration in, it is only in Dublin Docklands that a fast-track, planning process was established by the Irish Government. This fast-track planning process completely bypasses the traditional planning process, including the third-party appeal, as provided in the Planning and Development Act 2000 legislation. Under this regime, master plans (and planning schemes) were prepared for the Docklands area. The Authority could then issue what was known as a Section 25 certificate in respect of a development, which meant that once a development was consistent with the master plan or scheme it could be exempt from the requirement to obtain planning permission. Within this process, community or public participation in the planning process was limited to the master plan or scheme making phases. Once a plan was complete and approved, the public could not appeal any development seen to be consistent with the plan.

The perceived benefits of this fast track approach were set out in a report DDDA in 2008. These benefits, clearly focussed from the applicant or developer perspective, were stated as follows (Grant Thornton, 2008):

- The planning application process is shorter than the conventional planning route due to the elimination of Third Party Appeals.
- Greater certainty is ensured in planning applications submitted as part of the DDDA planning process as once development complies the respective plans within such schemes, the development will be permitted.
- The cost of the conventional planning process is often significantly higher than costs associated with applications under the DDDA planning process. This is primarily due to the presence of third party appeals, with the involvement of the Board (the Irish appeals board) driving consultants costs and therefore, applicant s costs rise.

As the focus of the regeneration project became far more commercial in orientation, questions arose around the role of Dublin City Council during this period, and around the nature of the planning system itself -

The vesting of planning powers in a pro-development body...runs the risk of challenging the legitimacy of the urban planning system itself by exposing it as a tool for legitimating the unequal distributional outcomes of the development process (MacLaran, 1993)

Particular concern was raised as the 1990s progressed, as the idea of developing an International Financial Services Centre (IFSC) became not just part of the overall plan for the docklands, but the major flagship project. In a short amount of time, the IFSC became a keystone of the entire regeneration project and today ranks as a key symbol of the new docklands. developments in other waterfront locations, and in particular that of Canary Wharf in London, the IFSC project was designed to attract international investment to Dublin with the overall aim of improving tax revenue and jump starting an ailing economy. As such, the focus of the regeneration programme, under the CHDDA, shifted as the 1990s progressed from providing for mixed use development to a far more commercial orientation. This move was also exacerbated by the changing economic climate, as Ireland experienced an unprecedented economic boom with an average growth rate of 9% in GNP between 1995 and 2001 (In contrast, most other European countries experienced annual growth levels of between 4-5%).

Hailed a major economic success by some commentators, the CHDDA prompted phenomenal demand for office space following the establishment and continued promotion of the IFSC. The focus, however, on establishing the IFSC at the site led to a predominance of office activities and a limited amount of residual development. Indeed, a report commissioned by the Department of the Environment (central government) in 1996 to examine the operations and achievements of the CHDDA found that the kinds of mixed use development and heterogeneous social profile that was intended had not emerged. The Government also recognised that planned trickle marginalised communities had also failed to happen in the now largely mono-functional landscape as a growing divide was emerging between the new Docklands area and the surrounding communities (Bartley & Treadwell-Shine, 2003; in McCrory, 2013).

In 1997, the CHDDA was subsumed by the DDDA under legislation to encompass redevelopment and regeneration of a larger area (526 hectares) of Dublin s docklands. The legislative remit of the Authority was wider than that of the CHDDA, and required it to secure three primary goals the social and economic regeneration of the Docklands area on a sustainable basis; improvements in the physical environment of the Docklands area; the continued development of financial services activities

in the Docklands area. Yet, following its establishment much of the population and socio-economic trends continued. Indeed, between 1981 and the mid 2000s, there were significant changes in the employment and social structure of the inner city. The population, declining quite rapidly between 1981 and 1991, began to increase quite substantially between 1991 and 2006 from 20,146 to 27,652 (see table 1, below).

	1981	1986	1991	1996	2002	2006
Total DDDA Area	23,205	21,708	20,146	21,341	24,061	27,652
% Change over previous Census	-4.10%	-6.90%	-7.80%	5.60%	11.30%	13.00%

Table 1: Population Change in the DDDA area between 1981 and 2006 (Source: Adapted from Moore, 2008)

In addition, between 1991 and 2002, there were two notable changes to the tenure structure of the area: a large increase in the number of households in privately rented accommodation, which more than doubled from 5,611 to 13,272 households; and a 20% reduction in the number of households in social housing (resulting from the sale or privatisation of existing stock and the decline in the number of new social housing units being constructed). Since 2002, the change in tenure has been even more dramatic, with the number of households in privately rented accommodation again more than doubling to 28,286, representing 51% of all households. In 2011, households in owner occupation and privately rented accommodation accounted for 77% of the total, up from 53% in 1991 and 63% in 2002. (MacLaran and Kelly, 2014: 175)

Such developments, according to MacLaren and Kelly (2014: 178) were characteristic of an area undergoing a process of gentrification, which they define as

a process of broad socio-spatial change which centres on the transformation of working class neighbourhoods into middle class residential and / or new commercial spaces .

This was also demonstrated by significant changes to the age structure of the population (there was a 90% increase in the number of adults aged between 25 and 44 years), levels of education achieved and employment rates. While the docklands came to embody all the positive aspects of the Celtic Tiger economy, it also in many ways demonstrated the underbelly of that growth, in particular the emergence of a dual city . While spatial or geographical proximity between a had increased, the problems of social polarisation became a huge concern in the docklands and elsewhere in the mid 1990s. Although thousands of jobs had been created in the new economic activities based around the financial services sector, they did nothing to address the long term unemployed residents in the area, many of whom were either manual or unskilled workers.

5.0 The Dublin Docklands in a Post Crisis Context

From the mid 1990 s until the onset of the global economic crisis in 2007, Ireland was one of the strongest economies in Europe. During the 1990s the so called Celtic Tiger Ireland experienced an average annual rate of 7.5%, more than three times the European average at the time (Murphy, 2000). In the last few years of this boom era however, Ireland's property market entered a high-growth phase which eventually burst in 2007, leading Ireland into the greatest economic recession in the country's history. Moore-Cherry and Vinci (2012) contend that it is precisely because of the development model, described as predicated on constant growth to function (Kitchin, 2007), from 1986-2006 , heavily reliant on borrowed money to fuel an overheated property sector, that the post 2007 crisis has had such a major impact on the social, economic and physical landscape of Dublin.

Unlike as has happened previously in other European countries such as Sweden and Iceland, Ireland's banks were not allowed to collapse under the debt burden created during the boom. In order to introduce liquidity into the Irish banking system the state took a two-pronged approach: (1) direct recapitalisation or nationalisation of the banks; (2) relieving the banks of their toxic assets by purchasing all property loans of 5m or more and placing them in a new state agency to behalf of the taxpayer (Kitchin et al, 2010). This state agency, established in 2009, is the National Asset Management Agency or NAMA. NAMA, having taken control of many of Ireland's unfinished developments and zoned land, became the largest land owner in the state.

Within the Docklands, and other parts of the inner city, a number of key challenges started to emerge relating to a number of large scale partly completed developments; the lack of financing across both the public and private sectors as many of the largest developers became bankrupt; and social issues relating to the impacts of emerging austerity policies. A number of sites in the Docklands which were bought by the DDDA in boom times using compulsory purchase orders were later transferred to NAMA at a fraction of their initial value. Indeed, the DDDA lost an estimated 180 million from seven property deals (Phelan, 2014) over the course of the crisis. In February 2012, in light of its emerging financial difficulties, the Government Auditor General undertook a review of the activities of the DDDA. Three DDDA Executive Board members were also members on the boards of Bank of Ireland and Anglo Irish Bank (one was Chairman of the Board at Anglo Irish Bank), where the DDDA sought funding for a number of sites. The report raises concern of potential issues which may occur in these circumstances.

The huge financial losses suffered by the DDDA, combined with the findings of this report, led to the announcement in 2012 that the DDDA was to be disbanded. In 2014, the government published the General Scheme of the Dublin Docklands Development Authority (Dissolution) Bill, a stand-alone piece of legislation which provides for the transfer of certain responsibilities, rights and liabilities for the Docklands area to Dublin City Council.

As Ireland emerges from the worst economic crisis it has faced since independence, questions have been asked about the extent to which the crisis could have been minimised or reduced. The rapid and highly unsustainable development patterns experienced in Dublin over the past two decades were made possible by a combination of political and institutional factors, in particular the relationship between planning, politicians and the property development sector (Moore-Cherry, 2012). The neoliberal approach to development characterised by de-regulated planning in places like the docklands and the willing transfer of power to semi private and private interests by the state, resulted in an environment within which massive speculation was permitted and indeed encouraged. Over the course of the crisis, the legitimacy of the DDDA was called into question and the Irish planning system suffered serious reputational damage. Indeed, Kitchin et al (2010:2) affirm that as well as a catastrophic failure in Ireland's banking and financial regulatory system, there has been a failure of the planning system at all scales.

Today, Dublin City Council is now responsible for leading the social, economic and physical regeneration of the Dublin Docklands. Yet, the 2014 dissolution bill also refers to a continuation of fast track planning procedures, as part of a new planning mechanism to be used in the Docklands. In May 2014, part of the Docklands (former) DDDA area (66 hectares) was designated a Strategic Development Zone or SDZ by the government. A number of special rules apply to planning and development in an SDZ. These rules make it significantly easier to obtain planning permission for development which is consistent with a Planning Scheme in force for an SDZ and prohibit planning permission for development which is not consistent with it. Similar to the DDDA approach, there is no right of public appeal against a decision of a planning authority on an application

for planning permission in an SDZ. The planning authority may also acquire land in an SDZ, compulsorily if necessary. Fox-Rogers et al. (2011, 650) contends that

The power to designate SDZs is an example of the Government's desire to retain the power to intervene in the planning process (Fox-Rogers et al., 2011, 655).

It is also important to note that NAMA has an interest in 75% of the 22 hectares that are available for development (out of the full 66 ha) in the SDZ area. In light of NAMA's primary objective of obtaining the best achievable financial return on these assets, the potential for future planning and development of the inner city should be a critical concern. While achieving the best financial gain may be in the tax payers interest it cannot be considered a core planning objective. NAMA must make important decisions about strategic land holdings and yet there is no overall spatial vision for NAMA assets. The incremental and disjointed disposal of property based assets, it could be argued represents a quick fix property based solution to a property based crisis. Moreover, such focus on reviving stalled developments (which in many cases should never have got through the planning process in the first instance) can undermine and inhibit new attempts at innovation and entrepreneurship.

Irish urban planning is at an important crossroad and inevitably, the legacy of this period will influence theory and practice for years to come. As Murphy asserts, one might expect both the scale and impact of the recent crisis years to bring about a path shaping moment. Yet Wickham (2013) argues that such shifts have not taken place and that Ireland is surviving. The overall character of policy and institutions remains constant and this is evident in the Dublin Docklands. While the planning and development of the area is no longer the remit of a private authority, the planning mechanisms remain much of the same with the overarching focus, it could be argued, predicated on quick fixes to stimulate markets and reinstate growth.

6.0 Conclusion

There is an extensive amount of research on *how* and *why* the global financial crisis has evolved since 2007. However, although there have been studies on *responses* to the crisis, these have typically been conducted at the national or international level. Little or no attention has been given to how municipalities and cities have responded to the crisis. This paper (and the research project from which it stems) works towards closing this gap. This paper proposes that in studying responses to the crisis, and the resilience of cities, it is necessary to understand the adaptive capacity of urban planning systems. In doing so, we must seek to explore preconditions under which spatial and institutional challenges lead to adaptations of planning system characteristics (including legal configurations, tools and spatially relevant discourses).

In Ireland, responses to previous crises (in particular, the 1980s economic crisis) have created path shaping moments for public policy and urban planning. Following the 1980s crisis, Ireland adopted a development model which was predicated on constant growth to function (Kitchin's model shaped the direction of urban planning in the years to follow, including the new planning mechanisms implemented in the Dublin Docklands. These mechanisms, utilising flexible approaches under the direction of private development authorities, were designed to promote more flexible or adaptive forms of planning in response to a system that was perceived to be bureaucratic and too inflexible to tackle the scale of the city's problems in that period. Yet, the use of tools to promote flexibility cannot be considered a flexible planning system. Indeed, the use of such approaches within the context of the crisis contributed quite substantially to the issues the area faced as the 2000s progressed.

Indeed a number of scholars increasingly highlight a perceived inability of current (market driven) planning systems to adequately enhance the resilience of urban areas due to the sustaining nature of neoliberal ideology (Eraydin, 2013; Fainstein, 2013; Joseph, 2013). Related to this, has been a critique of planning theory in addressing urban vulnerability in a neoliberal age. Urban policy; legislation on urban governance and planning systems; and some institutional changes have emerged, but, according to Eraydin (2013), they have not been supported by a new planning perspective and this has certainly been the case in Ireland, and in the Docklands. It is thus argued that a new paradigm, focussing on the need for greater adaptive and reorganisational capacity in urban systems, is required. Eraydin, (2013) proposes that resilience thinking can form the basis of an alternative planning approach, within a process that will focus on value systems and power relations. Thus, it is argued that a more detailed theoretical understanding of institutional and organisational mechanisms shaping resilience debates and action needs to be developed.

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