

Planners and the moral power of the “unpleasant”

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Abstract

Aesthetics are paying increasing attention to negative sensations and to individual judgements that cannot aspire to universal validity. The agreeable or pleasant, and especially its converse the unpleasant, have a considerable motivating power for action, often intertwined with ethical judgment, legitimizing action in the public sphere.

The aesthetic and ethical power of the unpleasant is illustrated by three case studies in Madrid. The first one is tactical urbanism response for street redesign (Vallecas, Arboleda street). The second one (Puerta del Sol) shows the accommodation of the public space to the pressure of touristification, to foster economic opportunities. The third case one (Green Southwest Boulevard) shows the consolidation of pre-existing power relations in response to a blighting process.

Keywords: Aesthetics, planning ethics; unpleasant; pragmatism; public space

The unpleasant as an aesthetic category

Kant paid little attention to what we now call negative aesthetic categories such as the unpleasant, the ugly or the disgusting. His most elaborated reflection on these appears in his *Critic of Judgement* (1790, §48) with an inspiring distinction between the unpleasant (which can be beautifully represented in art objects), and the disgusting (which cannot). Disgust has a sort of imposing nature which cannot be overcome, so that any object attempting to represent it cannot be dissociated with the nature of the object itself. (Kuplen, 2011). Three key features of Kantian aesthetics are positiveness (focus on beauty and the beautiful object), the disinterest of aesthetic judgments and the potential of aesthetic judgments to be universally participated, in spite of their subjective nature.

One of the first attempts to critically analyse negative aesthetic categories comes with Rosenkranz's *Ästhetik des Hässlichen* (1853). The ugly is not the mere opposite of the beautiful, but more precisely the negation of total unity and formal definitude; amorphousness or, in other words, the absence of a boundary to the outside and, internally, the absence of distinction: asymmetry and disharmony turn objects ugly.

Dewey's aesthetics turn the focus from the object to the subject or, better, to their interaction. As Dewey (1934) considers *Art as Experience*, he is placing aesthetic judgments in the humbler realm of contingent human experiences, challenging their pretence for universality and disinterest. Imagination- a human trait that can be developed through education- plays a key role in creating such experiences. For a pragmatist, there are many kinds of aesthetic experience, especially if- as Dewey did- there is no precise definition of the term or restrictions about its appropriate usage. As Shusterman, (2012) puts it, “not all of the experiences or reactions that we call aesthetic are experiences of pleasure; not only are there bad aesthetic experiences that provide no pleasure (except by the relief of their ending), but there are also valuable aesthetic experiences that cannot be described as pleasurable”. Furthermore, aesthetic experiences can generate from everyday experiences, and are likely to merge with other human experiences, including moral ones.

Dewey's pragmatic aesthetics considerably expands the realm of aesthetic appreciation and gives room to aesthetically reflect on the ugly, the disgusting or the unpleasant (negative aesthetics), the objects and events of everyday life (everyday aesthetics), or interest and action embedded in aesthetic experiences (aesthetic engagement). Berleant develops all these dimensions with the concepts of the aesthetic field (1970), aesthetic engagement (1991), environmental aesthetics (1992) and negative aesthetics (2010). Together, they provide a

unique framework to analyse how the relationship between people and urban places (the built environment) creates an aesthetic experience prone to action.

Miller (2021) summarises the realm of negative aesthetics in Berleant (2010) as what is "*perceptually distressing, repellent, or painful, or [that which] has effects that are harmful or destructive*" and is elusive to rational criticism: "*The aesthetically negative often slips by unnoticed and eludes critical scrutiny, settling into vague discomfiture. Part of this discomfort... may result from the subtle presence of negativity or from the very failure to recognize that aesthetic negativity is indeed present*".... Berleant (2010) notes that, in the context of landscape and built environments, aesthetic negativity often takes the form of aesthetic deprivation. It is not surprising that, for Berleant (2017), the moral and the aesthetic are two dimensions along which negative aesthetics may operate.

Aesthetic engagement becomes for Berleant (2013) as the central concept of an alternative to the aesthetic disinterestedness that was central to traditional aesthetic theory. It emphasises the holistic and contextual character of aesthetic appreciation. The attention of critical scrutiny moves from the aesthetic object to the situations and the ways in which engagement arises. For Berleant, as for pragmatic aesthetics (Shusterman, 1992), aesthetic value involves experience that is somatic and not exclusively psychological.

Forsey (2016) makes a useful distinction between the various categories in negative aesthetics. The ugly- like the beautiful in Kant- has a disinterested note and an ambition for universal validity. The disgusting leads to visceral responses associated to immediate sensorial or somatic reactions that cannot be overcome. The unpleasant, however, has great motivating power together with a modesty well suited to our daily lives; it is an aesthetic category referring to physical sensations that engage our higher faculties, spurring imagination, creativeness and, ultimately, action. The fact that it does not have universalising demands does not mean that the unpleasant is completely subjective: in fact, it can be shared, eventually engaging people in acting together.

The unpleasant is for Forsey (2016) a *catalyser* of aesthetic action. Such call for action is spurred not only from the displeasure it generates, but also from our closeness to it (it forms part of our environment, and even of our everyday, which is not the case for the ugly) and from its relatively manageable size (which is not the case for the disgusting). Furthermore, the unpleasant is often morally charged as a sort of disorder, unbalance or unfairness (such as in contact with dilapidation, dirt, etc.), especially in objects or places shared with others, from our home in which we may receive friends and family to public spaces in the city. That is the intuition Saito (2001 and 2007) develops in its everyday aesthetics, looking at daily events and actions in which the human sensorial faculties are *saliently at stake*. It is also from this perspective that our judgment cannot remain purely personal, and claims some kind of minor generality, getting us involved in a- does not matter how small- community of others.

The moral and the aesthetic experience in the unpleasant

It is well known that for Wittgenstein (1923) "*ethics and aesthetics are one and the same*" (Tractatus 6.421). Appelqvist (2013) explores the sense of such identity. Aesthetics and ethics are equally transcendental and ineffable, because they both look at their respective objects (the work of art or the good life) under the same (*sub specie aeternitatis*) way of seeing, i.e., from outside. Beauty, as happiness, "*relies on the way of looking at the world*". The attitude shared by ethics and aesthetics is a feeling: "*Feeling the world as a limited whole- it is this that is mystical*" (Tractatus 6.45).

Such attitude would require the renunciation to any interest and the renunciation to seeing objects and things from the midst of them, but the latter is precisely the pragmatic understanding of the aesthetic experience and the perspective of the aesthetic engagement. By renouncing to transcendentalism and even to any pretence of universality, the pragmatic approach does not pursue any identification of aesthetics and ethics in the human experience, but this does not mean that some kind of contingent convergence is not possible. In fact, much of modern art includes some sort of ethical claims at their core, and art is eventually seen as a form of self-improvement or cultivation, for example in somaesthetics (Shusterman, 2014) or in the *art of living* pervasive in many Eastern traditions.

The unpleasant arises discomfort, as repeatedly described in works on everyday aesthetics and environmental aesthetics. It arouses our will for action and our longing for change. What is interesting is that such longing is strengthened when intertwined with some sort of ethical judgment. The combination of the feeling of the unpleasant (but not the ugly, which is contemplated without interest or engagement, nor the disgusting, which leaves us paralysed if not running away) with the feeling of the morally wrong (but not the absolutely evil, which can be seen as a particular form of the disgusting, preventing any positive action) is what emboldens the subject to presume that her judgement may have some potential of generality, and what triggers her resolution to act in the public sphere. Note that the merely *unpleasant*- as a personal judgment- hardly legitimizes such action in the public space, although it can certainly move to action in the private sphere: changing the wall colour in my room or tidying up my desk.

It is possible to find ethical considerations as a powerful leverage to trigger action out of an aesthetic experience. Note that the process moving to action is more likely to be triggered by the aesthetic experience, and that ethical considerations subsequently come to further spur the motivation for action. The urban public space is an excellent field to observe such process and the intertwining of aesthetics and ethics.

Such intertwining may be used by planners and by other urban stakeholders to gain support to their proposals for urban interventions. The subjective aesthetic experience of unpleasantness gains in generality when it is compounded with ethical motivations, enabling collective action. Micro-policies in the urban public space, like those addressing street design or mobility management, provide an excellent illustration of such intertwining of an aesthetic experience with ethical values, (1) by strengthening the claim for wider generalization of subjective judgements, and (2) by offering to those engaged in action small wins with immediate (aesthetic) satisfaction and strong ethical symbolism. Ultimately, it is the aesthetic-ethical connection which makes of the urban landscape "*markers of inclusion and exclusion in planning*" (Duncan, 2004) or "*a medium of identity formation and power relations*" (Mitchell, 1994).

Ironically, the theory and practice of planning engaging public spaces have often crystallized in a "dictatorship of the visual" in contemporary beautified cityscapes which, beyond hiding or displacing what is considered as unacceptable, introduce active practice of control over them (De Martine-Ugolotti and Genova, 2025). Modern commercial spaces, over-touristified neighbourhoods and fenced urban developments all share the traits of aesthetically led planning. Needless to say, far from begetting an aesthetic experience in the pragmatic sense, they are firmly imposed on city dwellers and visitors alike with their undisguised pretence of completeness and immobility. Such cityscapes can be not merely ugly but utterly disgusting, especially for those intertwining them with ethical considerations on power and domination. But such negative aesthetic experiences are overwhelming, unlikely to engage the wider array of people necessary to unfetter any collective action.

Current debates on the pervasive touristification of the cityscape can be read from a Deweyan perspective. For residents, familiarity, safety and identity are likely to be key traits in their everyday aesthetic experience. Such everyday traits can also trigger strong aesthetic experiences also in visitors sensitive enough to appreciate them. Aesthetically led planning, however, prefers the shortcut offered by blunt standardization of the public space for its subsequent commercialization. For residents and aesthetically aware visitors, the unpleasant moves to engagement; for massive tourism, it merely reduces commercial value.

The merely unpleasant, on the contrary, belongs to the unstable realm of the provisional; it is perceived as a temporal situation, a work-in-progress waiting- and even urgently calling- for our intervention. Therefore, it can be wishfully manipulated by planners as a way to gain momentum for subsequent collective action. One obvious example is tactical urbanism, especially within highly controversial sustainable mobility policies reallocating the street space. Whereas the negative aesthetic experience resulting from a car-dominated street or square is neutralised by daily routine and by the incremental way in which cars have conquered and transformed the cityscape, the aesthetic perception of the unpleasant by a handful of planners moves them into action, initially just to highlight with some minor painting and cheap street furniture the obvious inconsistencies of the situation.

Important to note that such tactical actions do not create a pleasant perception, very much on the contrary: the clearly provisional and unstable image tactical urbanism creates widens and generalizes an aesthetic experience that calls for subsequent action. But such call for action is not a move back to the original situation, due to the fact that now the unfairness of car-dominance has been taken to the forefront; it is that intertwining between aesthetics and ethics that make it possible to engage and move forward towards an alternative, more permanent (and expensive) design, in which the new power relations established by the tactical intervention are consolidated.

This example shows instability as one key feature of the unpleasant. If unaddressed, the unpleasant may deteriorate into the ugly (blighting). The ugly can claim universality, but it does not call as much for action as for simple cancellation, even if such cancellation is expensive in city planning. In fact, blighting has been profusely used by urban decision makers (and planners) as a strategy to subsequently claim the need to further adapt cities to cars (i.e. by increasing road capacity with expensive tunnels on the pretence of removing traffic from the surface). It is relevant to note that the aesthetic experience of ugliness, or the action for its cancellation, does not intertwine with any ethical considerations.

Planners dealing with the unpleasant: the case of street space

Cities- and particularly urban roads and streets- show how planners make use in different ways of the strength of the unpleasant to mobilize action. In some cases, they actually create the unpleasant as a way to highlight the moral inconsistency of the *statu quo* and to gain momentum for radical changes; in other cases, they provide more or less sophisticated aesthetic criticisms on the urban space, which often remain unnoticed but sometimes push decision makers to act, implementing more or less elitist projects with unexpected outcomes; in some cases, the unpleasant is left untouched by inaction, until it turns into the ugly or even the unbearably disgusting; in this case, the request for action does not come as much from planners as it does from outraged citizens or concerned decision-makers, asking planners for quick and radical change, although without challenging the causes at the root of such ugliness. The combination of the aesthetic power and ethical dimension of the public space is different in each case: respectively, with moral judgment triggering action, with aesthetic judgment claiming moral authority and with aesthetic judgment virtually ignoring moral considerations.

These approaches can be illustrated through three cases studies in Madrid, in which the planning response is ethically charged in different ways. The first case study corresponds to a tactical urbanism response provided by a street redesign in the south of Madrid (Vallecas, Arboleda street) in which power relations are first revealed and subsequently transformed. The second case study (Green Southwest Boulevard, A-5) shows a decades-long strategy of inaction leading to blighting, turning the unpleasant into the socially unbearable, and paving the way to the adoption of solutions based on the consolidation of the existing power relations in the distribution of street space. The third case study (Puerta del Sol) shows how a *beautification* attitude results in the accommodation of the public space to the pressure of touristification, changing power relations on the ethical grounds of fostering economic opportunities.

A similar itinerary is followed below in the description of each of the three interventions. After a short description, the paper examines (1) who are the actors that initially provide the judgment of unpleasantness, (2) what such actors identify with unpleasantness in the site, (3) the character of the moral considerations associated with the aesthetic judgment, (4) the actors whose interests are privileged or relegated by the aesthetic intervention and (5) the costs associated with the intervention.



Figure 1: Tactical intervention in Arboleda Street, Vallecas District, Madrid (2019)

Arboleda Street in Madrid provides access from one main transport hub in Vallecas District to a small University Campus, going through a blighted industrial area that has been waiting for decades the implementation of a residential development project. This semi-abandoned street served mostly as an on-street parking area for trucks and cars and induced high-speed traffic for those entering or leaving the Campus by car. The tactical action was implemented in 2018, installing (quite ugly) precast concrete barriers to expand walkways and painting an unprotected bike lane. This was well received by most street users, as well as by district residents, hoping that this would accelerate decisions about the larger regeneration project. Nevertheless, further action to consolidate the new distribution of the street space was postponed until the end of 2024, when the regeneration project for the main lot (*Tubos Borondo*, 137.074 m², with 11.2 million of public investment) was finally launched. In accordance with such project, the final design of Arboleda street will consolidate the tactical intervention, privileging pedestrians and cyclists.

It is fair to say that the unbalanced distribution of the space in Arboleda street had remained generally unnoticed, until mobility experts and planners highlighted it through their tactical intervention, and the unpleasantness of the place was highlighted with the grey concrete barriers protecting pedestrians. In doing so, these experts and planners visualised how this “no-man’s land” had been conquered by cars and trucks, not only neglecting soft modes, but actively expelled them. The aesthetic judgment was strongly intertwined with a moral judgment on the fair distribution of street space; in fact, it was even at the root of the action: the aesthetic unpleasantness was a consequence of wrong decisions in the allocation of the street space. Logically, the tactical intervention (and the subsequent regeneration project) privileges soft mode users as well as future residents, while relegating car traffic and on-street parking. The costs of the tactical intervention stayed in the tens of thousands and the public contribution to the regeneration project is 11.2 million.

Most of the surroundings of the road linking Madrid with the southwest of the country (Extremadura) and Lisbon in the outskirts of Madrid were in the past occupied by large military compounds and agricultural land.

The former were progressively abandoned since the 1980s, and the latter were replaced by high-density low-quality residential compounds since the 1950s. Urban growth, combined with the enlargement of the road to accommodate a motorway in 1968 created a progressively unattainable situation for residents.

At the end of the 1980s, as most of the military compounds had been abandoned, talks about a comprehensive regeneration plan for the whole area (named as *Operación Campamento*) proliferated, although with no tangible results. Traffic on the motorway kept growing and, in 2003, the new elected mayor announced a plan to replace the inner orbital motorway by a tunnel, including a tunnel for the 3 km of the Extremadura motorway closer to the city centre. This would not affect the area of *Operación Campamento*, but raised hopes among residents that a similar tunnel could sometime in future be built to get them rid of the motorway. Nothing happened, however, in the next decades, while residents experienced how their environment continued degrading. Demand management options to substantially reduce car traffic and traffic speed and allowing for the transformation of the motorway into a boulevard were analysed by some planners but such proposals were dismissed not only by decision makers afraid of the reaction of car users, by also by a part of the residents, encouraged by the active lobbying of the construction sector and others pushing for the tunnel option. Finally, in 2022, the project to build a 12-km long tunnel was approved, although only 3.2 km would be built in its first stage, started at the end of 2024, with a cost of € 408 million; the remaining of the 12-km tunnel will need to wait until the regeneration project of the old military sites generates enough cashflow to finance it.



Figure 2: The A-5 in Batán neighbourhood, Madrid (2024)

The area had been neglected for decades, since the first urban settlements started at the beginning of the XX century, in what is now known as Colonia Jardín, Batán and Lucero. Batán and Lucero already had a significant population in 1960, and shortly afterwards (1966-68), the road was enlarged and transformed into an 8-lane motorway, in some sections less than 1 meter away from residential buildings. The first buildings in Aluche, another residential development close to the motorway, appear in 1960 and the area is virtually fully consolidated at the beginning of the 1980s.

As traffic grew (and also as more pressing issues such as schools, public transport, basic equipment and parks were addressed), residents became more aware about the unpleasantness-turning-into-ugliness of their cityscape, identified the A-5 motorway as the main source of blighting, and mobilized with demonstrations

starting in the 1990s. They complained about noise, air quality, security and safety concerns, poor lighting of subway pedestrian crossing, and other nuisances linked to the motorway. For those in Madrid not living in the area, the neighbourhoods along A-5 were merely a no-man's land in the outskirts of the capital, very much an unnoticed place. If addressed in the 1990s or in the 2000s, the residents' concerns could still have been addressed with simple traffic and demand management measures to progressively reduce the number of cars and encouraging their users to try the alternative bus, metro and commuter train lines, but when this was tried, in 2018, it was probably too late. By then, the construction coalition had successfully created an alternative vision, replacing the motorway section by a long tunnel, as had been done 15 years ago with most of the inner orbital motorway. In spite of such strong opposition, the municipality introduced a traffic management scheme reducing speeds and capacity, but a change in the municipal leadership resulted in the removal of the concept after only 4 months of operation.

The aesthetic judgment associated to the unpleasant initially referred to the poor living conditions created by the motorway in already socially stressed neighbourhoods.

Surprisingly, as a way to strengthen the claim for the tunnel project, car users were also considered to be treated unfairly should traffic conditions be restricted. This resulted in planners developing a solution primarily addressing car users' interests (a tunnel with similar capacity to the existing motorway) and residents getting rid of the perceived nuisances. The project was named as the Green Southwest Boulevard. What is debatable is whether the resulting green corridor above the tunnel will be able to generate the sort of dynamics and liveability than the transformation of the motorway into a boulevard was expected to launch. Obviously, the costs for the taxpayer skyrocketed to the hundreds of million. The instability leading to radical action, in spite of high costs, grew incrementally due to the inaction of planners and decision makers.

The recent reform of Puerta del Sol can be seen as a good example of the adaptation of the public space to touristification. It could be said that virtually any mayor in Madrid has tried to leave its footprint in Puerta del Sol. A busy (if not messy) irregular crossroads of eleven streets, which took the form of a rectangular square in the XVI century and was transformed into its now characteristic semi-elliptical layout surrounded by homogenous 30-m high white façades in 1860. Since then, multiple reforms adapted this space to the claims of the day: leaving space first to trams and later to cars, setting, displacing or removing fountains and sculptures, placing or removing vegetation and trees... In 2009, after long and costly works to establish a major underground transport hub (including metro and commuter railway lines) and to dedicate most of the space to pedestrians, some thought that the time for reforms was over. And yet... only a four years later, the regional association of architects successfully lobbied the municipality to launch an international competition to redesign the site, on the basis that *Puerta del Sol* was lacking a well-balanced visual image.

Disorder was, therefore, in the essence of the unpleasantness felt by these professional body. No moral considerations were made here, beyond the certainty that "Madrid deserved better". Surprisingly for a call focused on aesthetical considerations, the obvious point that the landmarks located in this square were little more than a bunch of kitsch objects lacking artistic merit was not mentioned at any time by either those asking for action or those participating in the contest. The winning project (subsequently subject to some minor changes at the final implementation stage) provides a clean space, better suited for an occasional visit than for recurrent stand-byers, by rearranging its traditional landmarks. Although not implemented until now, the winning project also intended to replace the main entrance to the underground public transport hub with a more *discreet* one, as if it were better to hide the daily lives of citizens to allow tourists and visitors to enjoy a clean cityscape. The new layout implicitly relegated daily local passers-by and the few remaining residents in the vicinity of the square, while fostering its iconic value for occasional visitors and singular events. No significant changes in mobility behaviour were expected, as the site was already almost fully pedestrianized, although it could be argued that locals would probably prefer to avoid the site and use alternative routes instead of crossing such a space. Tax-payers footed a bill than reached € 12 million. Unpleasantness in this case seems to generate from elitist professional criticism (and ambition to intervene in a highly symbolic space) that allies with the ambition of

decision makers to intervene in such spaces; in fact, this has been a traditional mechanism in the history of urban planning and the source for the creation of both, revered public spaces and wasteful arrangements, the one destined to survive for generations, the latter just waiting for the next politician to convene another international contest.



Figure 3: Tiding up Puerta del Sol, Madrid (2024)

Conclusions

The unpleasant can be understood as a key aesthetic category, in spite of lacking the Kantian traits of positiveness, disinterest and universality. In fact, the absence of these traits is what can turn the unpleasant- and more generally *negative aesthetics*- into a leverage for action in planning. For turning into action, the aesthetic judgment of the unpleasant is often intertwined with moral judgments, although in different ways. For example, planners in tactical urbanism often challenge consolidate power relations in the public space and aim at rebalancing them, provisionally with visually unpleasant arrangements to gain legitimacy for such rebalancing as a way to build up the consensus to consolidate the new power relations with more permanent and costly designs. Planners in traffic engineering may prioritise the consolidation of pre-existing power relations, generally favouring car traffic, and use the unpleasant and inaction towards its deterioration as a way to gain support for costly infrastructure solutions preserving car hegemony. Planners following the city beautification tradition may use unpleasantness as a label to use in elitist aesthetic criticism of existing public spaces, to influence decision makers and undertake dubious public space reforms on the ground of fostering economic development opportunities. This has been illustrated by three case studies in Madrid.

Besides showing different ways of identifying the unpleasant to make of it a force for change, the three case studies also show other differences. First, in the different relevance they give to everyday experiences, characterised by the prioritisation they give to certain actors compared to others: Everyday experiences become the focus for planners when residents or daily passers-by are put at the centre. This is pretty much the case in *Vallecas* and much the contrary in *Puerta del Sol* (where the casual experience of tourists or attendants to events is clearly privileged). The third case study (the A-5 motorway) stands somewhere in the middle: residents are given a brand new public space in what used to be a major barrier and a source of nuisance and blight, but planners have not cared much about the residents' everyday practices and how these practices may be affected by the new design; there is not much clue about whether everyday life will go on without making much use of the renovated space or will change in unforeseen ways, for good or bad.

Another difference revealed by the three case studies, closely linked to the ethical dimension, refers to the ambition for transformation of dominance and submission relationships. In the three case studies, mobility and public space distribution are at the centre of the intended actions, although with quite diverse sensitivities. In Vallecas, space reallocation is at the centre of the tactical action and of the subsequent permanent intervention it intends to kick off; therefore, there is a significant change in the dominance relationships, changing priorities from cars and trucks to pedestrians and cyclists. In the A-5 motorway, there is a similar push for change, although with a significant difference: residents and pedestrians (as well as, eventually, public transport users) are expected to benefit, but without compromising the conditions of car traffic; in fact, the intervention can be better understood as a way to protect the mobility privileges of car users at a moment in which they could be challenged by residents and other actors in the public space. In Sol, the pedestrians-cars relationship had already stopped to be relevant many years ago, and conflicts were now growing between different kinds of pedestrians: close-by residents, daily passers-by, tourists, and occasional attendants of flagship events, with these two already establishing their dominance; the intervention obviously takes sides in their favour.

The case studies also show how the social (and the planners') toleration to the unpleasant is quite different depending on the parts of the city under scrutiny. Central public spaces have historically been the most sensitive places to the criticism of mainstream planners as well as urban designers that see intervention in these areas as an opportunity to gain social prestige. On the contrary, the no-man's land in the outskirts of cities is likely to remain unnoticed for decades, and even when they receive the attention of advocacy planners or the living conditions attain the unbearable sparking the protests of residents, the planning bureaucracy and decision makers are slow to react. Interestingly, once they receive the attention of a wider group of stakeholders, such places may be perceived by developers and infrastructure contractors as an investment opportunity provided the political and social pressure forces decision makers to poured tax-payers' money in expensive infrastructural solutions, like the A-5 tunnels analysed above, and they actively engage in establishing coalitions to push for such expensive solutions. In short, planners actively participate in the social construction of the unpleasant, although in different ways, and such differences show how planners align with different urban development agendas.

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