

BEING AND PLANNING

Sophie Sturup¹, and Nicholas Low²

¹A1 Affiliation (Xi'an Jiaotong – Liverpool University), sophie.sturup@xjtlu.edu.cn

²A2 & A3 Affiliation (University of Melbourne), npl@unimelb.edu.au

*Hannah Arendt in *The Human Condition* wrote of the substitution, in modern times, of the ‘social’ for the ‘political’, thereby creating a situation of ‘worldlessness’ wherein the ground on which we could be held to account for our self-construction has disappeared. This ‘worldless’ world, in Peter Wagner’s words, is ‘a world in which social relations may have global extensions, but are so thin and ephemeral that contemporary modern human beings are held to realize their own lives in a social context that they cannot conceive as their own’ (Wagner 2012, 66). Planning is left trying to construct a collective reality in an ephemeral and indeterminate social context where the only ground for determinations of truth and right is individual opinion .*

*In this paper we approach the question of ‘worldhood’ from the ontological and phenomenological perspective of Heidegger’s *Being and Time*. We attempt a preliminary exploration of the ‘Being’ of planning and the ‘Being’ of planner as *Dasein* (the one that is there, for whom the world occurs). Our task is to identify the ‘worldhood of the world’ of planning and planner, and relate Heidegger’s insights to the problem of ‘worldlessness’ facing the planner in today’s modernity. From *Being and Time* we take two aspects of Heidegger’s thought of helpful potential for planning in a worldless world, his concepts of authenticity and truth, noting that Heidegger always thinks in terms of both the positive and privative (or deficient) modes of qualities with which *Dasein* relates to Others and to the world.*

Keywords, Heidegger, Arendt, Ontology of planner

1. Introduction

This paper is an attempt to consider the relationship between the world as it now is and the occurring world of the planner (as reflected in the actions, rationality, knowledge and technology of the planner) to see if this sheds light on why what we now call ‘strategic’ planning has become problematic if not entirely meaningless.

We commence with a consideration of Heidegger’s understanding of how Being works, that there is a relationship between Being and the actual and occurring world, and that the occurring world can be understood as a world view (*Weltanschauung*) which grants being to the one for whom that world occurs. We then seek to uncover key features of the world view of planners (or the Being of planners). To do so we use a version of a methodology developed from Dean (1999) and Foucault (1991) in understanding governmentality, which holds that the world view in play in a particular situation (in our case that of modern planners) can be understood through a historical analysis that identifies which technologies, rationality, and knowledge, survive and transform over time (Sturup 2010).

Having established these features of the world view of planners, the paper turns to a discussion of the idea of the worldlessness of the world presented by Arendt and Wagner amongst others. These authors posit that there has been a decided shift away from a world which can be understood as fabricated by humans (*Daseins*) and it has been replaced by a social world. In this view fabrication is

the act of bringing into being an object which is already envisaged, an object which is designed to hold an envisagement of the world through its existence (Arendt, 1958). Such objects include tables, institutions, and persons of historical significance. Such a fabricated world includes a public realm in which humans can fabricate themselves as public beings, beings which they come to be known as, and have a kind of historical longevity. This public realm is also the space in which humans come to create and maintain the distinction between one another. A planned world is clearly one that is fabricated. Arendt suggests that the public realm has been replaced with a ‘social’ world. The social world is one that allows complete and ongoing creation of the self, without any prior envisaging of who we might be. It is a world which displaces any relationship between the social self and the fabricated world in which human society functions and is maintained with any longevity.

Our discussion then turns on consideration of how this destruction of the fabricated world and the public realm, and its replacement with the ‘social’ interacts with the being of planner. Is there any possibility in this world without fabrication for the construction of a collective world view? What are the ontological conundrums presented for planners in this new world? What can we understand from this analysis in terms of the survival of planning?

2. Heidegger’s Ontology or How ‘Being’ Works

Heidegger’s project in *Being and Time* is to address a question which, he argues, philosophers – assuming that the answer is self-evident – have ignored, ‘What is Being?’ (Heidegger, 1962). He goes about this on the basis of the phenomenology developed by his mentor Edmund Husserl. Heidegger (Heidegger, pp.128-135) is seeking to break up the Cartesian way of seeing the world which informs mainstream science, the core of which is that there is a fixed distinction between what is objective (extraneous to the human mind) and what is subjective (constructed by the mind). Heidegger wants to propose a monist philosophy in which the subject-object distinction – which is after all no more than a human construct – is collapsed into one, ‘experience’. Today we can say that his analysis has not changed, as he might have wished, the dominant and conventional way in which we still ‘normally’ perceive the world ‘out there’. However it has created an opening for inquiry about whether, if there is a world ‘out there’, we have any relationship with it as itself (Bennett, 2004), and importantly for this paper, it sets up an understanding that while we construct the world out there in our relationship to it, this also generates the construct that we are for ourselves.

For Heidegger, all that ‘is’ does not exist in some ideal abstract ‘reality’ that is outside human experience. This is not a ‘subjectivism’ as we explain below. There is an outside world but it does not have ‘Being’ without us. All Being is conferred on entities by human experience. In that sense the only world with Being is the world that occurs to us. Being, then, starts and ends with the human, Dasein. Like many of the neologisms and compound words Heidegger uses, the term Dasein (Being-there) is designed to avoid, or bracket out, the conceptual loading given by the weight of philosophical reflection over the centuries that already attaches to a term like ‘human’. In keeping with that purpose we will adopt Heidegger’s term from now on.

Mulhall (2013, p.36) explains that Heidegger contests the Cartesian understanding of the human way of being ‘as a synthesis of categorially distinct elements (i.e. of mind and body) in a purely material world’. Heidegger complains that Descartes, conceiving of a world of ‘things’ in contrast to the subjective internal world of thoughts, imposes his scheme upon the world and does not ‘let entities in the world speak for themselves’. In Heidegger’s critique Descartes thus disconnects the occurring world from Dasein, and forces everything that is not ‘I’ to occur as ‘present-at-hand’ – merely there.

For Heidegger, Dasein is given by the occurring world. Dasein has ‘‘Being-in-the-world’ in such a way that it can understand itself as bound up in its ‘‘destiny’’ with the Being of those entities which it encounters within its world’ (Heidegger, 1962, p.82). A human, then, is not fixed, but exists as a ‘Being-in-the-world’, and changes according to the assemblage the occurring world is perceived to be made up of.

Heidegger positions himself as the philosopher of the ‘everyday’ - one who looks at the everyday experience, from an everyday perspective, which is a phenomenological perspective (see for example Heidegger, 1962, pp.163-168, Section 27). In his work we can observe three different types of being given to Dasein’s relationship to the world. He notices that much of what we experience and on which we confer Being is fabricated for our use. To see this we only have to name the entities we encounter, houses, plans, organisations, strategies and so forth, but also all the tools we use and the objects around us, hammers, books, paper, laptops. The mode of being of these items is what Heidegger terms ‘ready-to-hand’ (*zuhanden*); they have their being as useful for us (Heidegger, 1962, p.98, Section 69).

Another sort of being Heidegger reserves for those objects to which we cannot attribute a being for our use. Such being he terms ‘present-at-hand’ (*vorhanden*, Heidegger, 1962, p.103). These present-at-hand entities, or objects, are thing-like. Entities that are ready-to-hand typically become thing-like when they are broken, as with a broken hammer which devolves to pieces of wood and metal (see Mulhall, 2013, p.58). Thus ‘ready-to-hand’ and ‘present-at-hand’ should not be thought of as a backdoor into dualism for they both stem from the singular experience of Dasein.

Finally, in turning to the matter of the relationship of Dasein to others of its kind, Heidegger once again insists that we must not make the mistake of starting from an isolated ‘I’. To characterise this relationship Heidegger introduces another term marking a mode of being of Dasein, Being-with (Heidegger, 1962, pp.154, 157). Being-with is the kind of being we share collectively with that which occurs as also creating an occurring world. Collectively those which create an occurring world come to an agreement about that which ‘is’ sufficient to allow society to function. This collective, agreed ‘is-ness’ is the always already world, the dictatorship of the ‘they’. The market is perhaps its most familiar manifestation, an occurring world in which we find ourselves dissolved, being without intent. Entities which occur as capable of being-with are provided room to present themselves ‘as they are’, or at least as they would occur for themselves.

In Heidegger’s terms, then, the being of the world, or the *is-ness* of the world, is given by Dasein. Dasein is Being in a world which occurs as ready-to-hand, present-at-hand, or being-with. Things ‘occur as’ because they are not fixed. For example something like the environment can occur as present to hand (*Vorhandene*) when it occurs as ‘that which we are in’, or as ready to hand (*Zuhandene*) when we search the Amazon for cancer curing plants, or able to create its own occurring world (to be-with) when an environmentalist experiences it as itself. Dasein is the kind of being that has choice in how it constructs the world and therefore, in so doing, reflexively constructs itself. In more commonly used terms, the ‘worldhood of the world’ consists of instruments (*Zuhandene*), things (*Vorhandene*), and of course people (*Daseins*), and the being of a particular individual person is constituted by which things are occurring as *Zuhandene*, *Vorhandene* and *Daseins*. That is to say what occurs (the occurring of everything including ourselves, or Being-in), provides a world view from which what it is logical, necessary or possible to do is derived, and with which our actions are in perfect accord. When Dasein learns to distinguish the world in particular configurations, they are said to have ‘become’ something, for example a planner.

Our next section will attempt to draw out key features of the world as it occurs for planners, always bearing in mind that this occurring gives being to both the world and the planner. It creates the world as it 'is' and thus what can be done in it. It creates planners as they 'are' and thus what it is possible for them to do. We can say that the discipline of planning holds a particular understanding of *Zuhandene*, *Vorhandene* and *Mit-dasein* (that *with* which one can Be), which can be understood through observing the actions of 'the planner' and that with which it is concerned. Thus planning is a world view which gives being to planners and we can understand the construction of this being (and thus what is it possible to do) through understanding that constructed reality.

3. The Worldview of Planning

The 'world' of planning in which planners are situated has gone through a number of transformations over the last hundred years. Observing these transformations, what is resisted and how things adapt, provide insight into the underlying world view that constitutes planning. In this section we offer a – necessarily brief – interpretation of the recent trajectory of planning's world which seems to correspond with historical interpretation by at least one leading scholar and historian of planning (e.g Hall, 1996, 2000; Tewdwr-Jones et al. 2014).

By the end of the nineteenth century in Europe urbanisation had delivered crowded cities infested by squalor, poverty, malnutrition and disease. The modifications to capitalist growth engendered by the collective struggles of factory workers and the response of the more enlightened elements of ruling elites had opened the way to new ideas about cities, and yet failed to offer a path of 'real reform'. Those who we think of today as the founders of modern planning were visionaries drawn forth by the currents of modernity. Marshall Berman (1982) argues that the idea of 'planned development' can be traced to the Romantic interpreters of Enlightenment thought such as Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. Though not a central theme in Goethe's *Faust*, towards the conclusion of the great poem and near the end of his journey through life with Mephistopheles, Faust turns to a vision of great works transforming the environment for the good of humanity, and he uses the power of the Devil to force labour to the great work (Goethe, 1999, p.344). Berman comments 'Gradually, as the work comes together, we see Faust radiant with pride. He has finally achieved a synthesis of thought and action, used his mind to transform the world. He has helped mankind assert its rights over the anarchic elements' [of land and sea]' (Berman, 1982, p.65). Berman argues that to be modern is to believe in a kind of victory over the world. That all things will eventually bend to our will and design. We can make a plan and impose our will upon the world.

Several key elements in the world view of planners then stem from these earliest planners. Firstly from modernity we find the world 'out there' which of its own course will not lead us to where we wish to be. Second the idea that we can impose our will and design upon this world. Third that to do so requires a vision of what should be. This vision is beyond what will just happen in any case if societies are left to behave as an earlier vision has dictated¹, but somehow must deal with what the world 'out there' throws up.

¹ We are not suggesting that urban development left to a free market is somehow 'natural'. That would in any case be in precise contradiction of Heidegger's thought. In fact the 'naturalisation' of the market as beyond the human is a thoroughly Cartesian idea.

We can see this thinking in the work of the twentieth century Swiss-French architect, Charles-Eduard Jeanneret – Le Corbusier – developing grand visions for entire cities on green field sites, embracing the new world of individual car-borne mobility (Le Corbusier, 1929). ‘We must kill the street’ he thundered in a 1929 lecture (Moholy-Nagy, 1968, p.274), tear down the old cities and build new ones. ‘Cafés and places of recreation will no longer be the fungus that eats up the pavements of Paris’ (Le Corbusier, 1946, p.58). Such places would be ‘transferred to the tops of flat roofs’ segregated from ‘the complete network of traffic’ (Le Corbusier, 1946, p.58). Even the vision of the more accountant-like Ebenezer Howard involved creating new systems of cities in the countryside, effectively abandoning the industrial cities to their fate (Howard, 1898). Among British innovators, only Patrick Geddes (1915) in Scotland stood out as urging a more nuanced and socially informed approach to the understanding of city regions, looking beyond the carbon economy which polluted cities with coal smoke.

The bombers launched at the industrial cities of Europe during World War 2 did much in the way of ‘slum’ demolition, killing enormous numbers of civilians in the process, and transforming the world of planning (Judt, 2006, p.18). After the War European governments had little choice but to rapidly reconstruct the old cities to better standards and lower densities, and build new ones in what Hall (2000, p.26) calls ‘the great postwar rebuild’. Planning for reconstruction, commenced during the War, became legislated and institutionalized in the aftermath. The world of planning was brought inside government and the state. Planners brought their visions into state bureaucracies and became part of a wider pattern of management, though still with little contact with the social worlds of the ‘planned’ (Dennis, 1970; 1972). The success of planning in reconstruction deepened the understood functioning of vision versus that which the world ‘throws up’. Clearly the flattened landscapes of post war Europe were easier to plan than the complicated reconstruction of Haussman’s Paris. The world ‘out there’ was most easily dealt with if it could be reduced to rubble. Further, planners embraced new developments in rational processes, positivist methods and architectural design. Methods which are rooted in the modernist world view, and which demonstrate the truth of a ‘correct’ design better than what would have occurred if the current political dispensation in society were allowed to take its own course. Though they were now inside government, planners were insulated from politics. They counted on the legitimacy of liberal democratic institutions to secure the influence of their world view.

The legitimacy of planning, and thus the influence of the world view, began to be disrupted once the solutions proposed by the rational planners were implemented, and the social consequences of those solutions fully appreciated. The universal rightness of the professional prescriptions began to be questioned and a more pluralist understanding of planning was demanded by, mostly American, planning theorists. Jane Jacobs (1963) launched a blistering attack on both the visionaries and their epigones. Yet her fundamental concern, that planning interrupts the organic, chaotic, ‘what would have happened anyway’ world, was transmuted. It never successfully impacted the world view that a designed world would be better than what would have occurred without planners. Instead her concern was reinterpreted to the question of *whose* design should be implemented, *how* the vision to be implemented should be found. In the quasi-revolutionary climate culminating in the rebellions of 1968 there were demands for public participation in all aspects and at every level of town planning (Skeffington, 1969; Sewell and Coppock, 1977).

This transformation of the critique can be seen in the systems view of planning where the choice of planning solutions was placed firmly in the hands of elected authorities (McLoughlin, 1969; Faludi, 1973). In this perspective it was not the business of professional planners either to make choices or to

resolve conflicts amongst interest and pressure groups. That political role was for elected authorities to perform. In the world view of planning, the planner as visionary was surrendered, but not the fundamental view that a vision was necessary. The planner remained the implementer. This latter view soon came under attack in an onslaught of criticism from both left and right aiming at the very institutions of liberal democracy on which the planners relied to secure their standing. Marxist geographers interpreted urban development, its private entrepreneurs and all agents connected with its regulation, including planners, as agents of the capitalist class and the state as, if not ‘the committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie’, at least functionally related to the maintenance of capitalism (Scott and Rowes, 1977; Harvey, 1985). These criticisms were again absorbed, not impacting the fundamental view that a vision was necessary and should be implemented, but causing some shift in who should do the implementing.

The next wave of critique, ‘postmodernism’ questioned the objective reality of the very world in which planning existed and intervened, and the universal truth of the values justifying such intervention (Rorty, 1979; Lyotard, 1979). This critique was aimed at the epistemic foundations of which pluralism was a political manifestation, a critique of ‘knowledge’. Basing his ‘report on knowledge’ on Wittgenstein’s later work, Lyotard took apart the narratives that ‘allow the society in which they are told, on the one hand, to define its criteria of competence and, on the other, to evaluate according to those criteria what is performed or can be performed within it’ (Lyotard, 1979, pp.19-20). In planning literature the emphasis on narratives, ‘stories’ (Sandercock, 2003, p.183) threw into doubt the idea that social progress would be based on an objective understanding of the world. Reflecting on postmodern, feminist and post-colonial critiques, Sandercock (2003, p. 73) writes,

If we accept what is common to all these critiques – that all knowledge is embodied, historically situated, shaped by language, and embedded in power relations, institutionalized or not – then the very idea of the expert planner able to arrive at an understanding of “the public interest” through rational deliberation will have to be revised in favour of a notion of planning for multiple publics, based on an epistemology of multiplicity.

Sandercock’s words can look like a critique of ‘expertness’ per se, but actually, as is clear from what immediately follows, they seek merely to redefine the planner’s expertise as one who plans with multiple publics and their values, dodging the question of whether multiple and potentially conflicting values should be planned at all.

At this point it is worth making the obvious point that the occurring worlds of planners vary widely across different nations and institutional cultures. But we would argue that key features of the world view persist inside these variations. These key features include the idea that the world ‘is’ out there, and that something will negative happen if it is left to follow its current trajectory. There is also the idea that a vision can be created which will be a more legitimate expression of what should happen (or what people want to have happen, or the public good) than the default. Finally there is the idea that we can implement the vision and impose it on the world. This understanding of the world provides planners with the way they think about what can be done. Without this world view it would be ridiculous to even attempt a plan.

4. ‘Worldlessness’ and the Loss of the Public Realm

Just as the worldview of planning surrendered the position of visionary to some sort of collective, pluralist point of view, the validity and permanence of the ‘public realm’ as a means of collective

expression of needs was eroded. Arendt (1958, p.55) saw this coming in the USA even while the public realm still seemed secure as the foundation of post-war reconstruction in Europe, ‘Only the existence of a public realm and the world’s subsequent transformation into a community of things which gathers men together and relates them to each other depends entirely on permanence. If the world is to contain a public space, it cannot be erected for one generation and planned for the living only; it must transcend the life-span of mortal men’. Individualization and privatization results in a condition of ‘worldlessness’.

To live together in the world means essentially that a world of things is between those who have it in common, as a table is located between those who sit around it; the world, like every in-between, relates and separates men at the same time. The public realm, as the common world, gathers us together and yet prevents our falling over each other, so to speak. What makes mass society so difficult to bear is not the number of people involved, or at least not primarily, but the fact that the world between them has lost its power to gather them together, to relate and to separate them (Arendt, 1958, pp.43-44).

As Wagner (2012, p.66) puts it, a worldless world is ‘a world in which social relations may have global extensions, but are so thin and ephemeral that contemporary modern human beings are held to realize their own lives in a social context that they cannot conceive as their own’. Gone is the ‘communistic fiction’ (in Arendt’s term) that there is a natural harmony of interests in society, whether that be expressed through the ‘workers’ political party or through the invisible hand of the market – or, one might add, through some sort of pluralistic process (Arendt, 1958, pp.43-44).

As noted in the introduction the public realm was the place where a person could fabricate themselves in some sort of permanent way. The promise of the public realm was posterity, it provided the space whereby one could *speak* oneself into existence, and be held to account for that speaking. Acting and speaking in the public realm needed to be in alignment, so that the observed would be interpreted as who they were speaking themselves to be. In losing the public realm we have lost the space that held our self-constructions beyond the moment of our speaking them. The social self is constructed, but in such a way that any accountability or authenticity for that self lies at a place so removed from us that we might as well be something external to ourselves or something that we cannot control (the other). Although some argue that the lynchpin of liberal democracy, the nation state and its democratic forums, which provide a means for the formation of the long term public interest remain intact (Streeck, 2014, p.40), it seems increasingly the case that they are becoming empty shells, unfilled by any who is willing to speak themselves into existence, and none that would hear them even if they did.

Under these circumstances, the worldhood of planning has ‘splintered’ (Graham and Marvin, 2001) there is no ground upon which to create a collective vision, and nothing to ‘hold’ it in existence. Planners are thrown back on their own resources of interpretation and judgement to create a vision even while acknowledging its illegitimacy. The alternative is to attempt to create an expression of collective need and the long term public welfare, even while at the same time there seems no solid ground upon which to build this collective understanding. In the social world each person retains the right to their own world view, and to change that construction on a daily or hourly basis. In such conditions, agreement to a collective world view - let alone one that extends into a time frame relevant to planning horizons - seems impossible. The next section discusses the implications of the intersection between planners and this new worldless world.

5. Authenticity – Regenerating the Public Realm

Heidegger puts forward the proposition that while Dasein is often lured into a social world in which we cease to invent ourselves, it retains the capacity for self-saying, and truth finding. Heidegger invites us to see ourselves as ‘fallen’ or ‘thrown’ into a social situation which shapes our being, but from which, nevertheless, it is possible to distinguish ourselves as ‘authentically’ ourselves. In a most telling passage on the everyday condition Heidegger explains how we are all shaped by *das Man* translated as ‘the they’,

‘We have shown earlier how in the environment which lies closest to us, the ‘public environment’ already is ready-to-hand and is also a matter of concern (mitbesorgt). In utilizing public means of transport and in making use of information services such as the newspaper, every Other is like the next. This Being-with-one-another dissolves one’s own Dasein completely into the kind of Being of “the Others”, in such a way, indeed, the Others as distinguishable and explicit, vanish more and more. In this inconspicuousness and unascertainability, the real dictatorship of the ‘they’ (*das Man*) is unfolded. We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they take pleasure; we read, see and judge about literature and art as they see and judge; likewise we shrink back from the ‘great mass’ as they shrink back; we find ‘shocking’ what they find shocking. The ‘they’, which is nothing definite, and which all are, though not as the sum, prescribes the kind of Being of everydayness. (Heidegger, 1962, p.164).

Dasein can never be like a blank slate with the ability to write anything whatsoever on it. Dasein is a social being thrown into an already existing social world constructed by ‘the they’. The above quotation describes precisely the ‘social’ world that Arendt is referring to. The one in which, rather than distinguishing ourselves within, we merge into. But Dasein is the kind of being that has choice in how it constructs the world and therefore, in doing so, reflexively constructs itself. At this point Heidegger (1962, p.165) hints further at what authenticity might mean, ‘If *Dasein* discovers the world in its own way and brings it close, if it discloses to itself its own authentic Being, then this discovery of the “world” and this disclosure of *Dasein* are always accomplished as a clearing away of concealments and obscurities, as a breaking up of the disguises with which *Dasein* bars its own way’.

This means that planners can and should choose from the great welter of identifying and prescriptive messages (what is and should be) coming from ‘the they’ to shape their world and themselves as planners. This is to be ‘authentic’. The process starts with recognition of the pressure on them (dictatorship) of ‘the they’. It does not mean, and cannot mean, a rejection of the world constructed by ‘the they’ (which is the sum total of human knowledge), but rather of choice from within it. It also means that planners have a say about the apparent disappearance of the public realm. Such a realm was only ever constructed, and it can be again. Every time one speaks oneself into existence and then holds to that speaking, the public realm is reconstructed, especially where the speaking occurs in the presence of those who will hold the speaker to account.

6. Being With – New Concern for New Entities

To bring the focus down to one Heideggerian theme of particular relevance to planning today, consider ‘solicitousness’ (*Fürsorge*) which characterises Dasein’s relationship to other Daseins. Heidegger recognises that we don’t treat other humans in the same way as we treat things. This is not a categorical imperative as in Kant, it is a mode of Being of Dasein, Being-with. We can see that it is

not a matter of how to behave towards others of our species, because solicitousness includes its privative modes, 'Being for, against, or without one another, passing one another by, not "mattering" to one another - these are possible ways of solicitude. And it is precisely these last named deficient and indifferent modes that characterise everyday, average Being-with-one-another.' (Heidegger, 1962, p.158)

The mode of being of planning, in its early modern days planning seems to have been involved not so much with people as with things, it could be said that it was not planning –with, but rather planning-of. So the expression of solicitousness was more like the privative modes; planning for but not with them, as can be seen in Abercrombie and most dramatically in Le Corbusier. People become more like the things they inhabit and use – houses, roads, cars, mere sociological statistics.

The revolution of the so called 'post-modern' movement has been to force planning back into a condition in which the Other matters in all diversity. This revolution in planning can be further specified. Heidegger (1962, pp.158-9) introduces two different bands on the wavelength of solicitude. On the one hand solicitude can mean caring for someone by 'leaping in' so to speak and 'taking over'. 'In such solicitude', Heidegger remarks, 'the Other can become one who is dominated and dependent, even if this domination is a tacit one and remains hidden from him'. On the other hand solicitude can mean not taking over 'care' but handing it back to the Other. Heidegger says, ' This kind of solicitude pertains essentially to authentic care – that is, to the existence of the Other, not as a "what" with which he is concerned; it helps the Other to become transparent to himself in his care and to become *free for it*' (Heidegger, 1962).

It hardly needs emphasising that this mode of solicitousness introduces great complexity into the worldview of Planning, throwing open the difficulties of the planning task, the formation of a collective will out of the diversity, and the waywardness, stubbornness, distractedness, ignorance and *the-they*-directedness, just as much as the insightfulness, compassion and selflessness of the Other. There is a by now a huge planning literature on how to achieve this difficult task using various means (for instance see Healey, 2006). Facing those difficulties head-on, however, is what makes *planning* distinctively what it is, and not a branch of economics, political science, sociology or geography. Not shrinking from human complexity is something planners should wear proudly as a badge of honour.

Recently a new agent which we could be -with (have a kind of solicitude of authentic care) has emerged. An undeniable reality beyond the human has emerged which suggests once again that there is an 'out there' which can generate a world which occurs. The degradation of Nature through the very success of its exploitation for human purposes, and a long term public interest in bringing it under control, has created the conditions in which Nature is occurring as itself. Manifesting most clearly and dangerously in climate change, the 'limits to growth' have begun to appear across a spectrum of global ecological processes despite our repeated insistence that it does not have to occur that way (Meadows et al. 2005; Steffen, W. et al. 2005).

7. Truth and Reality

Experience is that of Dasein, and without Dasein no concepts of 'reality', 'being' or 'truth' are possible. As Heidegger puts it, "'There is" truth only in so far as Dasein *is*. Entities are uncovered only when Dasein is; and only as long as Dasein *is*, are they disclosed' (the quote marks and emphasis are in the text). Put another way, The 'isness' of truth is entirely dependent on the 'isness' of Dasein. Thus if planners are to find solutions to problems in the world they have to trust a kind of knowledge

beyond mere opinion. Given that everything that ‘is’ is constructed, and things as they really are, are concealed in that construction, what is beyond opinion? Recall that Dasein is ‘thrown’ into an ‘everyday’ world imbued with ‘the they’. ‘Its absorption in “the they” means that it is dominated by the way things are publicly interpreted’ (Heidegger, 1962, p.264). Dasein, even more today than in Heidegger’s time, is always immersed in an ocean of public communication in which ‘proximally and for the most part Dasein is absorbed in the “they” and is mastered by it’ (Heidegger, 1962, p.210). This idea approximates that of ‘stories’ or ‘storylines’ about which much has been written in the planning literature (Hajer, 1995; Sandercock, 2003). To find truth in these stories requires that we are reminded that they are stories and that we are the story teller.

All attempts to ‘uncover’ (find truth) must start from the understanding of Dasein’s being-in-the-world. That is the necessary point of departure for the struggle to uncover the truth of entities. Despite being embedded in a world structured by the they, Dasein’s Being is not completely predetermined. Dasein has a choice through an awareness, first of the constructed world it is in, and second, of its own authentic potentiality for Being. Since Dasein’s being is characterised by ‘care’, Dasein can project (think) itself out of its pre-structured world as it becomes aware of it. At this point we are brought back to the potential for authenticity. ‘Dasein is always beyond itself’ [*über sich hinaus*] not as a way of behaving towards other entities which it is *not*, but as Being towards the potentiality-for-Being which it is itself’ (Heidegger, 1962, p.236).

Essentially this means that everything I know is already given by the human world I am born into and later insert myself into (my profession, my role, my job), but planners can still choose the standards by which they discriminate amongst all that given knowledge. The choices I make also make the person that is myself. My knowledge that makes ‘the world’ – my world view – also makes me as a person.

The problematic of climate change provides a demonstration of the need for a kind of truth finding. There are conflicting opinions on climate change, and then there is the science of climate change which claims access to a truth – ‘an inconvenient truth’ – beyond opinion. In the question of what to do, there is an existential choice involved in what knowledge to trust and act on. (on science see Mulhall, 2013, p.172) (Heidegger, 1962, p.409). The arrival of Nature as an entity which we can be – with is acknowledged, then a collective truth, which includes Nature as one which creates an occurring world, becomes logical.

Equally, to assume that consultative planning is now the only kind of ethically acceptable planning is to fall into the trap of listening only to ‘the they’ (including all the aforementioned planning literature) instead of consulting one’s own judgement and knowledge. To do so is to sacrifice authenticity. In fact there may well be times, and perhaps not so far ahead, when sovereign action is needed *without consultation* to address exceptionally urgent or otherwise intractable urban problems. Reconstruction of Europe after WW2 was one such occasion. While we should try to avoid the planning mistakes of the past, looking ahead it is possible that tackling climate emergencies for instance might well be another such occasion (see for example Gilding, 2011; Moriarty and Honnery, 2011; Christoff, 2014).

8. Conclusion

In this paper we have demonstrated that being is a product of an occurring world. The occurring world is based on the three types of being we give to entities in the world, being present at hand, ready to hand and being with. The occurring world, or world view, is created by, but also reflexively

creates us. We have seen that the planning worldview relies on a world that is out there, which will progress somehow, planned or not. It is a world upon which we can impose our will, and which will be improved by the imposition of a vision upon it.

The question of whose world view is to be imposed upon the world has been uncovered. Such a vision should be created in the plurality of beings which have the capacity to generate an occurring world. Those with whom it is possible to be with. We have seen that this being with can result in a social world, one in which it is possible to merge and lose oneself. But we have also seen that we retain the capacity for authenticity. We can create an occurring world which aligns with our experience and in which we can express some generated self. This fabrication of ourselves requires no more nor less than our willingness to speak it, and a set of people to listen to it. This can be done in a social world, indeed we are freer to do so than ever, because the social world does not hold us to account. Tomorrow we can say ourselves anew and who would gainsay us? If we are no more than who we say we are, why not change that as we would?

The public realm, the realm we have lost, is the place where what we say develops an existence of its own. In losing it we have lost the ability to fabricate a world that lasts beyond the saying of it. The institutions which used to hold the world in some sense fixed, that mediated which sayings would last and which would not, have disappeared. Nothing lasts, all is mutable, 'all that is solid melts into air' (Berman 1982). The lack of a public realm expands the complexity of planning, because the public realm is what provides the ground for a lasting collective vision. Just as we seem on the edge of solving the question of how to create a valid, pluralist vision, the ground in which such a vision could be planted and expected to grow has blown away like so much dust. The question then becomes who will hold the vision while it is fabricated into the entities occurring as present to hand, and ready to hand. Who will generate the stories of what is present to hand and what is ready to hand that will fix a certain occurring into what is fabricated? Since we have lost the institutions of nation states, and liberal democracy, we can no longer rely on the old structures of the public realm. Perhaps instead coalitions brought into existence for the purpose of creating a vision, must also take up the burden of carrying that vision, and ensuring it is embedded in an occurring world that lasts beyond one human saying.

9. References

- Abercrombie, P., 1959. *Town and Country Planning*, Oxford, Oxford University Press
- Arendt, H., 1958. *The Human Condition*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
- Bennett, J., 2004. The Force of Things, Steps Toward and Ecology of Matter. *Political Theory*, 32(3), 347-372
- Berman, M., 1982. *All That Is Solid Melts into Air, The Experience of Modernity*, New York, Simon and Schuster.
- Christoff, P. ed., 2014. *Four Degrees of Warming, Australia in a Hot World*, London, Earthscan from Routledge
- Dean, M., 1999. *Governmentality, Power and Rule in Modern Society*. London, New Delhi, California, Sage.
- Dennis, N., 1970. *People and Planning*, London, Faber and Faber.
- Dennis, N., 1972. *Public Participation and Planners' Blight*, London, Faber and Faber.
- Faludi, A., 1973. *Planning Theory*, Oxford, Pergamon Press

- Foucault, M., 1991.. Governmentality. In G. Burchell, C. Gordon & P. Miller eds. *The Foucault Effect Studies in Governmentality with Two Lectures by and an Interview with Michel Foucault*. Hertfordshire, Harvester Wheatsheaf. pp.87-104
- Geddes, P., 1968 [1915]. *Cities in Evolution*, New York, Howard Fertig.
- Gilding, P., 2011. *The Great Disruption, How the Climate Crisis Will Transform the Global Economy*, London, Bloomsbury
- Goethe, J. W. von., 1999 [1832]. *Faust, A Tragedy*, Ware, UK, Wordsworth Editions, tr, J.R. Williams.
- Graham, S. and Marvin, S., 2001. *Splintering Urbanism, Networked Infrastructures, Technological Mobilities and the Urban Condition*, London and New York, Routledge.
- Hall, P., 1999. *Cities of Tomorrow, An Intellectual History of Urban Planning and Design in the Twentieth Century*, Oxford, Blackwell.
- Hall, P., 2000. *The Centenary of Modern Planning* in R. Freestone ed. *Urban Planning in a Changing World*, London, E and F.N. Spon. pp. 20-36
- Harvey, D., 1985. *The Urbanization of Capital*, Oxford, Blackwell.
- Hajer, M., 1995 *The Politics of Environmental Discourse , Ecological Modernization and the Policy Process*, Oxford, Clarendon Press.
- Healey, P., 2006. *Collaborative Planning, Shaping places in Fragmented Societies*, New York, Palgrave Mcmillan.
- Heidegger, M., 1962. *Being and Time*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell (tr.J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson).
- Howard, E., 1946 [1898]. *Garden Cities of Tomorrow*, London, Faber and Faber (edited by F.J. Osborn).
- Jacobs, J., 1963. *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, New York, Vintage Books.
- Judt, T., 2006. *Post-War, A History of Europe Since 1945*, London, Penguin Books.
- Le Corbusier, Jeanneret C-E., 1946 [1927]. *Towards a New Architecture*, London, Architectural Press. (tr. F. Etchells)
- Le Corbusier, Jeanneret C-E., 1971[1929]. *The City of Tomorrow and its Planning*, translated from the 8th French edition of *Urbanisme* by Frederick Etchells, London, Architectural Press.
- Lytard J-F., 1984, [1979]. *The Postmodern Condition, A Report on Knowledge*, Manchester UK, Manchester University Press.
- McLoughlin, J.B., 1969. *Urban and Regional Planning, A Systems Approach*, London, Faber and Faber.
- Meadows, D. Randers, J. and Meadows, D., 2005. *Limits to Growth, The 30 Year Update*, London, Earthscan.
- Moholy-Nagy, S., 1968 *Matrix of Man, An Illustrated History of Urban Environment*, London, Pall Mall Press
- Moriarty, P. and Honnery, D., 2011. *Rise and Fall of the Carbon Civilization, Resolving Global Environmental and Resource Problems*, London and Dordrecht, Springer.
- Mulhall, S., 2013 [1996]. *Routledge Guidebook to Heidegger's Being and Time*, London and New York, Routledge.
- Rorty, R., 1979. *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, Princeton NJ. USA, Princeton University Press
- Sandercock, L., 2003. *Cosmopolis II, Mongrel Cities of the 21st century*, London and New York, Continuum.
- Scott, A.J. and Roweis, 1977. *Urban Planning in Theory and Practice, A Reappraisal*, *Environment and Planning A*, 9, pp.1097-1119
- Sewell, W.R.D. and Coppock, J.T., eds. 1977. *Public Participation in Planning*, London and New York, Wiley.

Skeffington, A.M., 1969 *People and Planning*, Report of the Committee on Public Participation in Planning, London HMSO.

Steffen, W. et al., 2005 *Global Change and the Earth System, A Planet Under Pressure*, Berlin and New York, Springer.

Streeck, W., 2014 *How Will Capitalism End?*, *New Left Review*, 87, pp.35-64

Sturup, S., 2010. *Managing Mentalities of Mega Projects, The Art of Government of Mega Urban Transport Projects* PhD Doctorate, University of Melbourne, Melbourne.

Tewdwr-Jones, M., Phelps, N.A. and Freestone, R. eds., 2014. *The Planning Imagination*, Peter Hall and the Study of Urban and Regional Planning, London and New York, Routledge.

Wagner, P., 2012. *Modernity , Understanding the Present*, Cambridge, Polity Press.