

CAUGHT BETWEEN FAUST AND FAUX:
DEVELOPMENT AND CITY DESIGN [*]

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Abstract

This paper considers the challenges of contemporary urban design in the developing world -- China in particular, but “Asia” more generally – in the face of rapid economic growth and explosive urbanization. This extraordinary growth led by the deliberate state policy in collusion with local and global capital has provoked many scholarly ruminations. Editors of a recent book celebrate “the urban dreams, projects, and practices” as a “worlding” phenomenon that eludes the conventional frames of political economy or postcolonialism. But the urban outcome and “dreams” of this rapid development -- “Faustian” in scope -- is neither authentic nor sustainable. The absence of authenticity and sustainability is reflected in what one critic describes as the “original copies” in discussing the rise of simulacrum and simulacrascape in China. This paper argues however that mimesis, not unique to China, is inevitable, in the absence of genuine endogenous response as the exigencies of global capital leaves little time for reflection and deliberation. The paper concludes by making a case for an urban design manifesto for China, and the global south more generally based on considerations of cultural continuity, livability, social justice, and sustainability.

I write this essay from an outsider’s perspective on the breathtaking urban growth and transformation that are currently underway in China, and what I consider are the concomitant challenges for urban design.¹ I will begin by discussing what I consider the two major challenges for urban design in China: (1) the momentum of growth and development, which I call the Faustian imperatives for urban transformation; and (2) emergence of the faux, or “Original Copies: Architectural Mimicry in Contemporary China” – as the title of a recent book by Bianca Bosker suggests.² I will conclude by suggesting how the Chinese urban designers might address these challenges, and thus making a case for an “urban design manifesto” for China.

[*]AUTHORS’ NOTE: An earlier version of this paper was published in Chinese. See . Tridib Banerjee "From Faust to Faux: Concomitant Challenges for Urban Design In China" (translated in Chinese by Wan Li and Yang Yuzhen) *New Architecture*. 06:126-130.

(1). The Faustian Imperative of Development:

Currently the media is full of stories about China's stunning economic growth –7.8 percent in the third quarter of 2013, and a projected 7.5 percent by the end of the We read stories about China's rise as a "global factory," its voracious appetite for energy, its dominant contribution to global warming, economic impacts of its export on domestic markets and jobs in other countries, its "colonization" of primary resource producing countries in Asia and Africa, its domestic income inequality and rural poverty, a steadily growing consumer economy, the growth of its cities and corresponding investment in infrastructure and architecture, and so on.

While occasionally these stories are critical, more often than not they are adulatory, or at best one of deference and awe both in the media and professional circles. In publications on finance, technology, engineering, architecture and real estate such obsequious stories abound. In architecture trade magazines and glossy coffee table publications homage is paid regularly to China's modern structures and infrastructure, the emerging skylines of its cities, and its growing collection of "signature architecture" produced by world-renowned architects and firms. Today not just China, but also other "emerging markets" – as the recently prospering developing countries are fondly referred to in international finance and business circles – have created a new sandbox for Western architects to play out their aspirations, fantasies, and imaginations under the indulgent auspices of an authoritarian state and global capital. It will be recalled that in the immediate post-colonial years when the craze for new capital and new town development provided opportunities for the frustrated visionaries whose ideas were never fully accepted, indeed ridiculed in the West, to see their megalomaniac fantasies take shape in the desperate and helpless terrains of the decolonized world. The new global economy and the powerful authoritarian states have again created opportunities for such architectural fantasies to be built in the deserts of Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, or in the coastal plains of China. These projects have become the driving images of development today.

In a recent article critiquing contemporary urban development of China, Daniel Abramson aptly invokes the legacies of Hausmann and Corbusier as the defining characteristics of the transformation of the Chinese cities.³ But the names of neither Hausmann nor Corbusier necessarily symbolize the driving force behind these changes rather it is the Chinese, or earlier, the Saudi state that drives this change. To define the role of an authoritarian state in urban transformation and development in the contemporary project of modernization, it is apropos to consider the work of Marshall Berman.⁴

Although Berman's work predated the fantastic changes in the developing world we are observing today and was mainly retrospective of the nineteenth and twentieth century urbanism of the Western world, his treatise on "the experience of modernity" is still relevant today. In his treatise on the experience of modernity that combines a Marxist vision of modernism with a more humanistic interpretation of modernity drawn from Baudelaire and contemporary literary writings – the Faustian metaphor, especially that of

Goethe's "Faust as a Developer" – is of immediate interest to us. This metaphor remains an important trope in the way Berman subsequently describes the modern transformation of cities and the human consequences of the passage from tradition to modernity.

Of the many versions of the story of Faust told over some 400 years, Berman found Goethe's rendition of Faust most appealing because of the imperative of development intrinsic to this Faust' desire for change. "The vital force that animates Goethe's *Faust*," writes Berman, "...is an impulse that I will call the desire for *development*." (p. 39) What appeals to Berman about Goethe's interpretation is the "affinity between the cultural ideal of self-development and the real social movement toward *economic development*."(p. 40) In other words the transition to modernity can be achieved only through the parallel development of the individual and the larger society, a very republican idea that is embedded in many of the contemporary development theories.

According to Berman, Faust emerges as "the Developer" with his own imperative for rearranging the world by dismantling the traditional order and creating the modern world. During this phase Faust transforms the impetus for self-development to the development of the entire society and the physical environment. His visions are no longer in the realm of dreams and fantasies, but that of concrete projects and plans. Faust is not just a developer but also a planner. In Berman's (1982) words:

"He outlines great reclamation projects to harness the sea for human purposes: man-made harbors and canals that can move ships full of goods and men; dams for large-scale irrigation; green fields and forests, pastures and gardens, a vast and intensive agriculture; waterpower to attract and support emerging industries; thriving settlements, new towns and cities to come – and all this to be created out of a barren wasteland where human beings have never dared to live." (p. 62)

But development requires -- in modern terms -- capital, labor, and power. But where and how would Faust obtain such resources? Berman thought that this is an area that necessarily involves politics if not political economic explanation, which Goethe muddled through because of his uneasiness with the unavoidable political implications.

If Goethe's Faust is a developer, and development is an intrinsic experience of modernity, who then is Faust and who is Mephistopheles in the contemporary development experience? The answer may not be immediately obvious. Berman places the "desire for *development*" (p. 39) squarely in the imperatives of capitalism that requires growth, innovation, and change. But there is also an implicit notion of agency here, which Berman defines further when he expresses his own despair and disbelief in the way large scale public works projects – the Cross-Bronx expressway to be specific -- under the leadership of Robert Moses demolished the core of the Borough of Bronx where he grew up. The tableaux of New York in the middle of the last century, according to Berman, have been "an image of modern ruin and devastation" (p.290). Berman does not invoke Faust here, nor does he suggest Robert Moses as the twentieth century proxy for Faust, just as it would have been inappropriate to think of Hausmann as the Faust of the late nineteenth century Paris. Yet the Faustian imperative of change and growth that is manifested in the routine clearance and renewal of urban spaces, it can be argued, is

deeply embedded in the experience of modernity. The principal agencies of change lie in the authority of the state and in the capitalist economies, and some would argue, are intrinsic to the capitalist mode of production. Indeed contemporary theories of the political economy of urban growth have variously characterized the nexus between the state and capital as the “growth machine,”⁵ (Molotch, 1976), the “state apparatus”⁶ (Clark and Dear, 1984), and the “urbanization of capital” (Harvey, 1985).⁷

Some of the recent writings on the urban outcomes of globalization are beginning to capture the dynamics of development.⁸ Particularly worth noting is William Site’s account of the contemporary changes in New York, a sequel to Berman’s account some fifty years later.⁹ Rather aptly Sites describes the dynamics of redevelopment in midtown and lower Manhattan during the last two decades as “primitive globalization” which he defines as the process where “certain states, neither circumvented by globalization nor resistant to it, instead, actively facilitate globalization through the use of state power in highly destructive or “disintegrative” ways” (p. 2). The concept of “primitive globalization” captures the essence of what I have called the Faustian imperative, and also helps to locate Faust as the symbol of state power, and Mephistopheles – if we want to pursue the metaphor – as the icon of global capital.

We should note that the Faustian metaphor may not fully capture the contemporary drive for development captured by the notion of “primitive globalization.” Goethe’s rendition of Faust as a developer was not seriously challenged by the notion of a world that was fragmented, differentiated, and specialized in numerous nation states, many of which were controlled by megalomaniac state authorities. Faust’s world was a uniform and homogenous plane where the identities of city, country, nation, and beyond were conflated into a seamless space of continuity and tradition to be re-formed by imperatives of modernity and its inherent “desires of development.” In this undifferentiated landscape there was no competition between nations, nor any ranking of nation states by power and wealth. But in today’s world, nations and cities are in competition with each other, all vying for global capital and “foreign direct investment” (or FDI). Today there may be many Fausts competing for the attention and favor of one Mephistopheles: global capital. A country like China, it seems is in a race with time and itself, to reach the number one ranking as quickly as possible. Indeed a recent forecast by Goldman Sachs reported in *The Economist* (2007) shows China surpassing the United States in GDP by 2025, and just about doubling the US GDP by 2050.¹⁰

Recent events in China has shown that the provincial and local states of very large cities have taken on a life of their own, in competition with each other, often in defiance of the nation state. The Chinese State has now bred many sub-national state authorities that are all being driven by the same Faustian drive as the nation state. They are all competing with each other building, iconic monuments, exuberantly dominating city hall (to the point that the national government was compelled to put a ban on such extravagant public buildings, as reported in a recent story published in *The Economist*). Examples abound as documented by Tom Campanella in his book entitled “The Concrete Dragon”.¹¹ It is within this frame of reference we examine the Faustian imperatives that are driving the

unprecedented transformation of not only just China, but a number of emerging economies, albeit at lesser pace, and of smaller scope.

(2) Obsession with the Ersatz

In his book Tom Campanella provides a rather rich narrative of the scale and pace of the Faustian development, drawing mainly from the thirty-plus year history of Shenzhen, from a coastal village to a booming metropolis of 15 million, today a ranking member of the Chinese urban hierarchy. Interspersed with the story of China's Faustian development, are the stories of China's obsession with the "faux" or the ersatz landscapes of new development that often, in fact typically, copy in, out of, or miniaturized scale, built forms of the West. These simulacra often include important public buildings to luxury residential palaces of the *nouveau riche*. This may include new luxury housing or new landscapes of mass consumption – amusement parks and shopping malls. Indeed the simulacra are not limited to single buildings or complexes but may comprise large urban districts or even townships. The nine new satellite towns under construction – each on a particular European country theme – are such examples. Bosker refers to them as the "simulacrascape." The following table includes a list of such ersatz or faux elements of the emerging Chinese simulacrascapes described by Campanella and Bosker with illustrations (not included here).¹

In exploring the motivation of the faux, the ersatz, and the phantasmagoria it is important to note several points. First, as Campanella's and Bosker's discussion of the broader phenomenon and illustrations suggest, they are not all strictly examples of simulacra or even simulacrascapes. Some of them are inspired by a particular style or period architecture and urban form, usually of Western origin. Second, not all are copies of the Western form, a few are simulacra of native landscape and cityscapes. Third, some are inspirational copies of the ersatz, like Disneyscape, or are examples of what Umberto Eco would call "hyperreality." Finally, this is not a Chinese obsession only, Other countries, not just the developing world, but the developed world also, are also engaged in the production of such ersatz space. It will be incorrect to assume that the obsession with the faux (generically speaking) is cultural trait of the Chinese, or the Indian, or the Indonesian. Americans and Europeans are not above seeking such ersatz experiences in the cityscape. Recall that Umberto Eco's "travels in hyper-reality" was inspired by the faux and kitschy urban outcome of the economy of conspicuous consumption in the United States. If all this are an example of "consumer sovereignty" in urban design,¹² examples abound in the US as in many different parts of the world. Thus Venice, California was an ersatz copy of Venice, Italy. Now there is Venezia in the Las Vegas Strip, a casino hotel of simulacrascape of the original Venice. Then there is Paris, New York New York, the Luxor, and many other such faux environments of consumption and entertainment on the Strip. While Disneyland in California created a simulacrum of a New Orleans town square, and a seven-eighth scale simulacrascape of a generic Main Street to create a subtle "Gulliver effect", its east coast counterpart Disney World created a simulacrascape of the Hollywood of the earlier part of the last century complete with traffic signals, art deco facades, gas stations and drive-ins. Indeed the simulacarscape of

Table 1. Simulacra and Simulacrascapes of China (examples with images discussed by Campanella and Bosker).

Campanella	Bosker
Maisons-Laffitte (outskirts of Beijing, owned by Zhang Yuchen (S))	Chateau Maisons –Laffite (S)
Lamp King Tower, City of Guzhen (HR)	Tianducheng, Hangzhou (SS)
Old Beijing miniature landscape park (DS)	Venice Water Town, Hangzhou (SS)
Continental style villa estate, Nanjing (SS)	Weimer Villas, Anting Town
Cambridge Impression gated community (SS)	Holland Village, Shanghai (SS)
Southern California style villa (S)	English County development, Kunshan (SS)
Grand Epoch City (1/6 scale reproduction of Andingmen gate in Beijing), Xianghe, Hebei Province (SD)	Goya development, Hangzhou (SS)
Amrican Dream Park, suburban Shanghai (SS)	New Amsterdam, Shenyang (SS)
Lingshan Buddha, Wuxi (HR)	
Window of the World, Shenzhen (SS)	Minghang People’s Court, Shanghai (S)
Mini-U.S. Capitol, Beijing World Park (S)	San Carlos community (SS)
South China Mall complex, Dongguan (SS)	Thames Town, Shanghai (SS)
Zhongshan Street, Zhongshan (SS)	Palais de Fortune (S)
Xintendi style entertainment district, Nanjing (DS)	Luodian Town, Shanghai (SS)
Xinghai Castle, Dalian (SS)	British Town, Chengdu (SS)
	Forest Manor, Shanghai (SS)
	Fontainebleau Villas (SS)
	Palm Springs, Shanghai (SS)

	Cathay View, Beijing (DS)
	Fifth Garden, Shenzhen (DS)
	Mediterranean Villas (SS)

[Key: HR: hyperreality; S: simulacrum; SS:simulacrascape; DS: Disneyscape]

“invented streets”¹³ of the new open air shopping malls are presumably inspired by some referent urban form, if not the urbanism of such places. Thus invented streets in Los Angeles like CityWalk in the Universal City (which represents, according to architect Jon Jerde, “the quintessential Los Angeles”), or “The Grove” in the mid-Wilshire district, or “Americana” in Glendale. According to the developer Ric Caruso, consultants from Disney designed some of the details of the street furniture, streetcar and the like. Thus “The Grove” may have been a simulacrum of a simulacrascape.

In Europe there is a record of creating simulacrascape based on architecture of different part of the world. Sans Souci, the eighteenth century summer palace and gardens built by Frederick the Great, King of Prussia, in Potsdam near Berlin is indeed a carefree whimsical exuberance of hyperreality that included a Chinese pavilion presumably designed to look Chinese (See Figure 1). Similarly of King George IV of England built a summer palace in Brighton simulating of the architecture of palaces in India built in the Moghul era. Indeed Europe has a long history of rebuilding cities almost brick by brick exactly the way old city was after major disasters or wars. Rebuilding of London after the 1666 great fire was such an enterprise. The Poles rebuilt parts of Cracow and Warsaw after the World War II. The Germans recently have rebuilt the bomb damaged district of Dresden exactly the way it was. And the plan for the Innenstadt Neue Berlin is based on the principle of rebuilding the street walls of the old city (see Figure 2). Fires and wars not only destroy the built form, but also the social fabric and urbanism of the city. Rebuilding in the images of the old also becomes a simulacrum, just like the recent renovation of the Qianmen district in Beijing. Preservation or reconstruction of the shell of the old historic buildings or districts are complete simulacra because the space they enclose are now used for different purposes, and by different social class. Klaus Kunzmann discusses restoration of the façade and the main edifice of the historic Schloss in Braunschweig by developers who are using it as a front for a giant shopping mall.¹⁴ In Berlin a collective effort is underway to rebuild the Stadtschloss which was heavily damaged by the Allied bombing during the World War II, and then taken down completely by the GDR government who chose to build a modernist structure at the site of the old Stadtschloss to hold the assembly of the socialist government. That legacy of the socialist era is now gone, unceremoniously demolished to make room for the simulacrum of the historic Stadtschloss (see Figure 3). The interior space will be now used by commercial interest—shopping, offices, and the like.

Returning to the developing world, simulacrascapes are not uncommon in the recent urban expansion of the global south. Thus incongruously in the empty western edge of Yamoussoukro, Ivory Coast, stands the Basilica of Our Lady Peace, an imposing cathedral – a simulacrum of the St. Peter's cathedral in Rome, and biggest in the world. In

the outskirts of Bandung, Indonesia, a gated community called Vila Duniya (global village) offers simulacrum houses representing different European cities: Amsterdam, London, Paris, Rome. At the edge of the Jakarta metropolitan area two new planned communities - Kota Wisata and Kota Legenda - built by the same developer are offering weekend homes for Jakarta area prosperous class, but set in multiple simulacra of tableaux from different countries and places, mainly European but a sprinkling of global south as well. Then there is Hiranandini, a new development in the northern fringe of the Mumbai metropolitan area. The design of this complex of high-rise luxury towers, complete with its own shopping center, is designed after the Western classical architecture as would have been norm in the colonial times. What is relatively unique about the project is not the identity of its simulacrascape, but its official name, which is distinctly Indian. Typically such enclaves of modern housing for well-to-do Indians, many NRI's or non-resident Indians, will be called Buckingham Gardens, or Windsor Estates, or Kensington Village, as Anthony King has pointed out previously.¹⁵ ,

(3) Simulacra, Simulacrascape, and the Challenges of Urban Design:

What I have attempted to establish in the previous narrative is that the examples of the faux or ersatz is not peculiarly unique to China; other countries in the global south are also vulnerable to such tendencies. This is apparent especially in the urban additions comprising the higher end, upper class spaces of consumption. When I asked the young developer-architect of Kota Wisata and Kota Legenda about his choices for such ersatz non-indigenous style, his answer seem to imply: “wouldn't you rather have a good copy than a bad original?” This answer also suggests that perhaps the state of professional practice is not advanced enough to respond to the demands of the emerging consumption class in emerging markets. In other words development may have outpaced the state of architectural practice and pedagogy. Hence the tendency for the global south corporate interests (whether government or private) – or in other words, the forces behind the Faustian development – is to (a) hire “starchitects” from the global north, or (b) copy the built form of the global north, hence the preponderance of ersatz simulacra.

To test this assumption I went through *The Phaidon Atlas of Contemporary World Architecture Travel Edition* (2005) and summarized the distribution in Table 2. Of course the choices are that of the publishers, and architectural experts and observers may disagree. I have classified the architects of these chosen projects, mainly by their names, into two groups: Global South and Global North. The table shows that in Africa and Southeast Asia architects from the Global North tend to dominate the production of “world class” architecture.” In China, the majority of the chosen projects are of domestic origin, although the Global North architects seem to capture a significant share. But at least the table seems to refute the notion that the local architects are not able to produce “world class” architecture. However, the scope of this analysis does not interrogate whether the world class architecture produced by architects from global south are endogenously grounded as expressions of “indigenous modernity,”¹⁶ or simply influenced by the style and genre popular in the Global North. In other words: Is this the kind of architecture that is popularized by the “parametric design” of Frank Gehry or Zaha

Haddid, or does it reflect styles adopted, modified, and ultimately indigenously grounded? Cases in point are, for example, the architecture of Charles Correa and Balakrishna Doshi, who worked with Le Corbusier during his stint in India, and were profoundly influenced by his style, but were able to develop expressions of modernity that were grounded in the climate, culture, and customs of India.

In any event, I hope this rough analysis proves that copying and mimesis are not unique to the Chinese culture, unlike what Campanella and Bosker had implied, if inadvertently. Examples abound in other cultures, including the West. Indeed as Bosker has indicated that mimesis can be a rhetorical device as in art, often as “imitation of life,” and common in the Chinese landscape and garden design tradition. Certainly the Chinese culture has a rich heritage of originality and innovation in its arts and sciences, as history books would testify.

Table 2. Distribution of contemporary world architecture (and their architects) by global regions, from *The Phaidon Atlas of Contemporary Architecture Travel Edition*.

World Regions	Number examples	of Architects and architectural firms representing (author’s best guess)	
		Global South	Global North
Oceania	64	64	0
Asia (excluding China and Japan)	18	14	4
Asia (China)	61	33	28
Asia (Japan)	69	56	13
Southeast Asia	24	5	19
Europe		Not considered	
Africa	17	6	23
North America		Not considered	
South America	40	34	6

The Chinese problematic, however, is not the mimesis but the quantum of simulacrascape that is emerging in the context of its Faustian development. The question is, who commissions such work? Who funds them? And here, Campanella’s excellent and rigorous historical account suggests that it is often the wealthy developers or corporate interests that lead to such simulacrascapes. One wonders which minister or state authority thought of the nine new towns of Shanghai to be built in the images of different European

cities, and why? The answer might be obvious or known to the Chinese professional class, but remains somewhat of a mystery to the outsider.

The challenges for urban design in China, seem to be quite daunting. It is not clear that the Chinese urban designers can ban or control “simulacra” or “simulacrascapes” under some special authority granted by the local or national state. Nor would that be necessarily desirable. After all, simulacrascapes may have some appeal, and generally the public seem to enjoy them.

Elsewhere, I have argued that the practice and pedagogy of urban design has evolved in two very distinct traditions. The older of this tradition was rooted in the the Baroque and the Beaux Arts tradition and Platonic – authoritarian, dogmatic, elitist, and visionary in characteristics. Typically urban design as practiced and seen in architecture follows this trend. The younger tradition, in contrast, can be seen as Aristotlean – deliberative, democratic, organic, and pluralistic in characteristics. Urban design in the planning profession tend to be more of that type, and fits better with the public and participatory context of urban planning.¹⁷ It is this tradition that is much needed in shaping the pace and directions of Chinese urban design. It should involve periodic interrogation, reflection, and dialog in the true Aristotlean tradition reflecting multiple views and demands for urban growth. Sustainability should be an important component of this ongoing interrogation. It is possible to imagine that such interrogation would be involve research and expert observations, which then might lead to a “urban design manifesto” for China. This manifesto, in turn, can help structure a system of design guidance,¹⁸ as common in the U.K., as well as design rules, codes, and performance standards that will create livable urban environment, and an urbanism grounded in the culture of China.

End Notes:

¹ I must begin with the usual disclaimers: My exposure to China is somewhat limited, although I have visited China many times, since 1980, just when China was about to embrace market economy, and start up its growth machine, much vaunted these days. My observations might be ill-informed, and shaped by the Western media coverage of China's urban development. In event I am fully aware that it is audacious, if not presumptuous, to write about a country as ancient, as complex, and as culturally rich as China.

² Bianca Bosker, *Original Copies: Architectural Mimicry in Contemporary China*. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press.

³ Daniel Abramson, "Urban Planning in China: Continuity and Change," *Journal of the American Planning Association*, 72,2,2006, 197-215.

⁴ Marshall Berman, *All That Is Solid Melts Into Air: The Experience of Modernity*. London: Penguin Books, 1988.

⁵ Harvey Molotch, "The City as a Growth Machine: Towards a Political Economy of Place," *American Journal of Sociology*, 82(1976), 309-332.

⁶ Gordon Clark and Michael Dear, *State Apparatus: Structures and Language of Legitimacy*. New York: Allen & Unwin, 1984.

⁷ David Harvey, *The Urbanization of Capital: Studies in the History and Theory of Capitalist Urbanization*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985.

⁸ Tridib Banerjee, "Urban Outcomes of Globalization: Theory, research, and Practice", *Journal of Urban History*, 34,6, 2008, 1044-1054.

⁹ William Site, *Remaking New York: Primitive Globalization and the Politics of Urban Community*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2003.

¹⁰ In 2025, according to this forecast both China and the U.S. will have about \$20 trillion in GDP. But in 2050 China will have a GDP over \$70 trillion, compared to \$40 trillion that of the U.S. In that year India will also catch up with the U.S. and will be poised to exceed the U.S. GDP in the following decades.

¹¹ Thomas J. Campanella, *The Concrete Dragon: China's Urban Revolution and What It Means for the World*. New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 2008.

¹³ See Banerjee, op.cit.

¹⁴ See Klaus Kunzmann, "Spaces of Consumption" in T. Banerjee and A. Loukaitou-Sideris (eds) *Companion to Urban Design*. (London: Routledge, 2011), pp. 391-404.

¹⁵ See Anthony King, *Spaces of Global Culture: Architecture, Urbanism, Identity*. London: Routledge, 2004.

¹⁶ See Hosagrahar Jyoti, *Indigenous Modernities: Negotiating Architecture and Urbanism*. London: Routledge, 2005.

¹⁷ See Tridib Banerjee, "Introduction" in *Urban Design: Critical Concepts in Urban Studies (Volume I: The Idea of Urban Design)*. London: Routledge, 2014. Pp. 1-24.

¹⁸ Matthew Carmona, “Decoding Design Guidance” in in T. Banerjee and A. Loukaitou-Sideris (eds) *Companion to Urban Design*. (London: Routledge, 2011), pp. 288-303.