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# Title: The Dilemma of Programming and Mobilising in the Urban Cultural Landscape of the New Dutch Waterline

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**Governance has become a key concept in planning. In this paper we focus on a specific dilemma associated with the emergence of governance as a means of solving collective action problems in the area of planning: the tension between mobilizing and programming. Using the work of Scharpf (1997) and Ostrom (2003) we analyse the problems actors face in dealing with this dilemma. The multi-actor context of many planning problems requires on the one hand the interactive (re)construction of the problems and solutions available and on the other hand the establishment of concrete results. This interactive (re)construction is a communicative process in which actors are mobilised around a certain definition of a collective action problem (Fischer and Forester 1993, Healey 2007). Visionary documents aimed at reframing the problem at hand are typically mobilising. However, to reach implementation, actors must agree on clear norms for programming. Reaching agreement about concrete decisions puts actors on the alert and makes them risk averse, while mobilising requires an open risk taking attitude among actors.**

**This paper asks how actors in practice deal with the dilemma described above. The paper takes the National Project the New Dutch Waterline as a case study. In this project more than 30 actors cooperate to revitalize a 85 km long former military defence structure in order to preserve defence works that are considered cultural heritage and to preserve and develop the quality of the landscape. The project is situated in an area described as an in between city, or Zwischenstadt (Sieverts, 2003), in which the difference between city and countryside has blurred. The involvement of a multitude of actors and the need to develop new problem definitions that suit a previously unknown challenge, in theory provides the ideal typical context for governance (Albrechts 2004).**

**The tension between mobilising and programming was dealt with by separating the two activities among two different groups of actors and by dealing with them sequentially. As a result mobilising and programming became disconnected.**

## New Problems in zones in between cities

The once clear distinction between cities and rural areas is becoming increasingly blurred since changing spatial, economic and cultural dynamics have led to new polymorphic urban landscapes and new perceptions of cities and their periphery (Salet 2009, Ascher 1995, Sieverts 2003). Cities and the countryside are increasingly interconnected resulting in highly diffuse urban forms (Salet & Dembski 2011). This new configuration has been conceptualised as Rurban spaces (Gallent et al 2006), Landscape Urbansim (Waldheim 2006), the Zwischenstadt (Sieverts 2003) or the Città Diffusa (Secchi 1997). In the areas in between cities spatial patterns are still changing, leading to new, unpredictable problems. These problems are difficult to deal with because planning authorities deal with various spatial claims in an uncoordinated and insufficient way. This has two consequences: a loss of spatial

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quality can be experienced and the identity of rural landscapes is changing. Especially in the Netherlands the concept of '*verrommeling'*, or 'scenic deterioration' is being used in the public debate expressing the loss of spatial quality in rural landscapes. The concept has a strong negative connotation regarding the unwanted, ugly, disjointed and incoherent spatial development in rural landscapes (Gies et al 2005). Another effect is the loss of identity in rural areas: "Traditional landscapes with their ecological and cultural values become highly fragmented and gradually lose their identity" (Antrop 2004). This is problematic because urban dwellers visit the countryside in their search for recreation, authenticity and identity (Albers & Boyer 1997, Mommaas et al 2000). The spatial transition is caused by the shift of urban functions to the rural periphery.

Economic, cultural and agricultural interests clash in the zones in between cities leading to a chaotic patchwork of different urban and rural functions (Van der Valk et al 2007). Policy makers and planners have difficulty to guide the various spatial claims in these areas with respect to three institutional factors. First, the new evolving configuration at the fringes of cities crosses territorial institutional boundaries (Horlings 2010: 9). The transitions in the zones in between cities exceed the traditional separation of rural and urban municipalities. Second, planning doctrines and the organisation of planning authorities are grounded on the establishment of the traditional urban-rural formation (Van den Brink et al. 2006). The sectoral organization within public bodies regularly divides urban and rural policies, leading to separate and poorly linked policy plans for the zones in between cities. Third, within a diffuse field of power relations, it is not always clear who is responsible for the problems (Kreukels 2004) and which actor has to initiate and coordinate planning processes and eventually. This leads to a lack of *capacity to act* (Horlings 2000: 17). These three institutional factors make the organisation of planning in these areas problematic. Eventually, due to unclear rules and norms, spatial intervention takes place next or across traditional planning orders. This gap can be defined as an *institutional void* (Hajer 2003); a state of a policy sector where clear rules, norms, routines or institutionalized practices are absent.

Besides organisational difficulties, actors are confronted with a dynamic spatial configuration that is still evolving which leads to new problems. Planning authorities are still using 'old' frames when they try to tackle these new problems (Van Ostaaijen et al. 2000: 157). The old frames are based on the traditional urban-rural divide, while in the meantime socio-spatial reality shows that the boundaries between rurality and urbanity are fading. Moreover, the reciprocal relationship between public and private actors requires storylines and a communicative practice to reach a shared perception of the problem situation (Van der Stoep & Aarts 2000: 154). The aim of this communicative activity is to *mobilise* actors to change their attitudes towards the other actors (De Vries 2008), and let them reframe their perceptions about the current spatial transition and the associated problems (Healey 1993, Rein & Schön 1996).

The process of activating actors and the development of broadly supported collective frames are considered as *mobilisation*. When mobilisation of actors is pursued, a spatial plan is used as a tool to involve actors in the planning process. Typically, these processes conclude with the determination of a visionary plan. These plans 'create an image of a dynamic future and give meaning to isolated issues, measures and projects' (Van den Broeck 2004: 181). The

process towards the visionary document is most valuable because it reframes and aligns the perceptions of the actors (De Vries 2008). To prevent that actors drop out in the process because their interests are put under pressure, visionary documents are abstract, lack clear interventions and decisions about the distribution of resources. However, to execute spatial intervention, *programming* is required: this includes an agreement amongst actors about the final physical result and the contribution and distribution of resources and responsibilities. In programming processes, negotiations about goals, resources, responsibilities, and implementation take place, which means that the plan is not a tool as in mobilising processes, but the result of a negotiation process (Faludi & Alexander 1988: 132). Although there is a sharp contrast between the characteristics of mobilising and programming processes, both are needed to reach collective action (Van den Broeck 2004, Albrechts 2005).

Especially in the areas in between cities the contradiction between mobilising and programming is prevalent. Mobilisation is difficult because public and private actors are not aware of the dynamics and scale of the new evolving *Zwischenstadt* and its corresponding problems, which actors persistently try solve with traditional frames, strongly based on the separation of 'rurality' and 'urbanity' (Mommaas & Janssen 2008). In addition, innovative ideas in these regions 'come up against a glass ceiling of regulations and procedures, which makes it difficult to set new agendas for the region' (Horlings 2012: 17). Previous research in areas in between cities showed that mobilisation in these areas lead often to '…container plans [with] compromises in which too many things are interwoven,… integration become a goal in itself, obscuring the focus on resolving actual problems' (Mommaas & Janssen 2008: 27). The abstract characteristic of these mobilising plans makes the gap between mobilisation and programming problematic. Additionally, when actors have to negotiate about the final result and its program, they are aware of the risks of using their individual resources to solve a unclearly formulated collective problem. Above all, reaching collective action is difficult because both mobilisation and programming is required but has opposing characteristics. This leads to the following research question: how do actors deal with the dilemma of mobilising and programming in areas in between cities?

To answer this question, first theory about the dilemma will be reviewed, leading to the formulation of the hypothesis. The roots of the dilemma of mobilising and programming will be examined with the comparison of different planning methodologies with contrasting views regarding the function of a spatial plan in decision-making processes. Second, the research design and methodology will be explained. Third, the case of the New Dutch Waterline will be explicated as an example of a landscape in between cities where actors have to deal with the dilemma. Fourth, the research findings will be confronted with the existing theory in the discussion and conclusion.

**Theory: The Dilemma between Mobilising and Programming**

The question whether a spatial plan should be considered as an agreement about the final result and its implementation or as a tool to reframe and reshape a problem definition is based on presumptions about the function of a spatial plan in plan making processes. The core of this difference is found in the way planning methodologies consider the relationship between planner, spatial plan and the involved actors differently. To reach collective action, actors should on the one hand reframe and align their perceptions of the problem, and on the

other hand reach an agreement about concrete measures (Van de Broeck 2004, Friend 2000). Mobilising and programming activities lead to different type of spatial plans with distinctive characteristics. In this paper the four main differences between mobilising and programming planning activities are elaborated: goal setting, type of agreement, production of options and the mode of interaction between the actors.

The main goal of mobilising planning activities is twofold. On the one hand the actors are reframe their perceptions about the problems at hand and on the other hand they change their opinions towards the other actors (De Vries 2008). When many actors have diverging interests, a shared definition of the problem and a broadly supported direction for solutions increases the capacity to act (Healey et al 2003). This '…sense of direction reflects the tension and interdependence between different values and interests' …which enables new combinations of different objectives (Giezen et al. 2012: 43). Within the communicative practice in planning, mobilising activities can be considered as 'making sense' of the situation together using diverse types of knowledge for joining and defining problems (Forester 1993, Healey 1993). While mobilising activities generate mostly invisible products (Friend & Hickling 1997), the result of programming processes is a clear agreement about a specific solution and the implementation of the project. Agreement about the final result is also important for legitimacy of planning activities and engaging in contracts with construction companies (Rein 1969).

Mobilising and programming activities lead to distinctive types of agreements.

Reframing the perceptions of actors during mobilising activities often results in plan which can be characterised as a 'grey compromise between various interests' (Van den Broeck 2004: 174). Also, Mommaas & Janssen (2008) criticise these plans because even in the case of consensus. These plans do not stimulate institutional innovation that is required to tackle the rather new problems in areas in between cities sufficiently. However, Giezen et al. (2012) state that ambiguity could be strategic, leading to more flexibility to cope with uncertainty. Programming plans consist agreements about the contribution and distribution of resources. Moreover, the links between goals, resources the results and the sharing of costs and benefits are more clearly determined in programming plans. For reaching implementation, the gap between strategic ambiguity and operationalisation should somehow be bridged.

When plans are used for mobilising purposes, divergence of options is desirable. There are three reasons why variety of alternatives is important. First, the redundancy and variety of options makes project more resilient towards unanticipated changes (Giezen et al 2012: 40). Second, the alternative that is eventually chosen is perceived stronger when it is challenged with other alternatives (De Bruijn & Ten Heuvelhof, 2004). Third, a majority of the actors supports the plan making process and feel committed when multiple options remain on the table. The process of producing the alternatives is important because it uncovers the preferences, values, opportunities and interests of the actors. This is important for exploring win-win situations and framing the project in such a way that the plan is broadly supported. Ideally, every actor can propose alternatives, which contribute to the cooperatively defined problem definition. Van den Broeck (2004) states that it is of great importance to connect abstract ideas and concepts to local problems because it strengthens trusts and local support when then plan needs to be implemented. However, in practice it turns out to be difficult to create sufficient space in the process for retention of alternatives (Swyngedouw et al. 2002).

At a certain moment in time, a selection of alternatives has to be made, but what are relevant criteria and when should an alternative be retained?

According to De Bruijn & Ten Heuvelhof (2004), the production of alternatives should be stopped when learning processes come to a standstill. On the one hand, learning processes can come to a standstill cognitively, actors are unable to address new problem definitions, articulate new alternatives and change their patterns of thinking. On the other hand learning processes could end socially, when actors do not engage new relationships or attempt to understand the viewpoints of others anymore. When both learning processes have stopped, convergence of alternatives is of importance to get a step closer to implementation. However, divergence and convergence of alternatives is mainly executed in a messy process switching from the one to the other (De Bruijn & Ten Heuvelhof 2004). In programming plans, convergence of alternatives is important to determine a plan that can be and implemented. Now, the alternatives are compared by the actors, who possibly all have different preferences. Often, actors use different criteria ranging from political, practical to financial norms but have to agree about one specific option. The result is a negotiation where alternatives drop out and finally one 'best' alternative remains (De Bruijn & Ten Heuvelhof 2004). The divergence and convergence within programming and mobilising activities are conducted in arenas where specific *modes of interaction* determine the plan making processes.

**Table 1.1: Characteristics of Mobilising and Programming use of Spatial Plans**

| | *Mobilising* | *Programming* |
|---|---|---|
| **Interaction of actors** | Discussion | Negotiation |
| **Input and options** | Diverging | Converging |
| **Agreement** | Direction | Distribution resources and responsibilities / contracts |
| **Goal** | Reframe perceptions | Clear agreement for implementation |

The above distinction between mobilising and programming plans is strongly connected with the modes of interaction in plan making process. Although the structure wherein mobilising and programming activities are practiced is diverse, the main difference can be found in the interaction between the actors. A profound analysis of the interaction between the actors is important because, although mobilising and programming practises have opposing characteristics, actors have to reach consensus about the execution of both practices to eventually accomplish collective action. From a rational actor point of view, a crucial condition for interaction, collaboration or partnership is that the outcome of the process should lead to potential welfare gains which can be shared amongst the involved actors (Scharpf 1997, Pressman & Wildavsky 1974). The surplus created by the collaboration and the benefits that the individual actor eventually receives, should be larger in comparison with separate and singular behaviour of actors. It is a challenge to find ways to define problems and connect them with solutions which create additional value and can be divided equitably. According to Scharpf (1997), two activities can help in optimising the additional value and reaching agreement about the implementation: joint production and distribution. This

distinction is also known as the process of 'creation and sharing of value' (Lax & Sebernius 1986). Both activities can be linked to mobilisation and programming activities.

Joint production is the activity where actors are jointly interested in pushing the welfare frontier to its limit to pursue a solution that lead to maximisation of the total value (Scharpf 1997). In this process, actors try to find ways to combine their interests in order to establish a plan that create extra value that could be shared amongst the involved actors. Therefore, actors have to discover the interests, preferences, opportunities and threats of others and should be transparent about their own. This process is very explorative because actors have to localise the zones of 'mutual attractions' and the 'zones of conflict' (Scharpf 1997). Innovative processes that reframe the problem situations and create synergetic combinations of resources, can lead to additional value which cannot be reached by the actors on their own. One specific mode of interaction is connected to the process of joint production: problem solving. The central purpose of these activities is the creation of better projects, because the power of problem solving is joint action (Scharpf 1997: 130). Discussions amongst actors are focused on the possible solutions and the best way of achieving it (Elster 1986, Majone 1989). Joint production requires a, communicative practice, where actors are transparent about their goals and interests, and discuss what they like and dislike. The main goal is the harmonisation of the perceptions that contribute to a consensus (De Vries 2008: 857). Therefore, activities of joint production are expected in mobilising plan making processes.

Distribution requires a different mode of interaction because the basic question here is how the created or existing value should be distributed. The distribution question leads to different behaviour of the involved actors. Cooperation to maximise win-win situations is achieved through negotiations about the distribution of costs and benefits. Actors are not focused on the soft side of planning where definition and reframing play, but try to reach hard agreements about the final situation and application of legal and financial instruments (De Vries 2008: 857). In order to reach an agreement, actors can decide that compensation measures are equitable or multiple decisions can be brought together in package deals to level of advantaged to disadvantaged actors. Scharpf (1997) defines distributive bargaining as the mode of interaction where negotiation about the distribution of costs and benefits can lead to an agreement. This leads to behaviour that can be described as strategic, where actors keeping the cards close to the chest, and mark their positions. This distributive behaviour of actors is typical for programming activities in plan making processes.

The activities of production and negotiation are strongly interconnected but the opposing characteristics make it difficult to combine both activities. In academia, there are different views how to treat the dilemma of mobilising and programming. Scharpf (1997) states that "procedural separation of both types of interaction seems to be useful on theoretical grounds" (Scharpf 1997: 135), but notes that this is hard to reach given the interconnectedness and tension between both activities. It is difficult for actors to see both activities separately, because it… 'may facilitate the coexistence of 'arguing' and 'bargaining', which are … incompatible modes of communication and interaction' (Scharpf 1997: 135). The creation of value and the search for win-win situations is only interesting for actors when satisfactory distribution is in some way guaranteed.

Although Scharpf (1997) advocates the separation of mobilising and programming activities, Van den Broeck (2004) and Albrechts (2004) plead for simultaneously executing multiple tracks where the formulation of a long term vision, the arrangement of long and short term actions, and the mobilisation of different actors are at the same time performed. To bridge the gap between long-term visions and implementation, it is suggested that short-term actions are carried out in order to create trust by solving problems on a very short term (Albrechts 2004: 752). In contrast to Scharpf (1997). Albrechts (2004: 753) points out that during the process of developing a long term vision, "credible commitments to action engagement (commitment package) are needed where [different actors]… enter moral, administrative, and financial agreements to realize these actions."

The dilemma between mobilising and programming activities leads to three hypothesis. First, it is expected that mobilisation and programming activities lead to very distinctive types of plans with opposing characteristics. Second, distinctive modes of interaction characterise mobilisation and programming activities, regarding the theoretical differences between the creation and sharing of value. Third, although mobilising and programming activities are either simultaneously or sequentially carried out, the incompatibleness of the modes of interaction will presumably lead to conflicts between the actors.

**Research Design, Case Selection and Methodology**

A case study is good way to investigate how actors deal with the dilemma of mobilising and programming in an area in between cities. Regarding to Yin (2003: 13) a case study is a proper way to investigate a phenomenon when the boundaries between the phenomenon and the context are not clear-cut. In this paper, the phenomenon is the dilemma between mobilising and programming and in order to investigate this relationship between this dilemma and its context, an in depth case study is appropriate. To examine the dilemma, the case of the New Dutch Waterline is selected because it is a typical example of a project in the highly dynamic zone in between cities. The revitalisation of the cultural heritage in this project, can contribute to the recuperation and maintenance of the identity and quality in the zones in between cities. It is expected that actors will have difficulty to reach collective action because many actors with different backgrounds are involved and the project comprises various sectors within public bodies.

The New Dutch Waterline is a former military defence line located at the eastern fringe of the Dutch Randstad, containing a combination of different interconnected fortresses, bunkers, flooding fields, dams and dikes[2]. The line was built approximately between 1815 and 1963. The defense line was an ingenious concept; the main idea was to defend the rich urban area on the western side of the dike by flooding fields on the eastern side. When there was the threat of attack, military forces were entrenched in their fortresses and bunkers, positioned on strategic places in the flooded landscape in order to defend Holland.

Today, the New Dutch Waterline has lost the military function it once had. In 1995 the landscape was added to the potential shortlist of heritage for the Unesco list of cultural world heritage. In 2002, the management office New Dutch Waterline was founded with as main target the revitalisation of the landscapes and the hidden military structures. The main idea

[2] Map is located at final page of this paper.

was to make the cultural and historical value more visible and exploitable for the public with one coherent plan. Above all, this project should be a collaboration of different sectors within the public sector. The main challenge was to bridge the political complex situation: more than 35 public bodies were involved starting from five ministries, five provinces, more than 25 municipalities and different semi-public agencies.

To investigate this case in depth, three research methods are used. First, archive study is carried out for the period 1985-2011 at the archives of the national project office of the New Dutch Waterline. Especially reports concerning crucial decisions are investigated. Second, 25 in-depth interviews with involved actors are executed. And third, for the period of one year, one researcher was present as an observer at the national project office of the New Dutch Waterline and observed the practices of the employees from an appropriate distance.

**The chronicles of the New Dutch Waterline Project**

At the beginning of the nineties many study groups were founded within national public bodies. The goal of these study groups was to attune the plans of different policy sectors and to establish coherent and well consistent policy plans. The national project New Dutch Waterline (NDW) starts when three of these study groups' conjunct in 1992-1993. At the national spatial planning agency, the *Rijk Planologische Dienst* (RPD), the interdisciplinary study group *ArMoLA* was founded in order to bridge the policy gap between architecture, landscape and monuments. Employees from the RPD and three ministries (the ministry of housing, spatial planning and the environment, the ministry of culture, education and science and the ministry of landscape, agriculture and fisheries) were attached to this study group and searched for projects that combined architecture, landscape and monuments: they found the NDW. The second study group was "*Project 33*", initiated by the ministry of landscape, agriculture and fisheries. This was an interdisciplinary study group with civil servants of the ministry, scholars and members of interests groups who had the task to find landscapes of great international importance that ought to be protected from "spatial disturbance". Again: this study group found the NDW. The third study group which looked at this project was the study group *Waterline.* This study was appointed by the RPD and did an explorative analysis of potential new functions in the area, carried out by the Research Institute for Forest and Nature and the University of Wageningen,

Eventually, the study of *Waterline* appears to have ended up in the archives. However, the project was brought back to life again when the new national policy plan for cultural heritage was shaped. The new *Belvedere* policy was a breakthrough for cultural heritage because the existing sectoral and conservative policy was grounded on the principles of conservation and was replaced by a new perspective that was based on the famous statement of 'conservation through development'. The main idea was to make the cultural heritage more accessible and pay for the maintenance of the heritage through spatial development and exploitation (Bloemers 2010, Schoorl 2005). This new policy opened doors for the NDW project: it was introduced by ex-members of the study groups and rather rapidly, the project became an example project in the *Belvedere* heritage policy and rapidly a separate (interdisciplinary) team was founded to set up an organisation and to elaborate plans.

The management office of the NDW was founded in 1999. In the beginning, the management office was part of the broader *Belvedere*-program. At the start of the project, the

goal of the project was not clear, neither was there a definition of the exact problem, and neither a strategy existed that should lead to success. Nevertheless, some 'soft' directions were given by the Belvedere program, which was coordinated by the ministry of culture, education and science. The three main important directions were (1) the project should highlight the unity of the defence line, which included that the current developments in the area must be aligned with one coherent plan and (2) inter-sectoral plans (spatial planning, cultural heritage, housing development, infrastructure, water management and nature) should lead to well-attuned plans of high "spatial quality" and (3) the recognisability and acquaintance of the NDW should be stimulated because the military structure was hidden in the Dutch landscape and was rather unknown to the public.

The start of the project could be characterised as chaotic because many activities were carried out without a supportive and clear strategy. This changed after two years when organisation structure was installed with a political advisory board (Steering Committee) and at the operational level a civil project group (Project Group). The Steering Group, composing representatives of the ministries, the provinces, the municipalities and the water management boards, gave the management office the assignment to develop one coherent visionary document for the NDW. The management office followed two tracks to develop this visionary document: two tours through the area were conducted and a competition was organised between landscape architects.

Eventually two tours through the area of the NDW were organised to discuss the project with local politicians, farmers, cultural heritage organizations and citizens. The first tour comprised an open discussion about the *Belvedere* credo "conservation through development" in the NDW area. The main goal of this campaign was to introduce people to the NDW project and create political and local support for the project. The presentations given revived the historical value and contained a storyline which was grounded on historical images, tales about the rich history and discussions about the opportunities of the cultural heritage. For many people, it was the first time that they heard of the NDW and some experienced this as an exciting collective 'exploratory expedition'. Making people aware of the project using a coherent storyline which was based on the rich historical value can clearly be seen as a mobilizing activity because the involved actors cooperatively frame and reframe the direction of the project. However, people reacted differently; although they broadly recognized the rich history and great opportunities of the project, there was scepticism about the development and exploitability of the NDW. Some local and regional politicians said that the project was unrealistic because there was a lack of financial and political guarantees for implementation.

During the first tour through the area, the management office initiated multiple design sessions to create visionary plans for the NDW which were based on four different themes. Four landscape architects translated the themes in four –diverging- visionary proposals. Finally, the Steering Committee choose for the concept of '*Line in the Landscape'*, however, this decision was never discussed with local politicians, citizens or other actors at the local level. However, three feedback moments were important for elaboration of the plan and shaping and reshaping the vision. The first feedback was provided by the directors in the Steering Group, the second feedback was delivered by local residents and politicians in the second tour which was organized by the management office. And finally at the third moment

of feedback, the landscape architects showed how they applied the collected feedback in the final plan. Finally, the concept of *Line in the Landscape'* turned into the visionary document of *Panorama Krayenhoff* which was eventually determined by the Council of Ministers in 2003. This rather open process where many actors had the opportunity to deliver input for the of the visionary document could be seen as characteristic for mobilization processes.

The visionary plan of *'Panorama Krayenhoff'* was based on a four basic design principles. First, the defence line should become the central marker in the plan: the landscape at the eastern side of the line should be kept free from development, regarding the historical open firing and inundation zone. At the western side of the defence line there was opportunity for development in order to generate financial resources to maintain the fortresses and landscapes. Second, the bunkers and fortresses would be recuperated with the financial support of public resources, and the long term maintenance of the building would be paid by the function(s) in or around the buildings. Third, the plans should lead to a recognizable and coherent ensemble, with a proper distribution of recreational, ecological, residential and water management activities. Fourth, concrete programming should be articulated at the regional level and must be compatible with the overarching visionary document.

Obviously, the visionary document lacked clear measures but did set a direction for development. The visionary, abstract characteristic of the plan was a mindful decision of the Steering Committee. The following anecdote emphasizes this: the author of *Panorama Krayenhoff* made some concrete examples of implications but was obliged to keep them out of the final version because it could lead to resistance by local and regional actors. Strikingly the planners were conscious about the mobilising effects of the process and wanted to capture this with the determination of the visionary document. However, although joint problem finding is a characteristic of mobilising plan processes, in the case of the NWD, an exact definition of the problem was never clearly expressed by the initiators. Nevertheless, many actors acknowledged the importance of the project because the project management was convincingly bringing inspiring opportunities to the table. Furthermore, the level of abstraction made it possible for local, regional and national politicians to attach their problems to the project. Nevertheless, collectively defining and redefining the problem of the project is an important characteristic of mobilisation, it was never an issue in the case of the NDW. The starting point of the project management was convincing people of the importance of the project and give people the opportunity to use their imagination add ideas for the existing path that was already chosen. Striking in this process is the central position of the management office, which organized support for the determined direction without discussing the crucial necessity of the project or linking the project to concrete problems of actors at the local level.

When the *Panorama Krayenhoff* was determined in 2003, actors were sceptical about the implementation of the plan because there were no financial or political assurances given by the involved actors. Therefore, the project management decided to tackle this problem with two measures. First, they made a *Bestuursovereenkomst* in 2005, a formal declaration about the management made by the directors of the provinces and ministries. In this declaration actors agreed on the organisation, the distribution of responsibilities, and they articulated the intention to reserve funds for implementation of the project. Although actors determined officially their commitment in this document, there was yet no long term program been

formulated. And second, to deal with the scepticism about the implementation of the plan, "*Quick Wins*" were executed: small projects which were carried out quickly to show the politicians that the process would not persist in phases of bureaucratic consideration. The *Quick Wins* showed the politicians that the project was effective which indirectly contributed the support for the *Bestuursovereenkomst*.

Because the process of mobilisation was finished with the determination of Panorama Krayenhoff it was decided to change de organisation of the project. The NDW was split up in five different "envelopes" and regional civil servants became responsible for the management. With this measure, the regional level obtained a steering position. It was their task to activate the municipalities and develop projects for the NDW in the envelopes. A crucial qualification was that the projects should square with the overarching visionary document. The establishment of the envelopes was a technique of the project management to bridge the gap between the abstract level of the visionary document and the problems at the local level. Eventually, the plans delivered by the municipalities were brought together in one document: the *Uitvoeringsprogramma,* the implementation plan in 2007. The total costs of the project were estimated at 550 million euros.

Hence, the process of programming conducted at the level of the envelopes, where one crucial question dominated the debate between the actors: which actors would pay for the projects and how are the costs and benefits distributed. Essential that the ministries or provinces did not initiate a new financial program for the NDW project, and that funding for the project was generated form already existing programs. In the financial agreement in 2008, provinces and ministries agreed to dispose both 69 million euros which they reserved from already existing spatial, recreational, cultural and infrastructural programs. This meant that for every local project, municipalities and provinces had to apply for steams of money which were controlled by the provinces and ministries.

The phase of programming led interestingly in some envelopes to conflicts between the regional and local level. Some municipalities did not concede the relevance of the NDW project and disliked the guidelines and regulations executed by the national and regional actors. A number of municipalities had opposing preferences and priorities, for instance, one municipality had elaborated plans for a transport district in areas considered open space regarding the visionary document. Or, in the eyes of the Steering Committee, another municipality disrupted the historical value of the NDW with plans for a new residential area. Eventually, implementation of the plan was in some municipalities difficult, because some civil servants operating at the regional level had difficulty activating municipalities and designing plans that met the requirements of the management office and the visionary document.

**Discussion**

In the case of the NDW mobilising and programming activities are separated and sequentially executed. The management office recognized the importance of aligning the perceptions of actors and started with mobilising activities, creating an overarching visionary plan which was supported by the public and national, regional, and local authorities. A convincing story based on the historical legacy of the project combined with inspiring opportunities was used to mobilise the public. Eventually this process led to the determination

of a visionary plan that could be characterised as abstract, indefinite, and most importantly, lacked an agreement about the distribution of resources. The mobilising effect of this process was of great importance because national and provincial politicians could link the vision directly to their political agendas. Finally this resulted in an agreement amongst the national and provincial politicians to promise a financial effort. Although mobilisation appeared to be successfully carried out because the goal (reframing perceptions) was accomplished, the process of mobilisation was not sufficiently conducted regarding two shortcomings.

First, mobilisation was only partly been realized. The starting point of the mobilisation process was activation of actors and exchanging perceptions about the project and the opportunities. Nevertheless, an important step was neglected; the project started with an already clear track for solutions while the necessity of the project was never questioned. Moreover, the attendants of the discussions did not had the ability to challenge the direction of the project or to connect local problems to the already determined direction.

Second, mobilising activities were strongly attached to the determination of the visionary document resulting in a temporal mobilisation of local and regional actors. The interests and preferences of local actors were absorbed in this visionary document but were of significantly less important for the planners in the subsequent process. Although the visionary plan *Panorama Krayenhoff* was a product of mobilising process, the implementation of the plan was eventually hindered by local resistance. After determination of *Panorama,* the main question was how much the project would cost and how the cost would be distributed (programming). Therefore, the project management was strongly focussed on reaching an agreement amongst politicians which controlled the resources. This led to significant less attention for local actors in the period 2003-2008. The local actors were only mobilised one single time, during the design of *Panorama,* but when after all implementation of the plan was at stake, new local actors and politicians were in charge which were not mobilised at all.

Thus, the local actors were only mobilised one single time instead of constantly. The created support was translated in *Panorama Krayenhoff,* which turned into a static document, a fossil that slowly lost its support. During the programming activities, local actors experienced *Panorama Krayenhoff* as top-down planning tool, forced by actors of the provincial and national level. *Panorama* was based on the political agendas of 2003-2004, but because the visionary document was determined and was never discussed again, subsequent local politicians were not able to modify the visionary plan according to current political agendas. Although the planners thought that mobilising activities were successfully finished with the determination of *Panorama Krayenhoff,* they created their own resistance by isolating the local partners for a reasonable period of time and closing the discussion for the principles which were captured in the visionary document.

Although *Panorama Krayenhoff* mobilised many actor, the step towards programming remained large. With sequential addressing mobilisation and programming for this long term project, both activities became disconnected leading to resistance concerning the implementation of the project. As a result of mobilising activities, difficult decisions regarding financial and political commitment were moved forward leading to scepticism about the implementation and feasibility of the project. To bridge the gap between mobilising and programming activities, the actors conducted two measures. First, short term projects or *Quick Wins* were implemented, to convince the politicians that the project was effective.

Second, at the regional level *envelopes* were installed, which formed the nexus between the abstract national level and the concrete local reality.

**Conclusion**

In the NDW project a range of different actors were able to reach collective action in the dynamic area in between cities. The long term project started in 1999 and in 20011, 22 % of the programmed projects were implemented and 32 % was under construction. At the beginning of the twenties, the NDW project matched perfectly in the agenda of politicians to improve the quality and identity of space. However, for reaching collective action two important activities had to be applied: mobilisation and programming. Mobilisation was important for activating the many actors involved in this project and aligning their perspectives. Remarkable was that during the mobilisation in 2000-2003, the discussion was never focused on the direction or necessity of the project. The planners did not open the discussion and take a vulnerable position to reflect on the necessity of the project, or organized the debate concerning the direction of the path that was already chosen. In this perspective, "Joint Production" as Scharpf (1997) defines it, was never accomplished. In the NDW case, programming was of main importance to reach an agreement concerning the final implementation and the distribution of costs and benefits. The examination of the NDW case answers three theoretically grounded hypotheses.

First, theoretical background suggests that mobilising and programming activities leads to distinctive types of plans. The empirical study confirms this assumption: *Panorama Krayenhoff* was the result of a mobilising process and can, in line with the theory, be characterized as abstract, visionary, and lacks clear measures and implications (Albrechts 2004, Van den Broeck 2004). The *Uitvoeringsprogramma*, or implementation plan was the result of a programming activity and is way more clear about the final result and includes agreements about the distribution of resources and responsibilities (De Vries 2008). In practice it remains difficult to connect both plans in a proper way and when programming is conducted; the abstract norms in visionary documents can be interpreted differently, which leads to conflicts between actors forming a serious threat for implementation.

Second, mobilising and programming activities are separated and sequentially addressed in the plan making process. This practice is underpinned by Scharpf (1997) who advocates a procedural separation of both types on theoretical grounds (Scharpf 1997: 135). The *Quick Wins*, projects which were implemented quickly in the process to show the effectiveness of the program, would be supported by the theory of Albrechts (2004), who supports a constant leapfrog between mobilising and programming activities. However, although mobilising and programming was quite resolutely separated, the *Quick Wins* turned out to be not sufficient for bridging the gap: eventually the separation caused resistance of local actors. There was significantly less attention for local actors during the period 2003-2007, when there was a gap between mobilising and programming activities. In this way, some local partners saw the NDW as a top down forced project which eventually resulted in resistance and conflicts.

Third, programming and mobilising activities were carried out in a different institutional setting which exposed different modes of interaction amongst the actors. Scharpf (1997) distinguishes the process of 'arguing' and 'bargaining', which can be linked to both

mobilising and programming activities. To mobilise actors, the planners used a strong story, based on the rich history of the project and powerful imaginations of opportunities. Eventually this led to commitment of regional and national politicians who promised financial support. The most conflicts in the NDW case occurred when actors had to talk about the distribution of costs and benefits. Here, as in line with the theory, the actors acted strategically, marked their positions and kept their cards close to their chest.

The case study of the NDW showed that in the area in between cities projects are initiated which aim to improve the quality and identity of space. A multi sectoral project like the NDW is an opportunity to intertwine different interests and translate them in coherent plans for this dynamic region. However, to reach collective action, mobilising and programming activities are required but are difficult to execute because they entail opposing modes of interaction.

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**Map 1: The New Dutch Waterline**


**(Source: Management Office New Dutch Waterline)**