

ACTUALLY VARYING NEOLIBERALISM IN A GLOBAL ZONE:
DEVELOPMENT PHASES IN SYDNEY S DARLING HARBOUR

Glen Searle

University of Queensland, g.searle@uq.edu.au

Key words: neoliberal urbanisation; neoliberal policy path dependence; neoliberalism

Abstract

This paper traces the successive phases of the redevelopment of the Darling Harbour area as a central focus of the city's transformation into a global city since the 1980s. The paper is to identify the different versions of neoliberalism employed in each phase, the institutional and politico-economic factors that have generated varying versions in the same zone. The paper takes the premise of Peck, Theodore and Brenner (2000) that neoliberalism in practice is an imperfect vehicle that has to accommodate existing institutions and political structures as a starting point. The distinctive contradictions demonstrate how neoliberal outcomes in a given area draw selectively on such conditions consequentially to show how the place-specific practices of neoliberalism can vary over time as different factors are drawn on at different times according to micro-political and changing development objectives. The paper analyses four stages of redevelopment of the Darling Harbour area, using primary and secondary sources, to develop its argument: the Darling Harbour Authority scheme of the 1980s; the City West Development Corporation redevelopment of the western area in the 1990s; the post-2000 redevelopment of remaining old port land by the Barangaroo Delivery Authority; and the current redevelopment of convention and entertainment centre land by the private Lend Lease Corporation.

1. Introduction

This paper traces the successive phases of the redevelopment of the Darling Harbour area as a central focus of the city's transformation into a global city since the 1980s. The paper is to identify the different versions of neoliberalism employed in each phase, the institutional and politico-economic factors that have generated varying versions in the same zone. As part of this objective, the paper uses this analysis to assess the evolution of neoliberal policies in Darling Harbour and indicates some of the basic contradictions (2009) about the nature of neoliberal urbanisation including the role of local conditions and the potentially contradictory notion of policy congruence.

The paper analyses four stages of redevelopment of the Darling Harbour area, using primary and secondary sources, to develop its argument: the Darling Harbour Authority scheme of the 1980s; the City West Development Corporation redevelopment of the western area in the 1990s; the post-2000 redevelopment of remaining old port land by the Barangaroo Delivery Authority; and the current redevelopment of convention and entertainment centre land by the private Lend Lease Corporation.

2. Neoliberalism and urban development

Neoliberal policies underlying contemporary urban development took root in the 1980s when entrepreneurialism became the leitmotif of urban governance (Harvey, 1989). Nevertheless, urban policies cannot be seen as a hegemonic, unvarying entity applied unvaryingly

cities (Connell and Dados, 2014). Instead, Brenner and Theodore (2002) have argued that urban policies are contextually embedded through their production within legacies of institutional frameworks, policy regimes, regulatory practices, and political struggles. They view the resulting process and outcomes as actually existing neoliberalism. This means that these narratives have a disconnect with micro-level accounts of local urban policies and processes (al, 2014). Paradoxically, as Jessop (2002) notes, there might be an increase in neoliberalism. Thus there is a combination of rollback neoliberalism of oppositional forms and rollout neoliberalism of new modes of regulation and new forms of state intervention (Peck and Tickell, 2002). Peck et al (2009, p.52) see these processes as operating as error experimentation, more often than not under a situation of crisis that can have dysfunctional consequences.

Given the locally and transiently embedded nature of urban neoliberal policies, whether it is possible to discern underlying influences and communalities in such a way which we can make connections between neoliberalist policies in one city and policy in another or indeed between policies over time in a given city, and thus gain deeper understanding of the process (2009, p.61) have produced a table that summarizes key features of mechanisms of neoliberal urbanism. The key outcomes of rollout mechanisms they list are a checklist that has been used in comparative analysis, and that describes significant aspects of the case study in which the outcomes include:

- Creation of mega projects to attract corporate investment (in Darling Harbour, Sydney, phases 1,3 and 4)
- Creation of privatised spaces of elite/corporate consumption (casinos in Las Vegas, convention and exhibition centres in phases 1 and 4)
- Rolling forward of the gentrification frontier and the intensification of urban polarization (high income apartments in phases 2, 3 and 4)
- Adoption of principles of highest and best use as the basis for major land use decisions (phases 2, 3 and 4)
- Imposition of decontextualized best practice models derived from extra-jurisdictional examples (phase 1)

However, the re-organisation of regulations and institutional structures that produce these outcomes do not have a similar checklist. Such re-organisation must be contextually generated and will thus be the product of that context and less amenable to comparative analysis (2014) argues that the current urban governance environment of starved resources and low returns is producing policy imitation rather than innovation. Peck et al (2009) hold a similar view, that neoliberalism was producing heightened congruence and increased momentum of reforms. Jones and Ward (2002) reach a similar conclusion drawing on Offe's (1984) conceptualisation that there has been a crisis of rationality, an objective inability to reform the socio-economic system, and that this has generated unintended consequences through the contradictions of accumulation producing a crisis of crisis management (Jones and Ward, 133). Jones and Ward (2002, p.134) suggest that one implication of this schema is that policy repertoires become exhausted, with old policies being recycled and new ones borrowed from elsewhere via speeded up policy transfer. But the notion of policy congruence remains in contradiction of Peck et al's emphasis on the path-dependent nature of neoliberal urbanism which locally contextual paths are surely dominant. The importance of the latter changes responding to crises is emphasised by Jessop (1990), with changes selected for their effectiveness, which in turn depends on path-dependent specific structures of opportunity (1990; Gualini 2006, pp.886-887).

A central purpose of this paper is to take up this issue of emerging policy congruence to the extent to which the four phases of neoliberal policies in Darling Harbour have become more congruent over time between themselves and/or with wider neoliberal tendencies. This paper is to explore the micro-politics of policy in each phase to help understand the evolution of neoliberal policies over time in Darling Harbour. The following sections describe the four phases of Darling Harbour's redevelopment, and are followed by an overview of the findings. They help to answer the paper's central questions.

3. Phase 1: Darling Harbour Authority (1984)

Darling Harbour has been a port area since the early days of the city. The congestion of the port to the south at Botany Bay in the late 1970s, to relieve congestion in port activities generally, caused an extensive area of land at the southern end of Darling Harbour to be set aside for redevelopment. By 1983 a government study had identified preferred development options: an educational-entertainment park, Chinese garden, major residential complex, foreshore, and maritime museum (Young 1988, p.193). In 1984 the New South Wales (NSW) state Premier announced that Darling Harbour would be developed as the state's major contribution to the Australian bicentennial program for 1988. This came as NSW was emerging from its recession in fifty years. The project would be part of a Keynesian program of major works including motorways and rail lines to stimulate the economy. The Darling Harbour development was firmly oriented at capturing more of the already expanding global tourism numbers. It was one of three economic development foci of the Premier. The project would have major convention buildings, a harbourside market and a hotel along the foreshore, as well as a Chinese garden and maritime museum. A casino would be developed, with the state licence expected to recoup much of the project's development costs.

With a deadline of only three and a half years to demolish and rebuild over 50 hectares of land, a strongly pro-development institutional framework was established. In September 1984 the Darling Harbour Authority (DHA) was set up by an Act of state parliament (Table 1). The Authority's board contained appointees of the government, including several from the private sector. The Authority itself had sweeping powers, able to make its own planning controls and to amend the state planning act (the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act) and outside that it proceeded to produce its own development strategy by the end of 1984. The design and construction responsibilities of the Authority were given to private companies which reported to the Authority's executive. A Quality Review Committee was appointed to monitor the quality of the development process (Young 1988, p.195).

Table 1. Institutional arrangements in each phase of Darling Harbour redevelopment

| | |
|------------------------------------|---|
| Phase 1: Darling Harbour Authority | New development corporation under new legislation with full planning powers |
| Phase 2: Pyrmont-Ultimo | New development corporation under existing legislation with limited development control powers State government development controls Owners/lessees of large sites with right to make own master plans Federal government infrastructure funding |
| Phase 3: Barangaroo | State sponsored master plan guides development |

| | |
|--------------------------------|--|
| | <p>New state delivery authority Development bidding process with winner paying state for right to build offices & other uses under concept p parameters</p> |
| Phase 4: South Darling Harbour | <p>Redevelopment managed by Infrastructure NSW Development bidding process for construction of new convention and exhibition centre in PPP with government Winner of bid to pay for right to other development under urban design guidelines set by government No public master plan</p> |

The DHA was an example of UK-inspired path dependency. Its inspiration was the Docklands Development Corporation, recently established. The LDDC had similar planning and development, and had a similar goal of revalorising obsolete public end, Darling Harbour was not the electoral success that the government had hoped design was criticised by leading commentators such as Deyan Sujic (1992): the te Rouse-led redevelopment of Baltimore s waterfront, and Rouse himself was employe in early planning stages by the DHA. The promised people mover became a priva that required special state legislation because of major public and city council destructive visual impact at the city end. The first licence for the casino was operators were suspected of mob connections in the US, and a casino was not built (Searle and Bounds 1999).

4. Phase 2: Pyrmont-Ultimo (1992)

The redevelopment of the Pyrmont-Ultimo peninsula to the west of Darling Harbour under the City West Development Corporation which was established for that purpose (Byrne 2002; Searle 2005). This had its genesis in 1988, when the Central Sydney the peninsula s development potential. The new Liberal-National State government potential for several reasons. Pyrmont contained a number of major government s soon were to) become surplus, and redevelopment of these sites could generate fu state debt which soon emerged as a major ideological concern for the government. surplus government sites (especially port areas after the construction of Port B increasingly obsolete industrial sites on the peninsula such as the wool stores, help the government s main urban policy, urban consolidation, promulgated princi infrastructure costs arising from a welfare state fiscal crisis. It would also boom-time pressure on central city office accommodation.

Accordingly the government prepared a City West regional strategy for the penins west areas with large surplus government land holdings. A draft City West Regio Plan (REP) to provide for a large increase in population and jobs was exhibited adopted (gazetted) in 1992 (Table 1). The population would increase to 16 500 (in 1986), and employment would increase from 14 000 to 54 000, complementing CBD The strategy became financially feasible when the Commonwealth government signed agreement with the State government to provide it with \$117m of Building Better funds for redevelopment. An Urban Development Plan (UDP) containing development Pyrmont and Ultimo was produced by the government in 1993.

To fast track development in Pyrmont-Ultimo, the REP contained several key measures: the area for redevelopment, bypassing local council powers to do this under the Planning and Assessment Act (EPA Act). In addition, it laid down the development council or the Minister for Planning was required to consider before allowing development under the REP, the UDP would replace the standard local government development control under the EPA Act. Finally, the REP contained a new planning instrument, Master Plans, applicable to key sites in Pyrmont-Ultimo mainly located on the waterfront, and preferred type of development. The Minister for Planning would approve development in these areas, thus eliminating developer concerns about local government approval. The Master Plans to be prepared by site owners or lessees, which delivered a high degree of control to owners and developers. The largest master plan site was an old sugar mill site bought by major developer Lend Lease prior to promulgation of the REP. With the Lease produced a master plan that allowed development well above the limits set for the area it increased allowable development from a single 21storey tower to four towers that was 30 storeys, to maximise profits from providing harbour views (Searle and Searle 2005). These and other apartment blocks would be sold to incoming professionals, driving up the population out as rents rose.

Accompanying the new plans and planning procedures for Pyrmont-Ultimo was a new City West Development Corporation. This did not require new legislation that might have been difficult for the government to pass in a now hung parliament: instead, the corporation was set up under the provisions of the 1970s Growth Centres Act that was intended to encourage development in cities beyond the metropolitan area. The Corporation became the development agent for the peninsula. It would administer development of the government sites and the coordinate major infrastructure, as well as be responsible for the general implementation of the plans. This included responsibility for public participation programs, which were largely perfunctory and increasingly biased over time.

Community opposition to the government's plans for the peninsula steadily grew. It continued apace, with few concessions to local concerns. In sum, the Development Corporation was the central agency in achieving fast track development on the peninsula, making use of by-passed normal planning processes, and paying scant regard to the community's existing distinctive working class character of the area.

5. Phase 3: Barangaroo 2005

The Barangaroo project has involved the redevelopment of the last shipping wharf and dockside land in Darling Harbour, totalling 22 ha, located north-east of the Darling Harbour Authority's area. Value capture from development of the southern part of the site was necessary infrastructure and construction of a large harbourside park across the site. The initiative responded to a crisis in the form of a downturn in the local construction sector, in the years immediately following the 2000 Olympic Games (Searle 2013). The state government saw redevelopment of the site as a major office precinct construction in the short term and enhancing longer term economic development by Sydney's role as a global financial services hub in the Asia Pacific region (Barangaroo Authority 2010a). Following the success of the Olympic Games delivery authority projects of the Olympics delivered to a tight time schedule, another version, the Barangaroo Authority, was set up to ensure timely and efficient development of the site.

An international design competition for the site was held in 2005. The government set space levels and a condition for half the site to be public parkland (Headland consortium won the competition). The winning entry generated a concept plan that the government in early 2007, using new Part 3A powers under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act whereby the Minister could approve major projects and bypass the usual process (Table 1). The land was rezoned by the government in late 2007. The maximum floor space that would be approved was set at 388,000sm. Development rights and a 99 year lease were granted to Lend Lease, in return for providing waterfront plaza infrastructure and funding for Headland Park, building a pedestrian tunnel from the nearest rail station, and a new cruise terminal, at a total cost of \$A521m (Barangaroo Delivery Authority 2010b).

Almost immediately the concept plan became deeply contested. Lend Lease lobbied for an extra 120,000sm of floor space. The state's planning system allowed developers to apply for extra space after approval of initial project parameters at the Master Plan stage, and the process was being played out again by the same developer. Then the design excellence review by former Prime Minister Paul Keating, altered the concept plan to reinstate a more natural physical form that would be more akin to the landscape as it was in the early eighteenth century. The extra costs of \$A150m required to construct public elements (Lenaghan, 2010) were traded off against increased maximum heights for office towers. Accordingly, Lend Lease applied in 2010 to increase office space by another 60,000sm and the height of the towers to a maximum of 209m which would create valuable new views.

Much of the extra floor space was allocated to a new high rise hotel that would be jutting out into the harbour. There was intense opposition from at least three community groups who saw the iconic status of the harbour as being under threat (Searle, 2013). In response, the government approved a reduction in the office towers from four to three but keeping the total floor space the same and reduced the hotel height to a still considerable 170m, and reduced the length of the pier. The revised plan prompted a community petition to Parliament against it with 11,000 signatures. The Liberal-National state government, elected in March 2011, bowed to this opposition and rejected the hotel and pier proposal. Nevertheless, the demands by Lend Lease after 2007 to increase floor space had led by early 2015 to a total approved floor space that was 70 per cent greater than the original concept plan (Ruehl, 2015).

Following this, an unsolicited proposal for a casino for international players, with luxury accommodation, was put to the government by Sydney mogul James Packer. It would be on a site designated for foreshore parkland in the concept plan. This would require a new licence to be awarded after the expiration of the competition-free period that went with the original licence in the 1990s for the Star City casino on the other side of Darling Harbour. Packer was invited to submit an alternative casino expansion plan, but was unsuccessful in his bid, the company winning the right to the new licence. The Packer bid came with a full development plan involving an iconic building prepared by a leading UK architect that would be a landmark building (except for an observation tower). Most of the upper floors would be luxury apartments, the higher ones being able to see over the ridge at Observatory Hill to the panorama of the harbour, including the Opera House. The proposal is now with the government and it is doubtful that the state will require significant reductions given that it has a strong interest in principle, despite the City Council's opinion that the increase in public benefits outweighs the costs.

6. Phase 4: South Darling Harbour

The fourth and latest phase in Darling Harbour's redevelopment has involved the building of the 1980s Sydney Convention and Exhibition Centre (SCEC). To this has been added the redevelopment of remaining government land south of the original 1980s Darling Harbour construction area, including rebuilding of the state government's 10,000 seat Entertainment Centre that opened in 1983.

The initial stimulus was provided by private sector lobby groups, the Property Council of Australia and the Tourism and Transport Forum, which commissioned a study of deficiencies in the convention and exhibition industry capacity. The study, published in early 2007 (PCA-TTF 2007), concluded that SCEC capacity constraints were causing 40 events a year to be lost (worth \$A218m p.a.), and that expanded capacity would increase exhibit use by 16 to 32 per cent. The government then commissioned its own review, the O'Neill Report by the head of the Infrastructure NSW agency, published in early 2008. It supported the PCA-TTF report, finding that a lack of convention and exhibition space was costing Sydney's economy \$A477m a year (Hall, 2010), but that the expansion of facilities at Olympic Park in addition to expansion of the SCEC (City of Sydney, 2013a). The latter component was challenged by the Exhibition Organisers Coalition, who argued that the SCEC was relegated far from the city centre at Olympic Park (City of Sydney, 2013a). From 2009 the government requested the Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority, the successor to the Sydney Harbour Authority, to develop design proposals to rework and upgrade the existing SCEC for use as an entertainment centre. Master plan proposals were developed centering on expansion of the SCEC, but government commitment to expansion stalled.

However, Sydney's slowing economic growth, especially relative to its great rival Melbourne, has become a significant state political issue. Expansion of SCEC facilities was seen by the right-wing Liberal-National Coalition opposition, Barry O'Farrell, as an opportunistic initiative here. In March 2010, a year before the next election, he promised to support the private partnership development of a new convention and exhibition centre if he was elected (Hall, 2010). The infrastructure lobby group Infrastructure Partnerships Australia commissioned a pre-feasibility consultant study of a new centre that was presented to O'Farrell in March 2010 (Infrastructure Partnerships Australia, 2010). The consultant's report concluded that the Haymarket area was the best location for either new or expanded facilities due to the generation of significant revenues from higher levels of established foot traffic, and ability to integrate with the surrounding Darling Harbour including the CBD, major hotels and transport network. A new entertainment facility should be included for up to 10,000 people. The cost of redeveloping the SCEC and convention and exhibition facilities was estimated to be \$A630m. The Coalition went forward with proposals that were largely consistent with the IPA recommendations.

The Liberal-National Coalition won the state election in March 2011, and almost immediately announced that the size of the project would be increased by two-thirds, including the addition of a car park and the existing Entertainment Centre) in the monorail corridor. The SCEC where redevelopment potential would increase when the monorail was shown to be viable. This southern area – the Haymarket precinct – would be redeveloped for mixed use. The SCEC developer via a direct project agreement with the government involving a fee for land to develop, and not as a PPP (Table 1). This arrangement would also apply for a new development at the northern end. It is unclear why the winning developer of the SCEC was all but a *tabula rasa* for the southern redevelopment. But it is probably significant that the Infrastructure NSW agency, set up by the new government to recommend infrastructure projects, given responsibility for managing the redevelopment, was headed by Nick Greiner in a neo-liberal government ideology to the state when he became state Premier in

The SCEC requirements for redevelopment set out by Infrastructure NSW for bidding were specific in terms of size – principally an exhibition centre of 40,000sm, a convention centre to accommodate 10,000 people, a meeting room space of 8,000sm between the two centres, and a premium entertainment centre holding up to 8,000 people. Urban design guidelines were also set out. These covered reorientation, connectivity, activity, and open space in the public realm (Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority and Infrastructure NSW, c2012). These guidelines were in general, such as Building a place that invites tourists, visitors and locals to visit. Some were a little more specific such as requiring new east-west and north-south connections and a reduction of open space. These requirements allowed bid consortia considerable freedom in planning and design, especially in the Haymarket precinct where building size and form were very much developer-determined. This resulted in a virtually privatised planning process where a successful bid was selected mainly on financial criteria and to some extent the quality of the new convention and exhibition facilities.

The winning consortium was headed by Lend Lease, who thus had carriage of another stage of Darling Harbour redevelopment. The consortium's proposed development was a joint venture of professionals and the City Council (which was excluded from the planning process and designated as a state significant project). The demolition of the existing exhibition centre, which won a Sulman Medal, the highest award in Australian architecture, was criticized for its scale and relocation to serve unmet state needs was proposed as a priority (City of Sydney, 2013). ICOMOS considered that the scale of the redeveloped SCEC would overwhelm the surrounding century historic buildings and significantly compromise and reduce the harbour setting (ICOMOS International Scientific Committee Heritage, 2013). The consortium's proposals for Haymarket found some support from the City Council, in particular the provision of new connections as per the urban design brief, but were criticized for over-densification. A number of critiques of previous Lend Lease developments in Darling Harbour:

There is one too many residential towers that block views and generate overshadowing. The towers and cores have no setbacks from the street alignment to ameliorate wind downdraft. The height of housing is too high in its context and overshadows the Powerhouse Museum foreground (City of Sydney, 2013b)

More generally, professionals were critical of the covert non-public planning process. A Sydney University architecture professor said that a separate master plan should have been developed taking public opinion into account. Instead, the government had wrapped the master plan in the tender process (Hasham and McKenny, 2012).

7. Overview and conclusion

The Darling Harbour case studies support several key contentions made by leading commentators about the nature of contemporary neoliberal processes in city development. The rationale for a new round of neoliberal projects usually has a context of crisis. In the cases above, these include the perceived need for major projects/redevelopment in response to economic growth (phases 1 and 3), a state fiscal crisis (phase 2), and a competitive crisis in the creative sector (phase 4). The contention that neoliberal responses are path dependent on previous development finds support. The development corporation structure used in phase 2 derived from the model enacted for a very different kind of development, which was required because of the economic situation of the time. The delivery authority used in phase 3 probably owes much to the similar authority used for the Olympic Games. There is probably an element of path

involvement of Lend Lease as the major developer in phases 2, 3 and 4, although knowledge about linkages between its successes.

On the other hand, there is also ample evidence of using approaches and solutions common internationally. The use of a UK-style development corporation to produce development in phase 1 is the standout here. The output mix of convention and ex-casinos and up-market high rise apartments is a standard one in global terms. But neoliberal processes and outcomes in Darling Harbour does not point to policy coherence. The first phase was the most derivative of international policy practice and, arguably, its framing of development behind the deeply contextualised Headland Park is the fourth phase essentially revisits outcomes from the first phase and updates them locally path dependent. Finally, the way in which Lend Lease is paying for the roads and apartments in the last two phases and was or has been given the power to make plans in phases 2 and 4 (with fewer constraints in the latter) suggests that the policies are becoming less harshly pro-market (Peck et al, 2009) is dubious in this context.

Acknowledgement

The author acknowledges his gratitude for the assistance of Professor James Weir in the preparation of this paper.

References

- Barangaroo Delivery Authority, 2010a. Barangaroo Newsletter, August.
- Barangaroo Delivery Authority, 2010b. GIPAA Supplementary information report. Sydney: Barangaroo Delivery Authority.
- Blanco, I., Griggs, S and Sullivan, H., 2014. Situating the local in the neoliberal transformation of urban governance. *Urban Studies*, 51(15), pp. 3129–3146.
- Brenner, N. and Theodore, N., 2002. Cities and the geographies of actually existing capitalism. *Antipode*, 34(3), pp. 349–379.
- City of Sydney, 2013a. SICEEP public private partnership DA SSD 13_5752. Submission to NSW Department of Planning and Infrastructure 22 May. Sydney: Sydney City Council.
- City of Sydney, 2013b. SICEEP concept plan SSD 13_5878 Southern Precinct The Hay Submission to NSW Department of Planning and Infrastructure 20 May. Sydney: Sydney City Council.
- Connell, R. and Dados, N., 2014. Where in the world does neoliberalism come from? *Urban Studies*, 43(2), pp. 117–138.
- Davies, A., 2015. Modified plan for casino of no public benefit, says city. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 4 May, pp. 4–5.
- Hall, L., 2010. Convention centre backed. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 3 March.
- Harvey, D., 1989. From managerialism to entrepreneurialism: the transformation of urban space in late capitalism. *Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human Geography*, 71(1), pp. 3–17.
- Hasham, N. and McKenny, L., 2012. Former minister blasts Darling Harbour revamp. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 13 December.
- HVS International, 2007. Revitalising the convention & exhibition industry in Sydney. Sydney: Property Council of Australia and Tourism and Transport Forum.
- ICOMOS International Scientific Committee on Heritage, 2013. Darling Harbour a plan for people. *ISC20C Heritage Alert Template*, 9 May.
- Infrastructure Partnerships Australia, 2010. Towards a new convention & exhibition industry. New South Wales: report to the Leader of the NSW Opposition. Sydney: IPA.
- Jessop, B., 1990. Regulation theories in retrospect and prospect. *Economy and Society*, 9(3), pp. 333–356.

- Jessop, B., 2002. Liberalism, neoliberalism, and urban governance: a state- theor Antipode, 34(3), pp. 452-472.
- Jones, M. and Ward, K., 2002. Excavating the logic of British urban policy: Neoliberalism of crisis-management . In N. Brennan and N. Theodore, eds. Spaces of neoliberalism Malden MA, pp. 126-147.
- Lenaghan,, N., 2010. Barangaroo detailed. Australian Financial Review, 12 November
- Offe ,C., 1984. Contradictions of the welfare state. London: Hutchinson.
- Peck, J., 2014. Entrepreneurial urbanism: between uncommon sense and dull compulsion. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 104(4), pp. 396-401.
- Peck, J. and Tickell, A., 2002. Neoliberalizing space. Antipode, 34(3), pp. 380-401.
- Peck, J., Theodore, N. and Brenner, N., 2009. Neoliberal urbanism: models, moments and movements. Urban Studies, 46(1), pp. 49-66.
- Ruehl, M., 2015. Barangaroo set for gridlock. Australian Financial Review, 9 April
- Searle, G., 2005. Power and planning consent in Sydney s urban consolidation program. In G. Young and J. Hillier, eds. Consent and consensus: politics, media and governance in twenty-first century Australia . Perth: API Network, pp. 297-317.
- Searle, G 2013. Case study window discourse, doctrine and habitus: redevelopment and the Sydney harbor-edge. In G. Young and D. Stevenson, eds. The Ashgate research companion to urban planning and culture. Farnham Surrey and Burlington VT: Ashgate, pp. 135-150.
- Searle, G and Bounds, M., 1999. State powers, state land and competition for global capital: the case of Sydney. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 23(1), pp. 1-15.
- Searle, G. and Byrne, J., 2002. Selective memories, sanitised futures: constructing a new place in Sydney. Urban Policy and Research, 20(1), pp. 7-25.
- Sudjic, D., 1992. The 100 mile city. London: Andrø Deutsch.
- Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority and Infrastructure NSW, c2012. Community information briefing. Available at http://www.sfolk.com/_clients/insw/120031_CCPanels_120523_Screen_lr.pdf [Accessed 13 May, 2015].
- Weirick, J., 2013. Sydney international convention, exhibition & entertainment precinct concept proposals SSD 5752-2012 & 5878-2013. Submission to the NSW Department of Infrastructure, 10 May 2013 (unpublished).
- Young, B., 1988. Darling Harbour: a new city precinct. In P. Webber, ed. The design of Sydney: decades of change in the city centre. Sydney: Law Book Company, pp. 191-213.